PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 103, 24 January 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A note of cheerful confidencewhich no doubt faithfully reflects the spirit of the Allied armies is struck by Mr. Philip Gibbs in a review of existing conditions in tho Western theatre. His dispatch should serve to correct some of the impressions created by the stories which have been coming through lately about German preparations for a tremendous offensive on the West front. Ho supplies sonic positive evidence of declining German moral, and while there is an element of opinion hi his statement that tho German high comma;id is trying to' build up a mighty bogey that masses are coming from the East, it probably gets much nearer to the truth than many reports on the subject that have been transmitted in recent days. According to Sir AucKriAJtj) Geddes, the inactivity of Russia, will enable the German; to send close upon a million additional men to the Western

front. But apart from the fact that the transfer of troops from Russia lms long been in progress, such a statement does not mean that the enemy has prospects of assembling superior forces in the decisive theatre. The Allies arr capable of maintaining a very considerable numerical superiority whatever readjustment of strength the enemy may effect.

It is important also that it is mainly in the matter of man-power and possibly by gaining access to a new source of food supply that the enemy has profited by the Itussian collapse. In regard to tho material equipment which has such a vital place in modern war ha has not profited-to anything like tho same extent. It is long, for instance, since he has been under the necessity of maintaining any very strong force of artillery in liussia', or of sending to that theatre any considerable proportion of his output of munitions. So with aircraft and various other items of military equipment. The extent to which he ia in a position to gain by transferring c>r diverting material from Russia is limited accordingly. On the other hand, much of the material which in happier circumstances would have been used by Bussia remains fully available, ftus-

sia to the last was largely dependent upon imports from her Allies in carrying on the war, aifd vast quantities of supplies that she would have imported will bo used against the. enemy in the- Western theatre and elsewhere. Ships, also, that formerly served Russia are, now available to transport supplies to France and other theatrcs._ In its various aspects the position now reached in regard to material and shipping , transport appreciably compensates the loss the Allies have suffered by the Russian collapse.

It still remains possible that Germany contemplates a final bid for a decision on the Western front, but unless current news relating to popular upheavals in Austria is utterly misleading, she may speedily find it necessary to shape an entiroly different policy. _ As it stands the news calls for little oomment, but it raises issues of the first magnitude. The suggestion conveyed is that the organisation of the Dual Monarchy is cracking under an unendurable strain of war. Such a development has always been recognised as possible, and if present portents are to be trusted, events are in train which mark for Germany as well as for Austria the beginning of the end.

A J-ATE message yesterday threw some additional light upon the recent naval action outside the Dardanelles. The Turco-German warships, as the Goeben and Breslau are designated in the Admiralty report, emerged from the Dardanelles in the early morning and steamed to a point north of Imbros, a distance of twenty miles or a little more from the entrance to the strait, and it was in this locality that two British monitors were sunk. Thus far the enemy had sprung a surprise, and reaped tbo advantage, but the succeeding stages of tho adventure were from his point of view wholly disastrous. In spite of the loss of the monitors it is evident that the British organisation was particularly effective. The enemy ships had no sooner won their momentary success than they found themselves condemned to beat a hasty retreat before superiori forces over a stretch of sea that had been judiciously mined. The Breslau was forced into a minefield, struck a mine, and sank. The Gocben in her turn struck a mine, near the entrance to the Dardanelles, and after continuing her flight at a reduced speed which betokened serious damage was beached, evidently in a sinking condition, about 18 miles lie tho strait. The strength of tho pursuing squadron is not stated, but that it was considerable is indicated in the hasty retreat of the Goeben, and also in the fact that Turkish destroyers sent to the assistance of the Breslau were driven off. Damaged as sheis and subjected to continuous I aerial attacks, which may presently be supplemented fay naval bombardment across tho Gallipoli Peninsula, the Goeben is likely to become a total loss. Even if, against expectationsj she is salvaged, the resources available in Turkey will hardly make it possible to carry out such repairs as would again inako her fit for service. *■* * * Earlier reports conveyed an impression that though one of the British monitors sun): was a email vessel the other was of largo size, but the statement that the crews of the monitors aggregated only 311 men indicates that this impression was erroneous. Some of tho later monitors arc big vessels very powerfully protected and armed with naval guns of the largest size. A ship of this type might have proved moro than a match for the ■ Goeben. and it is practically certain that both the monitors sunk were of a smaller and less formidable type. Tho balance of loss, in any case, turns decidedly against the enemy, and if tho Gueben has reached the end of her career turns against him very heavily. Probably more men were lost in tho Breslau than in the British monitors. As to tho ships, the loss of two monitors, though serious in itself, is not to be compared with the enemy's loss of a modern light cruiser like tho Brcslau and the lengthy or permanent disablement of his only battlecruiser. #** . * The Turco-Gcrman ships may .have been sent out to raid the Salonika communications, or simply in tho hope of finding a weak spot' in the British naval organisation. Tho naturo of their reception in any case says a great deal for tho efficiency of the Admiralty dispositions. Due weight must be given to the fact that the enemy enjoyed some material advantages. Though he had only two effective ships of extended steaming range at disposal ho was greatly favoured in having a narrow and heavily fortified strait to work from as a base. It is to be considered also that the task of guarding the entrance to tie Dardanelles is only one item in the onerous and complex duties cast upou British and Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean. Looking only at the Eastern Mediterranean, these forces arc not only engaged'in defeating tho enemy submarines on the sea-transport routes j to Salonika and Egypt, but arc cf-1 fectively co-operating with the army I of invasion in Palestine. Free to choose his moment, and with tbo Goeben and Breslau its a striking force, the enemy might reasonably hav« hoped to seriously dislocate Allied naval control in the Eastern Mediterranean. That) His first attempt in this direction i resulted in disaster demonstrates that in this theatre, as in others, tht. Allied naval forces are equal to| meting exacting demands. :