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MR. LLOYD GEORGE EXPLAINS

THE COUNCIL OF VERSAILLES

SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON'S OBJECTIONS

By Telegraph-Press Aesocifttion-Oppirieht

t ■ ,••' A i, ■■~ ,„ '' '■""don, February 19, In explaining to the Houso ot. Commons the position regarding the status of the Allies' Supremo War Council at Versailles,' and the circumstances leading up to tho resignation of Sir William Robertson, the Trims Minister (Mr. Lloyd George) said:— _ , '•'Tho Government deeply regrets that Sir William Robertson's position is no longer compatible with the policy decided on at Versailles; but. if that policy is right, no personalities, however valuable, important, or distinguished, should stand in the wa> of its execution. (Cheerß.) If the policy is wrong, no personalities, no Governments, ought to stand in tho way of.its being instantly defeated. There is absolutely no difference" said the speaker emphatically, "between our policy and ihe policy of France, Italy, and the United States in this respect. The policv is based on the assumption that the Allies have hirJ crto suffered through the lack of concerted and co-ordinated effort, and our purpose and policy had been to get concentration and unity of effort. It is only necessary to look at 1917 - find exactly tho same set of circumstances, inevitably diminishing tho power and tho concentration which would otherwise have been possible to exert in order to counteract tho efforts of tho Germans and the results of the Russian collapse. , • . Must be a Central Authority. "If was agreed at Versailles that there must be a central authority, to exercise direction over war policy; that that authority must bo inter-Allied and must have executive power. The only difference cf opinion was over how that authority!should he constituted, but agreement on this point was also reached. It was felt that tho new body must not only know the conditions of their own armies, on their own fronts, but all tho conditions on all the fronts and of oil armies. Versailles is now • the repository of such informationi which is co-ordinated by very able staffs, No single War Office posspsses • such information." , The Premier proceeded to mention several proposals which were considered and rejected. One that the central authority should bo composed of Chiefs of Staffs, but this idea was unworkable. There were cogent reasons why'tho Chiefs of Staffs in tho various capitals could not properly exercise the functions aimed at. "The Supremo Council unanimously rejected this proposal," said the speaker. "Tho delegations then separated and considered' the matter independently, with the most remarkable result that next niorning each' delegation submitted exactly the same proposal, namely, the proposal which now held the field." He would like to have read to the House the document in which tho American delegation cogently put the case for the proposal, which was finally carried, but lie could not, because it was mixed up with_ the plan of operations. The American delegate presented the case with irresistible power and logic. The proposal was altered here and there during several hours' discussion, in which there was not a single dissentient as far as the.plan was concorned. "Sir Douglas Haig drew attention to a weak point or two, and we undertook to remedy them, but these were not points affecting the root of the proposal." _ Upon returning from Paris he reported to Cabinet that he thought the Chiefs of Staffs' plan unworkable and dangerous. Subsequently the Army Council made certain criticisms from a constitutional viewpoint. He considered these carefully with Lord Derby, who throughout put Sir William Robertson's case before Cabinet. Sir William Robertson's] Objections. Mr. Lloyd George emphasised his anxiety that these arrangements should be worked wholeheartedly by all the Anglo-French military authorities, and especially that Sir Douglas Haig should be satisfied. Therefore, before the agreements were made, he talked with Sir Douglas Haig-, who said he would work under t]ie new arrangement, which was that the British Permanent Military Adviser en the Council at Versailles should become a member of the Army Council, and should constantly communicate with the Chief of Staff, and should be absolutely free in the advice he gave. The Chief of Staff ' would have $e same powers as his predecessor (Sir William Robertson), and would remain the Supreme Military Adviser to the British Government. He would accompany Ministers to the meetings of the Supreme War Council as adviser, and have the right to visit France and consult the military representatives. Our representative at Versailles must have the most perfect freedom to discuss and recommend plans. If the Commander-in-Chief did not'approve, or if there was a difference of opinion among the various representatives, then the Government would decide. Thero was -no derogation of authority by the Government. The Chief of Staff would be the Chief Adviser to the Government in tho event of any such difference of opinion. It was only after the Government had decided to offer Sir William Robertson the position of representative at Versailles that the Premier realised that Sir William Robertson .objected on military grounds to the system which the Versailles meeting had decided unanimously to adopt. Sir William Robertson suggested that the representative at Versailles should he made the Deputy of the Chief of Staff, but the Government rejected the suggestion because the suggested position would be impossible for any man, and would make the British representative inferior to other members of the Council. • A voice: What about General Foch? The Premier pointed out that General Foch was within twenty-five minutes of Versailles, and could be consulted in the ovent of an emergency. The Premier reiterated that the Government deeply regretted that it was obliged to proceed without Sir William Robertson. The choice between carrying out unanimously the policy of tho military advisers of the Allies and retaining tho services of this most distinguished and very valuable public servant was paid the fullest consideration, but, in view of tho magnitude of the policy, the Government was hound to stand by its arrangement with the Allies. Plea for Mutual Trust and Confidence. The Premier dwelt on the natural difficulties in securing the military unity of the Allies. Some thought tho new arrangement would secure rsoHtical unity, but it was merely the unity of armies the Government proposed. He would invite suggestions from tho highest military authorities as regards the best means of removing tho anxiety that the new scheme might impair the: efficiency of our Army. The Government would adopt any such suggestion to improve the new scheme. National feeling, historical tradition, and suspicion militated against every alliance, while there were also other difficulties, due to professional conservatism. He pleaded for mutual trust and confidence, which was the very soul of victory. "We discussed and rediscussed this plan, in order that our whole concentrated strength should be mobilised to resist and break the most terrible foe civilisation has ever confronted. We faced terrible realities. The enemy had rejected most moderate term's, which tho whole of civilisation had accepted as reasonable. Why had the enemy rejected them? Because he was very clearly that the Russian collapse would give .him the power to achieve a military victory and impose Prussianism forcibly on Europe." Mr, Lloyd Georgo begged tho Houso to turn down all controversy and close up Hs ranks. (Loud cheers.) If tho House disapproved the Versailles policy, let it put in a Government which would refuse to accopt that policy, but it must be another Government. (Cheers.) "The Government is eu-

titled to know, and "know to-night, whether the House and the nation wish to proceed with a policy which has been deliberately settled with a view to organising our forces. I have endeavoured to discharge tho terrible functions of. my position to my utmost capacity and strength. (Cheers.) If the House to-night repudiates that policy, for which I am responsible, and, I believe, on which the safety of tho country depends, I shall quit office with but one regrot: that I have not had greater strength and greater ability to place at the disposal of my native land in the gravest hour in its history." (Loud and prolonged cheers.)—Reuter.'

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19180222.2.26.2

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 133, 22 February 1918, Page 5

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,336

MR. LLOYD GEORGE EXPLAINS Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 133, 22 February 1918, Page 5

MR. LLOYD GEORGE EXPLAINS Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 133, 22 February 1918, Page 5

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