HOW GERMANY TREATS THE SWISS

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 136, 26 February 1918, Page 7

HOW GERMANY TREATS THE SWISS

FRESH LIGHT ON THE BULLY OF EUROPE

COMMERCIAL TRICKERY

(Authorised for publication by the British War Office, per favour of the Royal Colonial Institute.)

The story of the various commercial agrcemonts between Germany and Switzerland is a story of steady German pressure on the smaller State. Gormaivy has employed threats and ultimatums to obtain her agreements, and has not kept them when made. She has made effort after effort to create bad blood botween Switzerland and the Entente Powers, efforts happily frustrated by the practical consideration which the latter Powers have shown for Switzerland's difficulties, and she has iu view a threat to Switzerland's future commercial prosperity which, says a writer, it will he necessary tor that country to consider very seriously. We may begin with the preliminaries of the commercial agreement which was negotiated in the summer of 1916, and came into operation in September of that year. The basis of all the Ger-man-Swiss agreements is to be found in the fact that Switzerland depends on Germany for coal and iron; the Allies could indeed supply her with coal, but it is impossible to ship British coal to Switzerland at a price comparable with that of Gormany. Germany has exploited this fact to the utmost. As the "Revue Suisse d'Exportation" said on August 2, 1917: "She makes tho most ruthless uso of her coal monopoly _to put pressure upon us." Tho position in the spring of 1916 was that Germany was supplying Switzerland with coal and iron under an agreement; under a separate agreement Switzerland supplied Germany _ with carbide of calcium and ferro-silicium, while she worked up much of the German iron into munitions for Germany. Tho Allies had an arrangement with Switzerland whereby they exported many things toiler for her own use, which were'consigned to an associationformed there, the iS.S.S. (Societe Suisse do Surveillance Economiquo), on terms intended to secure that they should be consumed in Switzerland and not passed on to Germany; for Switzerland depended on the Allies to a certain extent for corn and many other foodstuffs, and also for raw cotton and silk. A large quantity of the goods (largely cotton) so imported from the Allies had, however, heen bought up by German agents, generally at extravagant prices, and were stored in Switzerland on their account. The value was some 40 million francs (£1,600,000). A Fresh Turn of tho Screw. In April came a, change. Germany henoeforth hased her dealings with Switzerland on the principle of compensation. On April 3 the Swiss Government informed the Allies that Switzerland had to obtain from Germany a further supply of various goods—iron and steel, dyes, chemicals, which Germany would only give her in oxchango for goods imported by Switzerland from elsewhere. The Allies had always recognised that Switzerland had to get certain things from Germany to maintain her economic existence, and must givo certain things in return; and though it was, | of course, impossible for them to agree that Germany should receive goods which the Allies had sent to Switzer- j land for hor own use, negotiations wero instituted with Switzerland mi the questions raised by the Swiss hote of April 3, the Allies' position, roughly speaking, • boing that Switzerland should uso-her own home productsfor exchange. AVhilo these negotiations were in progress, Germany on June 9 suddenly sent Switzerland an ultimatum, requiring her to hand over within fourteen days all the German-owned stocks in Switzerland; all Gorman exports to Switzerland to ho stopped in caso of non-compliance. It was a vulgar attempt at blackmail, intended to wreck tho negotiations betwen Switzerland and the Allies. Tho German Note said: "Germany has decided to export her products and manufactures to neutral countries only in the measure) in which they resist tho restrictions imposed by the Entente Powers, i.e., in the measure in which they Tender possible tho exportation to Germany of 'prohibited goods.'" In plain language, it was easier to attack Switzerland than to attack tlir. British Fleet. Germany knew that Switzerland could not agreo, as Switzerland had given her word that the goods should not be. re-exported; Germany knew, too, that they were not German-owned goods in the sense of her Note, for what the German agents had bought was not so many bales <>' j cotton, but so many hales of cotton subject to a disability, the disability of being non-exportable to Germany; they bought with knowledge of the defect, and had no ground of complaint. Many Swiss rightly recognised in the German Note an attempt to -use Switzerland as a catepaw to get cotton for Germany. Tha Bluff Rejected. Switzerland stood firm, and Germany dropped that demand; but she tried again on the other line, cessation of her exports. Under the existing agreement she was bound to send Switzerland in August, 1916, 170,000 tons of coal and 50,000 tons of coke. "What she did send was 17,000 tons altogether. It was a second attempt to put pressure both on and on the Swiss negotiations with the Entente Powers. Krupp's organ, the "Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung," gave Germany away by writing that "if the Entente refuses to comply with tho just demands of Switzerland, Germany will withhold from Switzerland the right to economic existence. Again we note that Germany would have prefened to ruin Switzerland rather than attack Britain. Though Germany failed to wreck the Swiss negotiations with the Entente, she did succeed in causing grave anxioty in Switzerland lest all iron and steel works 6houkT have to close. Wo shall see how this affected the subsequent commercial agreement.