The Dominion. MONDAY, MARCH 18, 1918. THE ENEMY'S PLANS

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 153, 18 March 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, MARCH 18, 1918. THE ENEMY'S PLANS

Though the enemy is far from having shown his hand in tho conditions created by tho capitulation of llussia and the elimination of Rumania, some definite light has already been cast upon military prospects for tho year that lies ahead. Precisely what use Germany will make of the strategic reserves she has gleaned from the Eastern theatre is still a speculation of absorbing interest, but as time goes on it seems less and less likely that the much-advertised threats of a massed offensive against the Anglo-French front represented an actual disclosure of German plans, and more likely that these threats were intended to veil plans of a totally different character. The fact that Germany has allowed weeks of fine weather to slip by without attempting a decisive stroke in Franco or Flanders strongly supports the opinion expressed by Mr. Philip Gibbs that the German ffigh Command is disinclined to undertake an offensive like that at Verdun, and could not do so without risking a revolt among tho troops. Apart from tho continued inactivity of the great armies Germany has assembled in Franco and Flanders, this opinion is consistent with tho major facts of the war. Germany has never more evidently mpved towards defeat than in her principal offensive operations against the FrancoBritish armies during the last two years. In all the later stages of the war the height of her success in France and Flanders has been to spin out the contest and to reduce the Allies to a slow rate of advance. Verdun stands out clearly to-day as an unrelieved Gorman disaster, and tho attempt to dislodge the French from the Craonne Plafoau and from

dominating heights in the Champagne, which was Germany's main offensive effort last year, had much in common with the protracted struggle on the Verdun sector. Germany has so little to hope from forcing the issue on the front where her enemies are strongest that it is strictly reasonable to believe sho will ombark on no such venture unless she is driven to it by political necessity, that is to say, by the impossibility of inducing hey own people-to accept an indefinite prolongation of the war. Particular interest attaches in this connection to a statement by Ludendorff, the German Chief of Staff, and to observations by Austrian military critics which are quoted in the news to-day. Ludenbokff, it will be noticed, makes no promise that the German Western armies will attack, and relies mainly upon a contention that time is on Germany's side—a contention with which it will bo possible to deal more definitely when the British Government has made its promised disclosures in regard to the shipping situation. Unless it can be ■shown that Germany is in a position to carry her war on shipping to the point of preventing the transportation of the American reinforcements which are needed to give the Allies decisive superiority, and there is no reason to suppose that it can, the contention is absolutely opposed to tho facts. Ltjdendorff]s observations arc chiefly interesting meantime as suggesting that it is not in France or Flanders that Germany will make her principal effort this year, and on this point Austrian military writers have spoken still more suggestively. They state, according to one of today's messages, that Austria is concentrating her forces on tho Italian front "for an imminent offensive co-ordinating with a Gorman offensive on the West," and add that Austria has ceased sending troops to France, where she has sent thus far only , one division. There arc substantial reasons for believing that a more reliable hint is' hero given of the-enemy's offonsivo plans for thc ; year than in the numerous predictions of a tremendous offensive on the Franco-British front,Such !.an offensive is the least hopeful .enterprise Germany can attempt. An offensive designed to achieve its principal results in Italy and in the Balkans may easily seem to German strategists to hold out much better prospects of advantage. There is no room for doubt as to the vital importance of the southern extension of tho Allied front through Italy and tho Balkans. It is probably tho most critical feature in tho war situation to-day that the enemy, thanks to the partial respite he has gained and to his interior land communications, is in a position to devote very considerable forces to an attack upon Italy and upon the Allied army in Macedonia, which at the samo time would seriously threaten our sea communication's with the' East. ;

Fortunately there is no reason to beliovo that such a development of the_ enemy plans would take the Allies unprepared. Clear assurances have been given that the vital necessity of strengthening Italy is receiving full attention "from tho mter-Allied Council at Versailles. Weeks ago General Foch mentioned the possibility that the onemy might develop an offensive in Italy and tlio Balkans, and at the same time expressed a confident belief that tho Italian armies. were now capable of holding their own even without the aid which France and Britain wero ready to render. The achievements of the Italians have gone far to justify this opinion. After tho terriblo disasters of last year they stemmed the enemy invasion on a line which, when they first took it up, was generally regarded us untenable. In winter battles they havo ftrcngthened their hold on the narrow belt of mountain country which covers their northern flank. Available informa tion goes to show also that tho splendid recovery of the Italian armies is typical of conditions throughout the country, and that I a Government pledged to unflinch- | ing prosecution of the war is receiving whole-hearted support from all save a very Email minority in -Parliament and in the country. l r et tlio fact is to be faced that it is open to the enemy to attack tho Allies this year on vital fronts where they cannot, in the nature of things, organise as formidably as in Franco lafod Flanders, and where h)p onemy (enjoys a, pronounced advantage in the matter of communications. There are, of course, redeeming circumstances. At worst the bulk of Germany's strength will always henceforth bo firmly held in Franco and Flandors, and the Allies have good prospects of developing an air offensive on such a scale in the near future as to heavily intensify the enemy's present problems and increase existing, demands upon his resources. Austria also is riven by internal disorders, and of all the larger countries still-in the war has probably suffered most heavilv. Credible reports declare that famine and disease are rife in the Dual Monarchy. Generally such conditions exist as must militate heavily against the success of a campaign in which Austria will have to bear the principal burdens. Bui, all being said, it is as likely that a struggle of grim intensity will be witnessed before long in Italy and the Balkans as it seems unlikely that Germany will squander her remaining reserves in vain attempts on a grand scale to smaSn the Franco-British front.