PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 97, 17 January 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Adding the statement by Mr. Bonar Law which is transmitted to-day to the- previous announcement that some responsible officers have been retired, it would appear that the essential facts relating to the J British reverse at Cambrai have been,] laid before the public. The War Cabinet exonerates the British High Command, and'by inference, admits j a local failure in the military machine. Tho failure- was, of course, serious, since it resulted in a material reduction of the success won in General Byno's brilliant attack and in some countervailing loss, but it cannot be regarded rs having any very vital bearing on the larger issues of tho campaign. That view could be taken only if it wero assumed that essential facts had been suppressed.

The arrest of M. Cailuux, an oxPremW of France, may perhaps lead vn to a climax in the exposure of the adventurers who have sought bv intrigue on Germany s behalf to bring the Allies, and particularly Franc? to that psychological catastrophe which, as Sir _ Auckland Geddes observes to-day is the only, thing that could save the Central p 0 M. Oaih-aux is accused of being implicated in many treasonable intrigues, and his _ trial should. become the occasion tor_ an. oxtrcmely thorough investigation. It is interesting that some oi the evidence against him is said to have ben supplied by the American Government as part of its exposure of Count Luxburg, the advocate ot hinking ships "without leaving a trace." „ „

Fortunately there is no reason to think that the part a few of its native or adopted citizens have played in treasonable machinations indicates any lack of honesty or resolution in the French nation. Such a record as France has established, is not sullied because she- has had the misfortune to harbour a few black sheep. The fact could not be better emphasised than in a noble vindication of his country penned by Gustavb Hervk on the occasion of the last anniversary of tho llarne. "The celebration of the victory of the Marne," he wrote "comes just in time to recall to all Frenchmen and to all who are not French that Franco is not summed up and incarnate in Duval and in 8010 nor in the few adventurers of nolitics and finance circling round them. That the victory of the Marne should have been possible, treasures of heroism were- necessary and the spirit of sacrifice and virtue in the whole of the nation, lliat tho Marne shonld have been possible, there had to be cultivated for generations in every French, family the feeling of personal dignity and individual honour and the spirit of unselfish sacrifice. In every school —'godless' school as well as religious Rchool—the teachers of children, with patience and perseverance and conscience, had planted in. the hearts of this present generation the seed of those social virtues which sprang up on the day when the call to arms was given. For years, it had been necessary that sets nf officers and under-officers should labour and apply themiiclves to their own technical instruction and to the technical instruction and to the military education of the twentyfive classes of conscripts. It was necessary that our General Staff should have prepared our plan for mobilisation. It was necessary that our engineers and railway workmen should apply the plan

with discipline a'ld devotedness on the day of concentration. And it was necessary that tho engineers and workmen of our mills and factories should Jong before have manufactured precious munitions—tools, of war—the wonderful 75-gim which, in August and September, ISM, played its part so well, and counterbalanced the power of the enemy's heavy artillery. And to-day, in tho fourth year of the war, Franco is neither Duval nor his accomplices. Franco its the millions of brave men and women who, at front or rear, do with conscience and probity and devotedness their daily task, which is to make France victorious. If France were rotten with traitors and dishonest men, do you really believe she would have done the Marne and Verdun 1"

It is of importance in itself and not without a general bearing on the war outlook that.uneasiness prevails in at least some sections of the population of Holland in regard to Germany's plans. Dealing with this matter tho Amsterdam correspondent of tile Mornwij l'nsi recently quoted the Nietnrs van den ?)('!/, a Dutch newspaper which does not approve of the attitude of the Dutch Government in regard to the sand and gravel question, as remarking that the danger for Holland threatened from tho east and n'ot from the west. It has often been said, the Nieuivs ran den Dag observes, that Holland covers Germany's western border splendidly. This, it continues, is true. But only a slight change is necessary fof it to bo true no longer. Therefore, j and also considering the constantly j decreasing exports to Germany, one j of the great interests that Germany ; has had so far in our neutrality i would lapse. "The phrase 'slight change, 1 " the correspondent remarks, "has reference to the possibility that in vi-jw of the constant progress of tho French, British, and Belgians in Flanders, and tho expected appearance of a big American force, on the sceno in Flanders next spring, the pressure of the Allies might become irresistible, ao that there would be a chance of Bruges, and, peihaps, Ghent, having to be given up, and therewith Zecbrujfge. 'Against its worst enemy, Britain,' the Amsterdam journal goes on Lo say. 'Germany has only ope formidable weapon, her submarines, as from a strategical point of view air raids do not count. The loss of Zeebnigge would considerably limit the use of this v/eapon, if not. make it impossible. We imagine that in that case Berlin would politely request the Government at The Hague to be allowed to dispose of the Scheldt in order to use Antwerp as a new base for the German submarines. As we in the autumn of 1914 emphatically maintained as against the Entente the closing of the Scheldt for war purposes, such a request would have to bo refused. And then, does anyone believe Germany would acquiesce in a refusal and sell her submarines for scrap ivonf "

In conclusion, the Kicmra van -Jen bay recalls an article published in the Kolnisrhr. Zcituntj of Oclobei , 27, in which the writer remarks that since the outbreak of the war the- Dutch forces have been increased by ;iOO,OOO trained men, that Holland has 21fi battalions of infantry, and that the artillery, aerial defence, etc., are well equipped. But. it is worth considering, the Xieuirs van den Day says, that in this article in the Knhnschc Zeihin;; it is repeatedly added: "And then we Germans, in case of an English attack, should naturally be prepared to give energetic support to the Dutch." As to this, the Nieinrs ran. (b'li Day, which does not beliave at all in a British landing on theDutch coast, says that it is just this "support" that arouses concern. "Never should the example of Belgium in 1914 be forgotten. As to our attitude, in view of such possibilities, the most serious danger is that which is not seen." These speculations arc interesting, both as indicating that in Holland, as elsewhere, the possibility of an enforced German retreat is already recognised, and as emphasising a danger against which it is necessary that the, Allies, as well as Holland, should take all possible precautions.