PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 155, 20 March 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

According to an American _ communique published to-day, it is now believed that the Germans do not intend to launch a major offensive on tho West front. This opinion is consistent with all the detail evidence lately afforded, and at certainly receives Bupporfc .from tho accounta transmitted to-day of tho continued successes won by tho Allies in the air and of their splendidly effective counter-battery work. News of a German attack cast of the Mouse- weighs lightly in the opposite scale, for though it was organised on a considerable scale, on a front of half a dozen miles, it was easily and decisively defeated. There is in fact oo reason to suppose that tho Allies need seriously apprehend any attack the enemy.is capable of developing in France or Flanders, but this does not mean that theyaro in a position to regard the possibility of an enemy offensive with indifference. On the ' contrary the enemy's continued inactivity i in France and Flanders makes it moro than ever likely that he contemplates aggressive action elsewhere, and tends to confirm a conviction that it is to Italy or the Balkans that we must look as probable theatres of critical events in tho near future. A correspondent to-day mentions rising activity on all sectors in Macedonia, and it is qfuite possible that this state 'of affairs is leading up to ovents of decisive importance. The broad facts are obvious. The enemy is in a position to concentrate forces - in Macedonia much more rapidly and more conveniently than the Allies, and while the most brilliant success in this theatre would not give him victory in the war, any substantial gains in Greece would enable him to seriously derange tho Allied op-' erations in tho East. As Mr. Bonar Law pointed out the other day in a not very optimistic review of the position on the Salonika front, the enemy's occupation _of the Greek harbours as submarine bases would make it very difficult for us. to keep up communication with Egypt. It is a possibility _to bo faced that a powerful offensivo in Macedonia may appeal to the enemy as a hopeful means of gaining a peace which would leave him something at least of his present command of Turkey and of the routes to the East. It must be assumed that tho Allies have laid their plans with a clear recognition of this possibility, for it is evident that even perfect security on tho West front, including Italy, would fall far short of what is necessary if the enemy were left in a position to develop a successful offensive in Macedonia.

Much interest centres in the question of the rate at which America may bo expected to build up her armies on the Western front, but explicit information on the subject is naturally withheld. ' In a recent issuo of Land and Water,

however, Mi?. Hii-Ainn Beu.oc offcre an estimate based upon a calculation for which he docs not claim strict accuracy, but only that it will serve well enough for an ayi-' proximate judgment. "Every man maintained by the United States on French isoil," |ho observes, "means some six tons of shipping to maintain him—this calculated, of course, in gross tonnage, not in tonnage of displacement. Further, of two men thus supported upon the European side wc must not count upon more than one being present in an organised fighting unit upon the immediate front. . . . Experts differ, and published estimates will differ,also, as ito the number of months in which could be provided—quite, apart from the making good of losses—a tonnage sufficient for the maintenance of one million men. It is enough to say that such a force cannot- be aimed at until very far into the fighting season of 1918, and more probably towards its close; while in this calculation, which would mean but half a million men organised in fighting units, or say not more than double the German, troops actually engaged the other day in front of Cambrai—we are eliminating an unknown factor of loss at sea. ..."

*** - * Mr. Belloc probably does not err in his estimate in the direction of optimism, but undoubtedly the factor of shipping tonnage definitely limits the force which America is capable of establishing in Franco this year, and it is no doubt wise to assume that American aid will not before next year give tho Allies tho superiority which would enable them to resume the offensive. There is no definite certainty on the point, however, and it is possible that other factors than tho balance of numerical strength on land may very materially affect the general situation beforo this year has run its course. The most important of these factors, and ono upon which Mr. Belloc himself has rightly laid much emphasis, is the, Allied aerial superiority, of which further evidence is afforded to-day. If present expectations are realised, Germany, even if she is temporarily in a position to withstand attack by tho Allied Western armies, ww during coming months be subjected in her own territory, and in occupied territory behind her battlefront, to an air attack of unprecedented vigour and intensity. There aro prospects of in this way carrying tho war effectively into the enemy's country and subjecting him to a test ho has not yet been called upon to endure. The'results may easily be far-reach-ing.