The Dominion FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1918, THE BATTLE FOR UNITY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 127, 15 February 1918, Page 4

The Dominion FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1918, THE BATTLE FOR UNITY

$ At tho moment of writing reports dealing with the crisis which is said to have arisen in British politics are fragmentary, and leave the position at many points obscure. It now seems more likely than it did a few days ago, however, that the Lloyd George Government is about to be definitely challenged, and that the political air will not bo cleared until the Government and its opponents have put matters to tho test of a division in the House of Commons. The only issue visibly raised concerns the reported enlargement of the powers of tho Supremo War Council, but the tone of a number of to-day's reports strongly suggests that the enemies of the Government have eagerly seized upon this question as a pretext, and that some of them at least aro more inclinecl_ to make the most of the rather difficult situation in which the Government is placed, owing to tho evident impossibility of publicly disclosing Allied war plans, th;in to deal withtho question of unified control on its merits. A serious crisis in British politics has been foretold for some time past, but it is difficult to say what weight the prediction really holds. Mr. Lloyd George and his Government aro assailed ancl criticised on tho one hand by Conservative forces, whose members profess to have convicted the Premier of downright incompetence, and maintain that he lias lost the driving power which is essential to a strong war policy, and oil the other by pacifist factions and newspapers which more or less openly demand a modification of British war aims. The newspapers which are persistently agitating against the Government include not only the Liberal organs which desire to see Mi:. Asquith again at the head of affairs, but the Conservative Morning l'ost, which took a prominent part in the agitation that brought Mr. Lloyd George into power. It is a mixed situation, not easily to be read or interpreted at the present stage, but it docs not necessarily augur ill for tho prospccts of tho Lloyd George Government that its critics and detractors have now fastened upon its action in relation to the Supremo War Council—perhaps the boldest and most enterprising step it has ever taken in shaping a policy to meet the demands of tho war.

Undoubtedly differences in regard to tho powers and standing of tho inter-Allied War Council aro complicated and embittered by the preexistcnce of simmering political conflict and agitation. It must bo added that judgment upon the questions now raised is further hampered by the fact that the issues at stake arc not, and in tho naturo of things cannot be, stated comprehensively. The peculiar position exists that tho Government is unable to say in so many words what it is defending, and its critics are equally unable to say in set and specific terms wliat they objcct to. The main issue, as matters stand, concerns the alleged subordination of tho British' General Staff find High Command to

the international Council established at Versailles, but precisely what transfer of authority has taken place is :iot disclosed. Mr. Lloyd Gkouge has explicitly refused to satisfy M r. ■Asquith's demand for information on the subject on the ground that "the powers conferred on the Council could not be stated without disclosing military secrets of the first magnitude." Manifestly Mis. Asquitii will shoulder a very heavy responsibility if, having 'received this answer, he still persists in his demand for information and forces the matter to a division in the Commons. Meantime, though the issues are far from being clearly defined, the case thus far made out by the of the Government presents obvious weaknesses. The most serious ..weakness—one, indeed, which in itself goes far to warrant condemnation of their attitude—is an undue insistence upon the alleged necessity of preserving inviolite thfe separate authority of the British General Staff and High Command. We do not know to what extent the functions of the Supreme War Council have been enlarged, or precisely to what extent it is necessary and desirable on practical grounds that they should be enlarged. Even Mr. Lloyd_George's statement that the Council libs established complete unitythough it is suggestive of a material development of the functions of what was originally a purely advisory body, docs not afford conclusive evidence that the Council .has been made supreme in fact as well as in name. But with the position in this respect open, it certainly cannot be maintained as a matter of principle and of sound war policy that the independence of the British General Staff and High Command is in itself an end to a condition to bo insisted upon at all costs. The one thing essential is to win the war, and any pooling of Allied resources anJ temporary merging of national in international authority which tends definitely to the attainment of that object is iii itself right and desirable. This is so self-evident that it is astonishing that any body of rational men .should base an agitation upon the assertion, of national authority in such circumstances. What their attitude involves is best realised by considering that if the Allies had held aloof from one another instead of working in the closest co-opera-tion possiblo at a given time and stage of development, they would undoubtedly long ero now have lost tho war.

The only practical question open ' in this matter is how far pooling of resources and unification of control should bo carried in given circumstances, and this is certainly not a question which should be determined by military authority only; though that apparently is tho position taken by Mr. Asqtjith and his supporters. It is true of Britain as of the other countries concernep that final authority and final responsibility in regard to international relations rest not with soldiers, but with the political, leaders whom the people have established in power. In dealing with such a question as that of the enlargement of the functions of the inter-Allied War Council, the British Government is bound to give tho fullest possible consideration to the advice of its own military experts, Uut this is far from covering the whole of its responsibility. It is equally bound to weigh the proposals and suggestions of its Allies, and, when all the facts have been weighed, its duty may quite possibly be to reject the advice of its own General Staff and High Command in tho interests of an arrangement permitting closer unity with l its Allies and a moro effective use of common resources. Assuming that the Lloyd George Government has acted on these lines in the matter of ■the Supreme War Council, criticism of its action is certainly unsound in principle, whatever the detail and undisclosed facts of the situation may be. The issue in that case is not sb much whether politicians shall control soldiers, as whether the Allies shall or shall not develop the most perfect combination against tho common enemy which in the circumstances is possible.