The Dominion. FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1918. PSYCHOLOGICAL DIPLOMACY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 98, 18 January 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1918. PSYCHOLOGICAL DIPLOMACY

Another political crisis in Germany seems to be imminent. It is stated tb.at the Pan-Germans are now masters of the situation as far as Germany's war policy is concerned, and that they are endeavouring to induce the Kaiser to give his support to a programmo of wholesale annexations. This would, it is contended, make it almost impossible for the Chancellor (Count Hertwng) and the Foreign Secretary (Herr von Kuhlmann) to .remain in office. The star of Hinder burg, Tirhtz, and Ludendorff appears to bo againNin the ascendant. The Junkers arc shrieking their shibboleths, and the "no-annexa-tions" party is finding it hard to get a hearing. But it is extremely difficult to discover the true meaning; tho real significance, of the periodical political crises which take ,placo in Germany. It is impossible to say whether tho present Pan-Ger-man outburst is a genuine expression of public sentiment or an artificially created demonstration engineered eitjier for homo consumption _ or for tho edification of the outside world. It ma'y be a part, of that "psychological process" upon which yon Kuhlmann places much reliance. It may bo part of his scheme for the creation of an atmosphere which he thinks no people will be able to resist in the long run. It may bo a phase of the "diplomatie offensive" by means of which the Kaiser and his advisers hope to socure a Gorman peace. Von Kuhi--Mann had a good deal to say about the "psychological process" in a rccent spccch to tho Main Committee of the Beiehstag. He asserted that it was already in operation and possessed an enormous attractive strength. _ It was an important element in Germany's peace policy. If' the creation of an atmosphere was persevered with the situation would, he contended, become more and more favourable to Germany. This would be proved in the days of negotiation.

When von Kuhlmann made that speech Germany's "game'' was to make tho world believe that she was desirous of coming to terms with her adversaries, and throwing the responsibility for continuing the struggle upon the Entente. At that time the Berlin authorities thought it would be good policy to please the Vatican by sympathetic references to the Pope's peace Note. Von Kuiilmann told tho Main Committee of the ltcichstag that the offer of a peace tolerable to them would gnaw at the heart of Germany's enemies, would multiply their doubts, and pave the way to understanding. When Germany's enemies were faced with tho decision, their troubles and failures would gradually force them into tho path of peace. The foreign Secretary carefully avoided making a definite statement of peace conditions or war aims, which would, he said, be the subject of "successive diplomatic conversations." The "psychological process" then demanded pious pacific platitudes to conciliate tho Vatican. Now the tono seems to have changed. The .Reichstag peaco resolution of July 19 has been thrown into the waste-paper basket, and the Junkers are being encouraged in their wild clamour for wholesale annexations. Instead of endeavouring to cajole tho Allies into the congress room, Berlin now seems to bo all the use it can of the psychological weapon in tho hope of frightening Germany's enemies into the acceptance of a premature settlement by negotiation. The German _ Government is naturally exploiting the llussian collapse to the uttermost, and is throwing increased energy into the "diplomatic offensive" in order to mako tho most of her chances before the full weight of the fighting power of the United States can be thrown into the scale. But the boasts and threats of the Pan-Germans are not likely to make any deeper impression on the Allies than the insincero peace talk of German politicians in reply to the Pope's Note. Indeed, Junker domination of German politics may play into tho hands of the Entente Powers by forcing a conflict between the Pan-Germans and the less extreme section of the Gorman people who realise that Junker dreams of indemnities and annexations can

never materialise, and who recognise that the longer the war lasts the more complete will he the- banknip tcy of Germany.

J.t is quite possible that. ' the Kaiser will find it necessary to dispense with the services ot Count lleii'l'lino. It is generally believed that his appointment as Chancellor in succession to Dii. Michaklis was a phase in the "diplomatic offensive." It was thought that Count Hurtling would be the person most fitted to secure "the utmost exploitation of the possibilities of the moment,'' to quote the significantwords of tho Vol nunc. Gazette. He is a Roman Catholic, and for a generation has conducted every important _ German negotiation with the Vatican. No doubt he was selected with the object of exploiting the influence of the Vatican. "Could there bo anybody," asked the Cologne Gazette, "who would seem more suitable, to play the part of honest broker than the man from Munich —anybody more suitable than the Pope's confidant, whose German patriotism cannot possibly be clourj'ccd?" Vox Kuhuiann strongly believed that Count Hkrtliso's appointment would fit in with the "psychological process," and he made use of his "psychological diplomacy" to bring about an understanding between the Count and tho Reichstag. According to th>: Berlin correspondent of the Frankfurter ZeiUlnrj the Foreign Secretary made special efforts to ensure the success of the negotiations, which were, on the point of collapse, between Count Hertmkg and leaders of the Majority parties, and "one may well think that he was guided by consideration for tho educative force" which tho issue of the crisis would exert abroad. It is possible that the Kaiser may' feel that a new "moment" has now arrived and that a new man must be found to exploit its possibilities and to exert an "educative force" abroad in favour of the Pan-German programme. A candid German newspaper regards diplomatic strategy in the form of peace talk as "the best toioral weapon for defence against an immense numerical superiority," and adds: "The history of the war in the last three months has shown plainly that our other weapons do not rust while the moral weapon is being used." Knowing this, the Allies would be guilty of suicidal folly if they r Mowed themselves to be diverted by a hair's breadth from their pai.h'to victory, cither by the shouts of tho Junkers or tho psychological methods • in which von Kuhlmann puts so much faith.