THE LESSONS OF CAMBRAI

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 143, 6 March 1918, Page 4

THE LESSONS OF CAMBRAI

The Battle of Cambrai, which opened with a brilliant success by British forces under Sir Julian Bykg, and ended in what came perilously near to a serious disaster to the same fwces, has probably caused more mj "'ification and excited more cont versy than any other single battle of the war. Sir Douglas Haig in a dispatch to-day reviews the history of the battle, and clears up certain points which the veil of authority has hitherto obscured.. As is well known, the battle in its inception was a striking departure from the usual opening stages of major operations on the Western front—a prolonged and intenso preliminary bombardment, then the infantry advance preceded by a lifting barrage to a definite objective, wnich was to be taken, consolidated, and held against the inevitable counter-attack. At Cambrai the preliminary bombardment was dispensed with. Instead, the attacking troops were screened by squadrons of tanks, which proved their value so thoroughly that a great infantry advance, with comparatively slight losses, was rendered possible. So complete was the initial demoralisation created by the surprise attack by tho tanks upon the Germans that at one stage oi the operations it was found possible to use the British cavalry for clearing the area of the advance, and there appeared to be no question about the fate of Cambrai itself. Then came the German coun-ter-offensive, with what result is already well known. Sir Douglas Saio quite frankly indicates that there was an element of adventure , in the scheme of operations. The attack, he says, was planned to stop forty-eight hours after its commencement, or sooner if the results did not justify its continuance. This reservation was obviously made as a safeguard against a possible breakdown in the tank offensive, which was a new experiment. Tho brilliant success of the tanks encuuraged Haig to follow it up and extend his operations to new objectives, reckoning also for the success of his venture on the enqmy's preoccupation in Italy. The Commander-in-Chief then reviews the enemy's counter-offensive of November 30 and following days, and remarks in passing: "There is little doubt that, although an attack was generally oxpected, the enemy effected a local surprise."- This, added j?o the statement that tho garrisoning of the particular point at .which the eneray broke through was "insufficient, either owing to want of numbers, lack of training, or exhaustion," enabled tho Germans to score the partial success which deprived tho British of a part of the 'fruits of their initial triumph. That the consequences of the British set-back might have been more serious, Sir Douglas Haiq freely admits. The German plans for the counter-offenßive, had they succeeded, would have involved the capture or destruction of the whole of the British forces in tho Cambrai salient. That they failed was due to the "courage and staunchness of the troops at Masnieres, Bourlon, and Moeuvres." The lessons of Cambrai are important in their bearing on future operations. Laying aside as sufficiently understood and appreciated the fact that "the great offensive value of the tanks was conclusively proved," there is one point that deserves somo_ attention—the element of surprise in modern warfare. The Battle of Cambrai offers two notable illustrations of the fact that in spite of air reconnaissance, skilled intelligence officers, elaborate systems of procuring information df the enemy's plans, the element of surprise still remains one of the strongest factors in scoring at tho least an initial' advantage capable of being developed to an important conclusion. By using the tanks instead of the guns for the initial stroke, the British completely surprised the Gormans at Cambrai. By varying their artillery tactics tho Germans in turn were able to achieve a local surprise against the British. Had tho Germans not been preoccupied with their offonsive in Italy, and had been able to throw a greater weight of numbers against the weak link in the British chain, there might conceivably have, been a different story t6 tell. As it happened, tho events at Cambrai had an important influence on tho campaign in Italy, for tho .British success had the effect of retaining in Franco German divisions intended

for Italy. The eternal problem which confronts a military commander is to deVise a means of surprising his opponent and placing him, at the least, at a temporary disadvantage, if he can reinforce this with a powerful thrust of great weight, victory awaits linn. H'aig at Cambrai achieved the first, but he had not sufficient troops available on the spot to maintain his advantage.