PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 119, 6 February 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

An American correspondent on the French front was quoted yesterday as stating that Germany had 180 to 190 divisions in the "Western theatro and 60 divisions on the Russian front, consisting mainly of worn-out and decimated divisions, f bis, no doubt, is the disposition of her strength that Germany would like tn cucct, but there are some items in the later news dealing with Russia which suggest that _it may be some time before her desires under this head are gratified. Much of the news from and relating to Russia is more or less open to suspicion, but the material fact is plainly established that the Central Empires have not made tho progress they hoped for in the negotiations at Biest Litovsk. Even the Bolsheviki have thus far refused to accept a settlement which would leave great tracts of Russian territory in the hands of Germany or the Dual Monarchy; and the German Government, though it is doing its best to p'acate anti-annexation parties in Germany and irx AustroHungarVy has steadfastly insisted upon extensive annexations as an essential condition of peace. P recent indications are that a deadlock has been reached, and whatever else this .state of affairs may imply it should rcrtairi.lv mean that Germany will not be able for some time to mass al! her effective forces in tho Western theatre and leave only inferior and resting troops to keep watch and ward oil the Russian front.

According to a message from Copenhagen, Germany ■? sending an ultimatum to the Maximalists demanding acceptance of the peace conditions, and intimating tlu-t in the event of a refusal military measures will be taken forthwith against Russia, and if necessary against Rumania. Military action may prove to bo Germany's only way of enforcing her demands, but action on these lines would he ant to niah a by no means nominal call upon her resources. Organised resistance by Russian forces is hardly to bo looked for, cxcept perhaps in the south. Germany is no doubt quite capablo.of occupying Petrograd_ and further large areas of Russian territory, an.l bearing down all attempts at resistance. Rut the fag-end of her Army would hardly suffice for such a task. The anarchic state of the country raises immensely formidable difficulties, and it is tolerably certain that any approach to its successful military domination would demand the vigilant an'i indefinitely continued activities of a strong force of effective troops. Presumably it is on these lines that Germany must act if she is to reach any definite, point in her dealings with Russia, but the

whole question is obsciircd meantime by uncertainty as to whether the German Government and th-it oi Austria-Hungary will venture to admit to their own peoples that tiie negotiations iiave failed and to proclaim an open break with Russia.

# # if * On this point considerable doubt exists. An advantageous peace agreement, with Russia would have greatly strengthened the hands of the cneinv Governments, and might have given the war party undisputed command of the situation. The effect of a fresh rupture with Russia is not so easily calculated, but it is obvious that the enemy Governments have political as well as military reasons for looking to sucii an event with apprehension. .The later news of the strikes in Germany strongly suggests that like tho earlier upheavals of the same character in tho Dual Monarchy they represent a genuine, demand for peace. The distinctly plausible statement is made in one messago to-day that soldiers on leave are believed to have fomented' the strikes. If this is true these soldiers are likely to be as dangerous on the battlefront as in the capacity of strike-promoters _at _ home. Apparently the agitation has liecn defeated for the time being, but by ruthless measures of suppression which must in themselves tend to provoke further outbreaks. With matters in this state the rulers of the Central Empires are likely to add to their problems at homo as well as abroad if they reject peace with Russia and press their territorial demands. So acting they would directly defy the workers and others in their own territories who are ever more insistently demanding bread and peace, and would invite- and perhaps produce internal explosion. The political effect of the present contact with .Russia upon the people of the Central Empires and the effect that might be expected if the invasion of Russia were extended are largely a matter of conjecture,, but are certainly not unimportant. Neither is there any hope meantime of penetrating all the obscurities of the Russian situation, though it may be noted in passing that some of today's reports suggest that late developments in Southern Russia and Rumania have been much. IJbss satisfactory from tho point of view of tho enemy Powers than much recent- news has suggested. But, inconclusive as it is at many points, available information seems to amply warrant _ a conviction that the state of affairs which would enable Germany to withdraw all save a negligible proportion of her military forces from Russia is still far from having been reached.

#*. * * At the same time there are substantial reasons for believing that even if Germany were enabled to practically disregard Russia, instead of being on the horns of a dilemma where that country is concerned, it would still be well beyond her power to assemble such forces in tho Western theatre as would give her hopes of gaining a decision. The big question at stako is not whether Germany can muster a decisive superiority of fighting power in tho Western theatre, but whether she can hope for' a collapso of the spirit and resolution in which tho Allies have thus far prosecuted the war. Assuming that this vital question may be answered in the negative, Germany's prosports are limited accordingly. An attempt in these circumstances to force a decision would be doomed at its inception. It is a.more serious consideration and one of greater practical importance that by increasing her effective strength in the Western theatre she may materially hamper the development of the Allied offensive and possibly prolong her occupation of the Belgian territory, which constitutes her best base for submarine operations and for air attacks on England, and the loss of which would in a number oi ways lay her damagingly open to^attack.

Damaging admissions are mack by Captain Pebsius, ono of the foremost naval critics in Germany, in inference to the submarine campaign which are cabled to-day, but he still claims better prospects for the underwater craft than the facts warrant. England, he says, cannot bo starved, "but it may be possible so to reduce tho enemy as to enable us to _ achieve.a complete victory." With submarines being destroyed as rapidly as they are built, tonnage losses steadily declining, and the' output of British and American shipyards and those of other countries rapidly expanding, the hope expressed by the German writer evidently lacks foundation.