The Dominion. MONDAY, APRIL 1, 1918. THE UNITY OF ARMIES

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 164, 1 April 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, APRIL 1, 1918. THE UNITY OF ARMIES

■ A feature of tlio German offensive which has gained increasing prominence, as the struggle has developed has been the endeavour of the enemy to strike with all the power he is able to gather at the point where the British and French forces join, somewhere between the Somme and the Oisc. There arc two reasons for this. The first is tho evident assumption of the German High Command that this junction, because it is a junction, is a weak spot; and the second is that a break through at this spot would give the German Array an opening which would not only enable it to separate the British and French forces, but would give it a dominating position in relation to tho lines of communication of the Allies' armies over a wide and vf&ally important area. From a very early stage of the war it has been recog'nised that the Allies havo fought at a disadvantage owing to tho fact that the armies of each, though working together harmoniously, have been under separate commanders without one supreme controlling head to ensure complete coordination of effort. Along the Western front in France, Belgian, French, and British troops have fought heroically under their separate commanders, and more recently Portuguese and American troops have taken up sections of the long line. Until February last, when the Versailles Conference agreed on the creation of a central authority with executive power to exercise direction over war policy, it had been found impossible to arrive at any satisfactory form of unified control of these fighting forces. Perhaps tho reason for this was to be discovered in tho fact that no specially outstanding and overshadowing personality had come to the forefront in the ranks of the Allied commanders, but no doubt the difficulty of arriving at an understanding by which tho supreme control of the whole of the Allied armies would bo placed in the hands of one man or one group of men was due to a natural disinclination on tho part of each of tho Allied Governments to place their indiyir dual armies unreservedly at the disposal of a commander outside their own authority and control. The French and American Governments are said to have favoured tho idea of a Generalissimo for some time past, but British authorities appear to have been reluctant, on political and other grounds, to lake, a step of this nature. Tho consequence has been that the best use has not always been made of the forces available to the Allies. Tho armies have been working unitedly in the sense that they have a common object, that each knows it is dependent on tho others, and that all must co-operate fully and freely; but the system did not make for free and rapid movement of forces regardless of their nationality to points where they might be of most service. Speedy decisions and speedy action in such circumstances wore not always possible even where agreement by the commanders concerned was easily reached; and yet at times a quick decision and prompt action might mean the difference between success or failure. Moreover, where arlnics under separate commanders, each acting as own judgment mi#ht determine, join forcee, thnre is liable to be a weak spot, and this fact no doubt was not without its influence on the German plans in tho present great offensive. The point of interest, howevor, at the moment is tho very import-

anfc announcement made in this morning's cable messages that the Allies have now decided to follow up the agreement arrived at in February last to appoint a Supreme Central Authority to exercise direction over war policy by going a step further and appointing a Generalissimo, who presumably ( will cxerciso supreme command over the whole of the Allied forces. The fact that such a step should be now taken, while it may be accepted as indicating the gravity of the struggle on the West front, is also a reassuring evidence of the determination of the Allied Governments to shirk no sacrifice which will make for a successful prosecution of the war. That the Allied commanders most, immediately concerned, Sir Douglas Haiq and General Petain, are in agreement with the course taken is also a matter for satisfaction. General Petain, who is said to be one of the moat brilliant strategists the war has produced, but a very difficult soldier to work with, has always held the view that the- Allies cannot secure the decisive victory which would otherwise- be possible unless there is a unified command. "Brilliant but meaningless victories are won on bloody fields, because the war on the part of the Allies has become a series of illogical compromises." That is stated to be General Petain's view. The- selection of General Foch for the- post of Generalissimo will occasion little surprise. If an appointment of this nature was to be made he could hardly havo been passed over. He was General Joffre's right-hand man through the desperate early days of the war, and it has been said of him that no one won more brilliant renown. General Foch was the horo of the great German defeat at the Marne; ho distinguished himself again when the enemy threatened to break through to Calais from, the Flanders front; he co-operated' with Sir Douglas Haig in tho big Somme offensive; and General Foch it was who was sent to Italy when our Ally there needed the best assistance and advice that could be given to stem the tide of invasion after the collapse of the Italian defences last year. It is important that he has been one of the chief instruments of the close co-operation between the French and British armies. His intimate relationship with the British as well as the French Army Commands adds materially to his high qualifications for his new post. Much may be hoped for from the decision at last reached to place tho whole of the forces of tho Allies under one supremo head.