The Dominion. THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1918. A THREAT IN MACEDONIA

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 156, 21 March 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1918. A THREAT IN MACEDONIA

A Washington message which appears to-day definitely supports an opinion that the Balkan theatre is likely soon to regain the importance it held at an earlier stago of the war, though on grounds very different from those which formerly obtained. Balkan diplomats, the message states, have received advices indicating that the Germans are heavily concentrating- preparatory to a drive towards Salonika. As a prediction, this must await the test of events, but it is by no means improbable that it throws real light upon tho enemy's plan of campaign. Some well-informed authorities in Allied countries long ago recognised tho possibility that Germany's main effort this year may take the form of an offensive against Italy and in tho Balkans. Such an enterprise, if it succeeded, would as one of its results enable her to overrun Greece and so leave her ■ commandingly placed for a flank attack upon the Allied sea communications in the Mediterranean. Apart from what journalistic commentators have had to say on tho subject, a military commander of the highest standing, General Foch, spoke some time ago of an enemy offensive on these lines ag _ possible. The considerations which may induce the enemy to attack the Allied Army in Macedonia are fairly obvious. They aro twofold in character. A victorious offensive in the Balkans would very greatly improve his general situation, and there is no important theatre of war in which the Allies are more seriously handicappod in meeting and countering whatever aggressive action the enemy may attempt. It is, of course, true that tho invasion of Greece offers the enemy no such decisive result as would follow upon a successful offensive in France and Flanders. Given complete freedom of choice he would undoubtedly make it his first object to defeat the Franco-British Armies in the main theatre. ; But assuming, as is highly probable, that he recognjses this achievement to be beyond his power, it is more than likely that ho may turn his attention to an offensive in the Balkans, either as a separate enterprise or as tho complement to a formidable attack on Italy. To undertake such an offensive and to succeed in it are two different things, but tho prospect now raised 'serves to emphasise the fact that' in' the Balkans theatre the Allies arc faced by a serious problem of defence.

'Although information relating to the Macedonian front ia not at'all points, complete, it is evident that the conditions which obtained'when the Russian and Rumanian Armies were still in the field have been not merely changed, but transformed. Tho Macedonian front is still vital, but no longer as a vantage point from whien to attack, in concert with Russo-Rumanian operations on tho north, the enemy's communications with Turkey and tho East. With Russia 'and Rumania out of the war, the Allies have perforce turned from attack to defence in Macedonia/ It must bo recognised also that the long and almost uninterrupted stalemate which has reigned in this region since the Allies occupied Monastir in November, 1916, has in some respects materially favoured the enemy. Both sides have been . industriously engaged during this period in constructing and improving- communications, and so far as transport routes connecting their ports and bases in Greece with the battlefront are concerned, the Allies arc probably by no means unfavourably placed as compared with tho enemy. But in a larger view tho enemy enjoys an enormous advantage in this exceedingly important matter of communications. While the Allies are dependent upon long and difficult sea communications, and this at a time when they arc contending with an acute shortage of shipping tonnage, Germany and her allies are in a position to pour force into tho Balkans over relatively short land, communications, including one line of railway running right up to tho lighting front.

Ifc is in this factor of communications that tho Allies would be most seriously handicapped in such a campaign as is now foreshadowed. Both armies., as matters- stand in Macedonia, arc established on immensely formidable defensive- linos, and with anything like an equality of available strength in- mon and material the existing stalemate might bo expected to continue indefinitely. It is mainly because his marked advantage- in transport facilities may enable tho enemy at any time to attack the Allies in heavily superior force that the situation must bo regarded as critical. So far as numerical strength is concerned tho Allies havo probably little cause for uneasiness.

Taking account of French, British, and Italian contingents and of the Serbian and GrecK Annies a force of considerable aggregate strength should bo available to meet whatever attack the- enemy may attempt. The latest available information relating to the Greek Army indicates that its mobilisation is far advanced, and since the process of mobilisation has kept pace with thesupply of equipment by the Allies, tho Greeks should bo in a. position to render powerful and effective aid in defending their own territory. It is impossible, however, to speak with the same confidence in regard to tho provision of war material, particularly guns and vmnitions. Tho enemy certainly is very much better placed than the Allies to effect a powerful artillery concentration in Macedonia. It is an unfortunate aspect of the situation that there is no very obvious-way in which tho Allies can lighten their burdens of defence without sacrificing some of the vital interests they; aro defending in this theatre. The batfclefront, which extends across Albania and along the ScrboGreek borderland and then runs to the Struma and down that river to tho sea, has a, total length of somo 250 miles, but the Allies cannot fall back on a shorter line without abandoning to the enemy seme at least of tho Greek ports from which it is their essential object to exclude- him. Failing to maintain the line upon which they are now established, liiwy might- i>. 11 back upon a line little more than half as long, extending from sea to sea across the northern confines of Old Greece. But such a retreat, apart from its political effect, would involve abandoning Salonika, to the enemy, and also a section of the Greek western coast south of the Strait of Otranto, with the_ result of very seriously complicating Allied naval problems in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. Unpromising as the outlook is in somo respects it must be considered that the Allies have long been award of tho danger of an enemy offensivo aiming at the invasion of Greece and tho utilisation of its muchindented coastline as a base for submarine operations. Presumably thoy have, taken their measures accordingly, and wliil_« the dangers of the situation are in plain sight, fullor information would probably shew that much has been done towards meeting them. It seems at present extremely probable, howover, that the enemy has been preparing to launch an offensive in.the Balkans while he has been bilking about an offensive on the Western front.