The Dominion. TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 1918. THE SALONIKA LINES

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 148, 12 March 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 1918. THE SALONIKA LINES

In the course of his speech on the motion for the credit vote last week, tho Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Bonar Law) referred to the general situation on the Salonika lines, which, ho pointed out, iiad become unsatisfactory since the Russian collapse.. The Commandov-in-Chief at Salonika, added the Chancellor, recognised that the position at Salonika might become dangerous, as tho Central • Powers, with better communications, might send forces from tho Eastern front which would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to meet. The summary of the speech sent us may havo conveyed an impression which would not bo borne out by tho full text of Mr. Bonar Law's remarks, bub it is also possible that the Chancellor was preparing the House and the country for probable'withdrawal from the Salonika lines. This contingency is really not so alarming as would at Srst sight appear. It now seems hopeless to expect to make any serious attempt to advance against Bulgaria, Turkey, or Austria by way of Salonika, and in the circumstances the best course to pursue would unquestionably be to take up a position on the strongest defensive lino available in Greek territory. Wo cannot withdraw entirely from Greece, and apparently the Allied forces arc not strong enough to advance beyond their present positions. The only alternative to' holding the existing lines would therefore bo to withdraw as stated to a shorter and stronger line. This probably 'is what tho Chancellor of the Exchequer had, in mind, but his remarks as published aro liable to leave an unpleasant impression. Tho Salon- j ika expedition has come in for a I good deal of criticism from time to time, but, as Me, Bonar Law explains, it is not difficult to justify it If it had not been sent Germany, with the connivance of Oonstantine and his puppet Government, would have secured control of tho Greek harbours, which were vital to us in that if the enemy's submarines had been ablo to use them as bases of operations it would have been almost impossible for us to have kept up our communications,with Egypt. On these grounds alone the Salonika expedition, with its long and costly communications by sea for the transport of troops and supplies, was an imperative necessity. Had Eussia and Rumania remained in the arena there were sound reasons for thinking that an effective offensive through Serbia and against Bulgaria, together with a steady pressure on Turkey's flank, would have developed. The expulsion of the pro-German regime from Greece also paved the way for the active co-operation'of the Greek forces with the Allies in the Balkans. Unfortunately, tho Russian collapse and tho retirement of Rumania have removed the pressure from the northern Bulgarian frontier, leaving the Bulgars free to concentrate on tho Salonika lines with a nossible reinforcement from the Central Empires. The Venezclist regime is loyal to tho cause of the Allies, but wo have been left in tho dark of late as to what Greece is doing in tho way of rendering military assistance. It is a -very open question whether Greece, with the fate of Rumania before her, would caro to come into the arena of her own volition at this juncture—the fortunes of tho Allies during the coming campaigns will largely influence her decision—but there is no doubt at all that if there should bo any attempt to invado her territory or violate her sovereign rights she will be forced to throw her Amy into the field with tho Allies. It is true, as tho Chancellor observed, Germany's man-power is not inexhaustible, she cannot do everything at once, but Mit. Bonar Law's reference to the possibilities ahead presumably was not idle talk. There will be little occasion for surprise, therefore, if wo learn ere long of changes on the Salonika front involving the adoption by the Allies of a purely defensive role and possibly in new positions.