THE GERMAN LEGEND

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 96, 16 January 1918, Page 7

THE GERMAN LEGEND

WHO CAUSED THE WAR?

BERLIN LIES REFUTED

(By Professor D. J. Mediey, Glasgow University.) [Published by authority of the War Office, per favour of the Koyal Colonial Instituto.J Tho world has now heen at war for nearly three and a half years. We do not sufficiently remember that within that time a wholly new generation has come to manhood to whom the original causes of tho war are hut dimly known. The Germans have deliberately obscured the real reasons by building up a legend of the aims and actions of [ their opponents. It is necessary, therefore,, in the interests of truth to recall from timo to time tho actual circumstances under which we and our Allies accepted tho responsibilities of the great contest, which was thrust upon us. In a short article this is only pos T sible within severe limitations. And since the Germans concentrate the attention of the world more and more on tho conduct of the British Government in an endeavour to prove the innocence of their own motives, we cannot do better than to inquire shortly what aro the especial points which they stress in their indictment against us. To us it seems that Sir Edward Grey's endeavours were all for peace, even beyond I the moment when 't was dangerous to stand aside from tho contest which had already begun. By the Germans thin long abstention is interpreted as merely a more certain proof of a carefullysettled plan for forcing on the war for their destruction.

Four Points of Indictment. We may select four points by which they attempt to prove this. The first charge made is that we were the first of the Great Powers to mobilise, inasmuch as we had our fleet in readiness as early as July 24, 1914. even beforo Serbia, under threat of the Austrian ultimatum, had begun to prepare ber defence. In a circular note issued on December 24 of that rear the German Chancellor said that England was the first Great Power which ordered military preparations on a great scale, tnd thereby created a feeling, particularly in Russia and France, which was in the highest degree adverse to mediatory action.

To this charge we answer that the ordinary naval manoeuvres had just conw to an end and tho European situation was threatening. Mere common prudence dictated its retention. The Chancellor calls it a collection of the fleet at Portland. It was rather a non-dispersal of an already gathered fleet, and, unless it were moved into the North Sea, only by the stretch of a. maleficent interpretation could it be regarded as a threat to Germany. On July 27 Sir Edward Grey carefully explained the reason of this action to tho Austrian Ambassador.

A second and a third charge made by the Germans is that we gave a definite promise of help to Russia and to France. The Chancellor says that "London gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she was taking her stand on the side of Franco and Russia," and he asserted that "the Cabinet of London could have made this war impossible by declaring without ambiguity in Petrograd that England was not prepared to allow a Continental war m Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia. England," he adds, "saw her theories were moving, but aid nothing to spoke the wheel."

With regard to France, the charge against us is even more explicit. On August 2, even beforo Germany told Belgium , of her supposed necessity of violating the Belgian territory, England had promised her support unconditionally in the event of an attack by the German fleet on the French coast. Thus, it is triumphantly asserted, England was as a matter of fact in a state of war against Germany, and her declaration of war against Germany was not provoked, as England tried to make out, by the violation of Belgian territory.

Thus, the charge is that both positively and negatively the British Government encouraged Russia and France in an uncompromising attitude. If that was the case, then the Chancellor was right in concluding that, while the external responsibility for the outbreak of war is borne by these men in Russia who inspired and carried out the mobilisation of tho entire Russian Army, tho inner responsibility lies on the Government of Great Britain.

