PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 168, 5 April 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

_ A comparative lull still obtains in France, but it remains as likely as ever that the battle- may speedily be resumed in all its former violence. Tho situation reached is reviewed to-day by the British "high military authority." He observes, amongst other things, that the enemy, having broken through the British prepared positions, may think he can now repeat the performance against improvised ones. While the position ig certainly likely to present itself to the Germans in this light, the balance of advantage, as the official commentator suggests in his reference to readjustments and in other parts of his survey, does not incline as much in their favour as the movement of the Allied armies from prepared to improvised positions might suggest. Continuing his drive to Amiens the enemy would be commanding]}' placed on a range of railways that must be regarded as vital to the Allies_ in spite of all that they have done in the way of new construction behind their front. Advancing still further and reaching the coast, tho enemy would not only detach several British armies from tho rest of the Allied forces, but would be advantageously placed to attack these detached armies in flank and rear. At tho same time ho would heavily accentuate the Allied problems of sea and land communications, and would gain greatly increased scope for the development of his submarine campaign. These issues are at stake, but the enemy meantime is thirteen miles distant from Amiens at his nearest approach, and more than fifty miles distant from the coast.

The fact that any considerable extension of the enemy advance would lay them open to very serious dangers is no doubt likely to materially influence the policy of the Allies in the immediate future. So, too, is another fact mentioned by the "high military authority." He points out that the Germans are now grappling with serious problems of supply. On a great part of the battlefront they arc fighting a long way ahead of their prepared and organised communications, and the creation of a really efficient transport organisation in the intermediate area should bo a matter rather of months than of days or weeks. The existing state of the eueiny'.j communications in the battle area seems, to supply the Allies with a very strong motive for launching a counter-offensive before ho can Materially improve his position in this respect. At , the sumo time the fact that he is contending with serious transport difficulties on those parts of the front where ho has made.most headway lends colour to the opinion expressed in one message _ that the enemy's next big move will be a renewal of the attack on Arras and the Yiiny Ridge The experience of his first attack on this section of the British front is, from his point of view, anything but encouraging. On the other band, ho is here little ahead of the line on which the battle opened, and therefore has good communications extending right up to the fighting zone. ,

Information regarding the balance of fighting strength on the ' Western front is at many points incomplete, but some interesting estimates were cited by Mil. George Barnes, Labour representative- in the British War Cabinet, when he addressed trado union delegates recently on the man-power question. It will bo noticed from the excerpts given below that Mr. Barnes did not concur in the opinion expressed in a French official statement quoted yesterday that any reinforcements sent by Austria to the West front will consist mainly of artillery. "As far as it is possible to estimate the enemy situation," Me. Barnes stated, "it appears that the contending forces in Europe are about equal. In gun 'numbers, thanks to captures from .Russia and Italy, the German-Austrian combination is for the tirno superior, though in gun-power it may not be. In reserves available for use during 1918 the enemy position is believed to approximate to the following:— Germany. 1919 class: Youths at home 50,000 In depots 250,000 1920 class: Fit for fighting and reserve divisions 550,000 From Russia: 38 divisions entirely fit for fighting 500,000 42 divisions which can supply possibly 2000 men each 84,000 Austria-Hungary. 1920 class About 400,000 Other reserves 450,000 Bulgaria, All reserves About 120,000 Turkey. No reserves. "Taking all known reserves, it is probable that the Germanic Powers have fewer than two million available for 1918, and, as the Western front casualties were at least two million during 1917, the Germanic; reserves are probably insufficient to makq good the wastage this year if fighting proceeds with the intensity of last year. Taking the known reserves of the Entente Powers, including U.S.A., it is safe to reckon that (without the men yet to be recruited in Great Britain and including only such Americans as can reach Europe in time for the fighting) the Entente is in a better position at last than the Germanic Powers."

It will be noticed that Mr. Barnes says that tho Austro-Ger-raans are superior in gun-numbers but may not be superior in gunpower. This arises from the fact that in order to keep in action the numerous guns he has captured in Russia and Italy the enemy would have to reorganise his manufacture of ammunition, and also to make important adjustments in his supply organisation. As an English correspondent pointed out recently, apart from the fact that a certain proportion of the guns captured by the enemy have been damaged be-f yond repair, the Germans will be much handicapped in using them by the diversity of their calibre and the need of different kinds of ammunition which they have not so far been making. "For instance," he adds, "the enemy have no ammunition for the 4.5 howitzers and some others taken from the Russians, or for the s : inch howitzers captured from the Italians. They will manufacture it, no doubt, but a complicated ammunition supply cannot be so adequately kept up as a uniform supply—for one thing, the transport difficulties are greater and confusion ensues. The enemy, in a limited attack of a day or two's duration, 'tfhen these extra guns are ready, and before the Allies' production has overtaken them, might outgun us, but in a longer battle they might as easily bo out-gunned by us in the end. And the guns of the Allies will have more uniformity."

There was evidence last week that eoincidently with his offensive in France, the enemy had made an unsparing effort to increase the destruction of shipping by submarine attack. This week's figures show a heavy reduction in sinkings—six ships over and seven under 1600 tons being sent to the bottom, as against 16 and 12 respectively last week. Sudden fluctuations of this character can never be accepted as an absolutely reliable indication of the trend of the underwater campaign. But in view of the enemy's extreme anxiety at tho'present time to make maximum use of all his forces it is not at all unlikely that this pronounced drop in'. losses affords reliable evidences of his inability to maintain a sustained effort with his submarines, or to materially improve upon his normal achievement in sinking merchantmen without incurring more than proportionate losses of submarines.