PROGRESS OF THE WAR
A cable message from Washington this morning states that France has urgently appealed to America to speed up the dispatch of troops to the Western front, and America will respond to the- appeal by the dispatch of a division of drafted men without delay. This is the second reference- this week to the urgent need of men for this theatre of the war. The urgency of the appeal may spring from either of two causes—a desperate extremity, or a matter of expediency for t-ho fulfilment of a definite plan. There is no need to discuss tho first—it does not oxist. As to the second, it is probably a move to cjuicken the Americans to a realisation of the necessity for putting every ounce of effort into their preparations. The Allies have for the greater part of the war been fighting—and winning—battles against superior numbers, but they have been unable to force a decision for the reason that they have lacked just that essential reserve of force which enables a thrust to be driven homo for tho death-blow. Our victories in the West have been decisive within certain limits—the enemy's morale has been visibly shaken, his losses in men and material have been very great, but ho has been able to rally his public opinion by »• show of success on his Eastern front. The fact remains, however, that until we on the West have at our disposal the necessary reserve force to follow up our victories the war may be protracted indefinitely. In another column is published to-day a long dispatch from Sin Douglas Haiq covering by way of a general summary ana comment tho history of tho 1917 campaigns in tho West. It is a splendid record of victories, achieved undor circumstances of stupendous difficulty, but oven to tho most casual impressionist one factor stands out clear and conspicuous— the shortage of men. During that campaign 131 German divisions were beaten by less than half that number. The deduction is obvious. What would have been the position to-day had the forces been evenly matched 1 Haiq's promiso that tho Gorman military power in tho West would be smashed would have been fulfilled.
As has been previously stated, with the opening of the 1918 campaign the Allies in the West are faced with the prospect of a defensive role. Expocting a heavy offensive move by the Germans, they have provided for it by the construction of immensely strong defences, and if the Germans once commit themselves to their, grand attack they will pay dearly for every yard of advance. "The temporary adoption of a.defensive- rolo by tho FrancoBritish Armies (comments The Times • military correspondent) is not a symptom of weakness or of timidity, but a reversion to what Omusewitz declared to be the stronger form of warfare, with the plain intention of allowing the enemy to break his head against our defences beforo we resume tho initiative at the hour that euits us hest. This system of playing out time does not by any means excludo tho continuation of those limited offensives of _ which 1917 contained so many brilliant examples. . . . The main element in a, defence which is not , purely passive is the reserve, which in many forms reestablishes tho battle. The stronger tho defensive lines the' less numerous need bo tho garrisons, and the larger, consequently, can bo the reserves, whether local or general. When local reserves are handy and well placed, and when thero aro good means of communication for bringing up general reserves rapidly, it is rare for anything moro than a tactical success to bo gained by an assailant."
The important point to remember is that unless the Allies in the West have the necessary reserve force- it will bo impossible for them to force a_ counter-offensive at the psychological moment to a decisive conclusion. Sik Auckland Geddes, Ministor of National Service, stated that the diversion of the enemy's troops from tho Eastern front would probably mean an acceleration of 1,600,000 men to his forces in tho Wcst._ This was probably an exaggeration for the sake of emphasising the urgency of his requirements. A French critic recently expressed tho opinion that tho accretion of forces would not exceed half a million. As against that, if Sir Auckland GEDDEScan carry his recruiting schemo into effect, it is quito possible, the New York Evening Post estimates, that Britain will bo able to add nearly another million to her strength in tho field during the coming year, for, as is pointed out, there- should be added to the 450,000 which tho Minister expects to obtain from his combing-out Echemo another half-million of young recruits who have reached military ago this year. On the whole, therefore, there is a fair prospect that the opposing forces in tho West this year will be about evenly matched, with the advantage gradually turning to the Allies, and the corresponding prospect of a strong and successful counter-offen-sive. There is therefore every incentive for gcttiiiff every available man into the field in time to lake advantage, of the turning of tn C tide.
The German Press, for some reason or other, is hedging on the great and much-advertised offensive,
The military critic, of the Lnlwl Anzr.iijcv abandons the expectation (if an immediate offensive. He argues that it will be impossible for the AmericanK to outweigh the German accessions from tho East, but that delay will he good policy, as the submarines will probably compel tho Allies to resort to a hopeless and exhausting offensive, and then Germany will deliver a knock-out blow. Whether this is an inspired statement for public consumption in tho Fatherland, or a clumsy air tempt to fog tho Allies, is not clear, but it is probably the former. Apropos, the TageUal-l has been suspended for declaring that unless the Germans win the war this summer they will bo lost. It is fairly evident that the Germans do not relish this offensive in the West, for the venture contains an clcmont of risk that thoy are not accustomod to tuko in their grand offensives—a blow at a weaker enemy is their favourite role, and they do not liko the American factor. The German High Command was pushed into this offensive to satisfy public opinion, which demanded some ovidence that tho Army of the Fatherland could assert itself in the West. Tho offending of the- TagehlaU lies less in the remark 'than in tho deduction which could bo drawn—the existence of a doubt about tho outcome of the struggle in the West. "If we now, without America's assistance, are steadily developing our air supremacy, and more than holding our own," states the "high military authority" to-day in his weekly review, "no imagination can picture the result when the full strength of the American air forces are in the field alongside the AngloFrench forces. That is another jpill for the Germans to digest with fchcir menu for 1918."
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Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 151, 15 March 1918, Page 4
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1,157PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 151, 15 March 1918, Page 4
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