The only drawback is that this' , interpretation is contrary to all known tacts. Tims as to the charge that we positively encouraged Russia and France in an obstinate attitude, it may be pointed out that these countries represented to Great Britain as early as July 24 that a declaration of the solidarity of England with themselves was the best, and, indeed,. the only means of preventing au European conflict, while on July 30 and again on July 31 President Poincare mado the appeal to the same effect, and even tho Italian Minister Di San Giuliano expressed an identical view. And yet Great Britain was steadily deaf to all theso appeals. Her Government took up the attitude that Britain had no interests in Serbia, aiid would not go to war with her oven if tho conflict extended to an armed dispute between Austria and Russia; that the one chance of effective British intervention lay in the maintenance of a disinterested attitude, since her co-operation with France and Russia would only stiffen Germany's opposition; t'uat even if the conflict extended to Franco and Germany, sinco France would be brought in by her obligations towards Russia, England being iree from any engagements, would act in accordance with her own interests. And while tho British Government refused to give any pledge to the other members of the Entente, they warned Germany from the very first not to count on our neutrality if tho dispute sproad to Austria and Russia, since Germany and France would necessarily bo involved. As to tho question of the defence of the Fronch coasts, it may bo pointed out that tho arrangement under the Entente of 1904, .whereby tho French Fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean and the British Fleet in the Channel and the North Sea, placed an honourable obligation on us to see that Franco did noi suffer from this withdrawal of protection in a vulnerable spot. Moreover, since our promise to Franco was not given until war liad broken out between Franco and Germany, it can scarcely bn alleged as au incitement to war. , Then, as to our negativo Encouragement to Franco and Russia by our refraining from' checking them in their headlong course, it may bo premised that Russia's interest in tho Balkans was well known in Vienna and Berlin; that wo, as Russia's Ally, were bound to acknowledge it, whereas Austria had determined that no other Power should intervene in her punishment of Serbia, and Germany not only refused to restrain the action of Austria in any way whatever, but warned off with threats the interposition of any other Power: Furthermore, as a matter of fact, Great Britain urged moderation of action on Russia from tbo very first, and worked in cordial cooperation with tho French Government in the interests of arbitration; while her refusal to declare a solidarity with them was no small deterrent to hasty action mi their pall. Then, when on July 29, the Gorman Chancellor made the insulting bid for British neutrality, the British Government knew that Germany was contemplating a war with

France, which, as tho Germans had often threatened, would at least "bleed her white." Tho German accusation that England did not press Russia to ■ suspend her mobilisation is absolutely i untrue. But ws could only press it on tho understanding that Austria should suspend her preparations while Austria continued liors against Russia would have boon just tho insult which Germany herself inflicted upon Russia. i We Plotted With Belgium! Tho final charge to bo noticed is that wo hail plotted with Belgium against Germany. "Belgium," said tho Chancellor before tho Reichstag on Decombor 2, lOl'l, "had long before tho war given up her neutrality in favour of England. We had," ho asserts of his Government, "indications of it, but only got proofs from documents in Brussels. There, tho Anglo-Belgian plans of. war have-been unveiled in all their c'otails." _ These proofs, of courso, aro contained in the conversations hold in 1906 and 1912 between British and Belgian officers as to a. common courso of action in the event of a German invasion of Belgium, and Sir Edward Cfrcy explained that theso conversations were provoked by tho development of strategic railways along the German sido of tho Belgian frontier.

We may ansner the Chancellor out of his own mouth. In his celebrated speech to the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, ho gave no hint whatever of tho knowledge of any relations between Britain and Belgium, while he did frankly acknowledge that the German invasion of Belgium was a breach of international law, a wrong, justified only by necessity, called for by tho menace, not of Britain, but of France. The Chancellor tells us that he had indications long before the war of Belgiums 1 unneutral attitude. No proofs whatever of this have ever been given to tho world, whereas long bsforo tho war it was known in every War Office in Europe that Germany had planned tho next attack upon France through Belgium. And Germany had acknowledged her intention. In 1911 the Chancellor, with a view to allaying the distrust of Belgium, declared to that Government that, while Germany had no intention of violating German neutrality, yot she could not mako a. public declaration to that effect, since that would weaken her military position with regard to France, who, secure at her northern side, would concentrate all her enorgici! on the oast. Thus Germany deliberately wished Franco to believe that Germany was capable of repudiating her pledged word. From such an attitude of mind it was but a short step to tho course which Germany actually took. And, moreover, all Europe knew that the Germans intended to take it.