THE ALLIES' VIEW

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 95, 15 January 1918, Page 5

THE ALLIES' VIEW

TERMS OF A LASTING PEACE

INTERESTING SURVEY OF POLICY

The changes in tho map of Europe which wo advocate are all changes which would emancipate peoples or provinces now under an alien yoke (writes Mr. G. W. Prothero, in an article that is given added interest by tho recent statements of Mr. Lloyd George- and President Wilson). They aro not conquests made by a great Power for her own ends, conquosts which violato tho principle of nationality. No State profits by the changes in Poland or in tho Austrian Empire, or in the Balkans, excepting the States which are themselves to be emancipated. The retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine would merely be the undoing of a wrong done nearly forty years ago, while the expulsion of the Turk from Europe would bo the well-merited reward of century-old misconduct and cruelties innumerable. Our aims, therefore, cannot fairly bo put in anything like the same class as those of tho Central Powers.

Peace made now on the basis of the war-map of to-day could not possibly embody the principles which President .Wilson has stated as requisite for permanent peace. On tho contrary, it would violate them by sanctioning some at least, probably a large part, of the conquests made by Germany; therefore, sucli a settlement would be merely a truce, teeming with the germs of future wars. In any case it would not bo a peace without-vic-tory, for it would mean tho victory of Germany—not perhaps such a victory as she at one time expected, but still a very real victory, which would leave her in an advantageous position for reviving her career of aggression with good hope of success. A peace restoring pre-war conditions would leavo unsettled all the questions out of which the present war arose; consequently war would be likely to recur as soon as the exhaustion of belligerent resources had passed away; in short, it could not be a permanent peace. Moreover, to obtain oven such a peace as this without tho decisive defeat of Germany is evidently out of the question. A peace based on the conditions set forth by the Allies is tho only sort of peace which has a chance of being permanent, because it would heal those sores, in tho body -politic which are the germ of future wars, and would apply those principles which are recognised as necessary for permanent peace. . .

The Allies' Conditions. The conditions we propose would, it is true, entail the disruption of the Austro-Hivngarinn Empire and the overthrow of Turkey, the two chief Allies of Germany; hut both these States have become anachronisms, and Austria-Hungary in particular embodies the most flagrant violations of the principles of nationality that are to be found in the modern world. But to Germany herself we desire to do no violence beyond the retrocession of 'Alsace-Lorraine, and the surrender of Prussian Poland in order to form an independent Polish Kingdom. As I have already said, we have no wish to impose on Germany such conditions as Napoleon imposed on Prussia in 1807. Germany would remain a great and potent nation ; possibly ever stronger than before if the German parts of 'Austria should gravitate, as they well' might do, towards the German Empire. She would still he free to develop her industry and commerce on peaceful lines; and would be able, as before, to play a leading }>arfc on tho political stajp of the world. Why should solution leave behind ft a permanent?) sense of soreness or desire of revenge?

What is the verdict of history as shown by earlier wars and pacifications? In theory, a peaca without victory sounds well; but, as a matter of historical fact, permanent peace has never resulted from such a conclusion to a great war. Take the wars fought in opposition to Louis XlV's attempt to dominate Europe. ■ One after another these wars recurred for some fifty years; and, none of them'having been really decisive, it was not until 1713 that tha Peace of Utrecht finally settled the question by the defeat of France. . Take, again, the War of the Austrian Succession, which began in 1740 and ended in a sort of draw. The Peace of 1748 was merely a truce; it led on to the Seven Years' War, which ended in 1763 with the defeat of Franco and Austria, and with "the final triumph of Frederick the Great in Europe and of England in India and the New World.

finally, the wars against the French Eevolution and Napoleon. Coalition after coalition was formed .and broke up without reaching a defin- : ite settlement. The Peace of Amiens ,in 1803 was merely a tnice between the litwo chief opponents—England and '(France. It was not till after tho 'liattles of Leipzig and Waterloo and tho j complete defeat of France that a settlement was reached in tho peace of 1815, i "which gave Europe repose for at any : rate forty years. In fact, the only war I can recall which ended in a peace 'without victory and yet a permanent .peace was the war of 1812, which arose 'out of a comparatively trivial dispute 'i'nnd ended when, with'the cessation of j the war in Europe, tho dispute itself came to an end. The two great Tars .which the United States have known ■—the Revolutionary War and the Civil , : War —both ended in decisive victories. •'Nothing less would have satisfied eilher '.the revolted colonies or the Northern States. Everyone knows how Lincoln repudiated tho idea of an inconclusive peace in the dark days of the Civil iWar. There never was a more crushing victory than that of the North in '1865; yet permanont peace was the cut come of that victory as of that of •Whatever soreness was left behind it did not lead to other wars. 0;i tho contrary, peace was maintained, because the great questions at issue vero settled in each case onco fer all. In short, I think it may fairly bo said that tho idea of establishing a permanent peace by a peace without victory is falsified by history and is nothing else but a delusion.

To sum up, I put before you this ■dilemma: You may have peace tiow, hut it will not be a peace without victory, i for it will mean victory for Germany; or you may have a peace wifcliout victory, if you mean by that phrase a icturn to former conditions, l:ut it cannot be now, for the Germans as at present situated would uot dna:n of allowing it. Moreover a poaco now ■would not be'a permanent peace, for it would lead on to other wars; and the samo may be said even of a pence "without victory for either side. The one solution which offers any real chance of permanent peace is that embodied in the terms of the Allieb. But victory, even more decisive than that which might lead, to a restoration of pre-war conditions, is required to hi ing it about. And that is why th& Allies refuse to contemplate peace at tin's moment, in spite of all ilie sufferings they have endured and have still to endure; and why they will not contemplate it until they hayu reduced Germany to such a condition as will make her ready to accept their terms.