The Dominion TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1918. THE OUTLOOK ON THE WEST FRONT

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 183, 23 April 1918, Page 4

The Dominion TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1918. THE OUTLOOK ON THE WEST FRONT

Though the present lull in the Western campaign is undoubtedly temporary and is likely_ to be of brief duration, it definitely bears witness to the success with which tho Allies have thus far resisted the German offensive. Germany has nothing to gain and much to lose by calling a halt at this stage, and it is not for a moment to be supposed that she has done so willingly. Tho .development of the offensive, both in the Sommo area, and, latterly, in Northern France and Flanders, has made it plain that the enemy's initial plan was, as has been stated in an official dispatch, to smother the British lines and shatter the whole of tho Entente resistance by an impetuous rush of highly-trained troops. This plan at least has collapsed, with tho German legions still a long way short of success. Some signs of failing vigour and of inability to continue the impetuous rush which he had hoped would carry him to victory appeared in the enemy's tactics when he reached the front he still holds on the approaches to Amiens. With a great prize almost in reach he was brought to a standstill largely as a result of steadily developing Allied pressure on either flank of his advance. The enemy's northern attacks, which followed swiftly, were at first described as a diversion, but if that estimate was ever valid it has been very plainly superseded by tllie course of events. The Germans unquestionably threw all possible weight into their effort to break through the northern front and reach the coast of France, and it is by tho magnitude of their effort and of the- sacrifices it entailed that wo must measure the significance of the present halt. There is an evident distinction to bo drawn between tho enemy's first check on' the approaches to Amiens and his late defeafc_ in the Lys salient. On the earlier occasion an offensivo drive had been carried almost, if not <]uite, to its practicable limits, and the hardening resistance of tho Allies_ was only one of tho factors which tended to compel a halt. It contributed potently to the same wd that tho enemy's attacking divisions had been thrown forward in advance of artillery support and that the wide tract, of devastated country behind them made an efficient supply service for tho time being impossible. Tho conditions ruling in the northern battle were widely different. At their maximum advance the Germans had covered only about a quarter of tho distance traversed in their southern drive, and they have vastly better communications behind them in t.he Lys salient than in the Sonnne battle-area. Indeed, their most desperate onslaughts in the latest phase of tho battle were made in the near neighbourhood of tho front on which the offensive opened. They wore well placed to concentrate all availablo men and guns for their attacks upon t.he defences flanking tho salient they have driven into the British line' and availed themselves of the opportunity to the fullest possible extent. Their effort to smash these defences and widen out the Lys salient ranks as one of the most formidable they

have, made in the whole course of the offensive. That they were squarely and solidly beaten in such an effort, made in such conditions, and have, little more to show for it than an appalling harvest of dead ami wounded men, can ho taken lo mean nothing else than that their general prospects of success are waning, and that the prospects of tho Allies in the greatest defensive battle of all time have notably brightened. The position meantime, is that the enemy has suffered a staggering setback at <i critical stage of his offensive and at. a moment when he was faced by a sup ionic necessity of'' building upon his firfjfc - success. »

This, of course, does not cover all 1 the ground. Against the slaughter j ot an enormous number of his best troops the enemy is able to set the fact that ho has iu. two distinct areas closely approached the vital communications behind the Allied line. The renewed enemy onslaughts which must- be expected in tho near future will of necessity create an tense and critical situation. But it nevertheless holds good that there is much in the conditions now reached to warrant a, confident outlook. The enemy may attempt to resume his southern drive, hut he is still handicapped in that area by transport difficulties which will not speedily be overcome, and hero as elsewhere the Allies have had time to reorganise and concert their measures of defence. The enemy's late experience in the northern battle-area makes it abundantly clear that'if he .attempts a further advance in that region he must, bo prepared to pay a terrible price. /The Allies have fared vastly better in the secorid great battle of the offensive than in the first, and, largely as a r.esult of the magnificent defensive stand on the heights flanking the Lys salient, conditions have been created which give them good prospects of methodically husbanding their strength as the battle continues and expediting that .exhaustion of the enemy's reserves which ultimately will bring tho opportunity of striking for victory. On the much-discussed question of relative numerical strength information at present is somewhat conflicting, but there is little doubt that tho Allies are capable, as time goes on," of throwing greater reinforcements into tho scale than the enemy can obtain by drawing upon his remaining cli-' visions in Russia or any other source of supply. That the Allies have employed thus far a smaller proportion of their total strength than the enemyand havo reserves of better quality to draw, upon is not in question, and this is all the more important since the frightful losses Germany has suffered during the last month have fallenchieflynpon her best remaining _ divisions—the storm-troops organised and massed, as it was fondly hoped, for a swift and overwhelming drive to the coast. To broaden the outlook and take account of such factors as the pronounced and developing superiority enjoyed by the Allies in aerial force is to perceive other grounds of confidence in addition to those which the past course and present aspect of the campaign afford.