The Dominion MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1918. A TIME OF CRISIS
The announcement that Sir William Robertson has resigned his position as Chief of the British General Staff must be accepted as plain evidence of an acute crisis upon which the gravest issues hinge. There is a hackneyed but true saying that no man is so great'or so valuable that lie cannot be replaced, but the resignation at a time like the present of a great military administrator like Sir William Robertson can only be regarded as a national misfortune. The- retiring Chief of Staff was already a notable figure amongst the higher officers of the British Army before he was called upon in 1915 to assume the tremendously onerous responsibilities bo has since carried. It is the universal verdict that he has carried on with splendid efficiency, as well as .with untiring devotion, the mighty work of organisation which was inaugurated by the lato Lord Kitchener. The loss of an able administrator is to be regretted at any time, but Sir William Robertson's resignation gives all the more ground for concern since it occurs almost on the eve of what promises to be the- sternest military contest of the war, and therefore at a period when continuity is supremely desirable. At the moment, however, the event holds and demands attention chiefly as it bears upon the vexed questions which have arisen in Britain in connection with the development of the inter-Allied Council at Versailles and the enlargement of its functiofis and powers. Presumably, Silt William Kobehtson has resigned as a protest against an actual or proposed centralisation of Allied military authority at Versailles. As yet the issue- has been denned only in the broadest outline, as much by suggestion and implication as by direct statement, and attendant details and circumstances which may be vital arc hidden from the public gaze. It is evident, however, that the action of the late Chief of Staff is calculated to bring matters to a head. Conceivably it may be followed by other resignations, including that of the British Comniandor-in-Chief. In any case, it is bound to deepen and intensify the existing unrest in British politics, and it places Mr. Lloyd George and the War Cabinet under a very plain necessity of defending and justifying the policy upon which they have embarked. However regrettable and untimely it may be, an open struggle for supremacy between opposed political groups now seoms probable, if not inevitable.
It is one of the peculiarities of the situation at the present stage that although political dissension in Britain over tho question of the intor-AUied command is evidently acute, the dividing line between tho opposing factions is by no means clearly drawn. Mr. Asquith, in bo far as he has shown his hand, is opposed to any transfer of authority from the British General Staff to the central authority at Versailles, but he has not made his position in all respects clear. It
should couut for a- good deal that if ho forces the issuo parf, of the support accorded lnm will come from members who arc pacifist in aim or tendency. It has been hinted in a number of recent messages that personal antagonisms have done a great deal to aggravate tho reigning dissensions, Loud Hugh Cecil stated plainly last week that there was a danger of. British domestic politics sinking, into a feud between Mrt. and Me. Lloyd Geohge, aDd appended the striking suggestion that a National Government -should be formed, with Mr. Ascftmi and Mr. Lloyd (Jeoiioe as Members, but with another Premier, to whom tho country would give luvivdrsal support. The suggestion carries all the moro weight since Mu. Bonar Law has taken an opportunity of informing the House of Commons that he has no moro interest in tho present than in the late Premier, and that if it were dissatisfied with the Government its duty was to get another, in which it had confidoncD. It is possible that Mr. Bonar Law himself may be regarded in somo quarters as eligible for the role of compromise Premier suggested by Lord Hugh Cecil.
Political stability , is certainly the first demand of the situation. Only a Government possessing the full confidence of the House of Commons can hope to dispose of tho questions relating to the British and inter-Allied commands which have been emphasised by Sir WilfiiAM .Robertson's resignation, and it is supremely important that these questions should bo settled as speedily as possible. Neither Britain nor the Allies as a group can afford to enter tho most critical phase of tho war with such issues open. Precisely to what extent tho position is affected by detail considerations and the play of tho personal equation we do not at present know. Possibly it is affected ill such ways very materially. But tho broad iesuo raised admits of neither doubt nor uncertainty. It is unquestionably necessary that Britain should combine with her Allies in making the closest possible approach, to unified war control, because by adopting any other plan the i Allies would deliberately weaken their aggregate effort. The case for unity is not merely strong, but absolute, and any British Government, with its hands otherwise free, which declares for the greatest possible measure of unification of Allied control, takes up the strongefit possible position—the only position, indeed, which is really consistent with a strong war policy. It is notorious that the idea of constituting a central Allied authority is much more heartily favoured in other Allied countries than it is in Great Britain. America, Franco, and Italy arc all prepared to go further in this direction than Britain, and the case seems to be essentially one in which we must accept a lead from our Allies or invite serious consequences. Such objections as have been raised in Great Britain are in general based upon grounds too narrow to be worth considering in a world-war, and in conflict with an enemy exercising undivided control over tho armies of four nations. It has been urged that if a generalissimo were appointed he would necessarily be a Frenchman, and that even to confer executive authority upon the interAllied Council would mean putting British forces under foreign control. This admittedly is no light sacrifice, but no sacrifice is too great to the end of winning the war. It is observed to-day by Loud Sydenham that domestic reasons are forcing Germany to a great attack which may cover 150 miles of front, and that in order to make possible the instant decisions that will be essential either a generalissimo had to be appointed or executive powers conferred upon the. Versailles Council. This is the case for unity in a nutshell, and it seems to be unanswerable. But we are faced at the moment by the disquieting fact that the achievement of complete unity is being delayed, and that at a period of supreme emergency Britain and the Allies have not yet grasped tho benefits that would reward wholehearted co-operation.
It is one bright spot in an otherwise troubled situation that Sir William Robertson has been succeeded as Chief of Staff by one who is generally credited with exceptional qualifications. Sμ Henry Wilson was appointed in November last to act as British military representative as Versailles, having previously been a special senior liaison officer at French Headquarters. He gave proof of his foresight when he put it upon record early in the century that he was positive that the great Prussian menace would materialise. Upon this conviction he founded a long course of painstaking preparation, including an exhaustive study and observation of what has become the decisive theatre of war. His intimacy with and knowledge of the French General Staff were of great value to Lord French in the early days of the war, and his close and cordial relations with the French Command should be even more useful in the post to which ho has now been called. No doubt S:r Henry Wilson is in full sympathy with the development towards a unified Allied command which for the time being has induced a critical state of tension in Great Britain.
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Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 129, 18 February 1918, Page 4
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1,356The Dominion MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1918. A TIME OF CRISIS Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 129, 18 February 1918, Page 4
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