THE BLOW AT ITALY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 99, 19 January 1918, Page 7

THE BLOW AT ITALY

A GERMAN HINT TO AUSTRIA GLIMPSE OF SUBTLE STATECRAFT (By R. P. P. Eowe.) (Published by authority of the War Oitice, per favour of the Royal Colonial Institute.)

Germany's spectacular assault on Italy has undoubtedly been prompted by State policy at least as niucu as by military expediency. In all Prussian history, from the days of Frederick tho Great onwards, there has been one aim most consistently pursued than any other. It has been to wrest from Austria and to Iransl'er to Prussia the control of Central Europe. The decisive Battle of Sadowa, it may be argued, practically completed the Prussian scheme, and yet while the Treaty of Prague fulfilled an immediate purpose, it also led to a development of that purpose. The ambition of tho Prussian rulers of Germany grow by what it fed on. Tho subsequent defeat of France added equally to thejr power and to their greed. They began to dream of Asiatic empire, but the road to the East was impeded, if not blocked, by Austria, and beyond Austria by Bulgaria and Turkey. What more natural, then, to a Machiavellian policy, than to subjugate by force or friendship the buffer States that stood in tho path, of which the first and the most important was Austria. More Ways than One. Now, the obvious method of subjugation is by complete military conquest. For this, war is necessary., but it need not be, as Germany has clearly proved, a war undertaken against tho country to be conquered. Strange and complicated results are produced by war 011 a heroic scale, and to the chances that such a struggle may provide, Prussian statecraft has never been blind. If wo bear in mind the covetous instincts of German .Imperialism, we can readily understand the policy to which they have given rise. The gradual absorption not only of Austria, but of Bulgaria and Turkey, was probably contemplated by that policy, even before the,war, but tho absolute control of tho two latter Powers was conceived as a distant possibility, rather than as, a present aim. Almost rrtainly a more immediate end was a wide doorway to tho Adriatic, and thereby to the Mediterranean, Ahrough Austria and Northern Italy. It need not be supposed, and is iiidopd improbable, that Germany expected to be herself in actual possession of this doorway in tho near future. That, again, was an ultimate aim. _ But practical control of the territories required oould be obtained commercially, and the future might_ provide further opportunities. Tho original Triple Alliance was thus fraught with promise. It did much nioro than strengthen Germany against France or Paissia, or a combination of these two. Tt provided allies which the system of peaceful penetration, while adding to Germany's commercial strength, would draw closer and closer into a net from wliicli there could at last be no escape. Thus could the Alliance be made increasingly secure and the gradual subordination of the two lesser Powers would tend more and more towards actual'subjection. This, it is extremely probable, is tlie true reading of the situation when the war broke out. It is at any rate certain that tho peaceful penetration of Italy had for ycar3 past been carried out with a concentration even greater £han that shown in regard to otlier countries. But the war, which was originally caused by tho support given by Germany to an Austrian assault on Serbia (also, he it noted, on tlio eastern road), opened an horizon of fresh possibilities. Italy saved herself from the German net, but Bulgaria and Turkey became enmeshed. Hencefor. ward the path of policy was plain.

Conquering One's Friends. To conquer an enemy completely is difficult, out Germany has made the discovery that the complete conquest of friends is comparatively simple, iloro and more, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey, have become bound, to the will of Germany by tho chains of necessity, and tho final coup-de-grace to their liberties is only a matter of time, provided that tho ultimate peace bp negotiated and not dictated by tho Allies. With this explanation the German assault on Italy may bo described as a last stroke to complete the conquest of Austria. That conquest was almost assured when tho Austrian forces wero placed under tlio German High .Command, but a further act was necessary. It had to bo a striking act; spectacular effect was essential. At a timo when Austria, left largely to her own devices, had struggled through three years of the war with decreasing success, Germany, favoured by circumstances, was enabled to prove to her convincingly how completely she was dependent on her dominating ally. Owing to tho Russian debacle, and tho slowing down of operations caused elsewhere by. the approach of winter, a powerful German concentration was possible on the Italian front. Probably Germany has exaggerated the weight of this concentration. At any rate, to make her power the more impressive, she has paraded the magnitude of her effort to tho utmost. Tho forces actually employed have been sufficient for her purpose. By a swift blow she has won back, for the time being at least, what Austria had lost. After this, it is only natural to assume that Austria will becomo 6till more subservient. Tho oldest and most consistent of Prussian policies is very near its final fulfilment. But Germany is not yet clear of danger. In the West—and the West matters most—her armies are overmastered and condemned to slow, but consistent retreat. And the vast power of America has still to make itself felt. It is certain that Germany's victory over her Allies is complete, but ultimate defeat by her enemies is a chance which she cannot afford to despise. It threatens her increasingly; and decision on tho West would mean a dictated peace. ' If Germany's friends value liberty, the victory of her enemies is their last hone.