THE PRICE OF PEACE

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 90, 9 January 1918, Page 6

THE PRICE OF PEACE

WHAT UNBEATEN GERMANY WOULD DEMAND

FACTS OF THE WAR MAP

Tlic rulers of Germany, while abstain- a ag from stating their peace terms in "'< my but the most vague manner, are qjnaking in clear enough that they con- " ider the war map should be the basis if negotiation. That is to say, they ™ ,re either to retain possession of the "' Ulied territories they now occupy, or ai ilso thoy are to be'bought out of those- ui orritorics by concessions of some kind ot ■lsevhere. This point is emphasised « ly Mr. G. W. Prothero in a pamphlet J fiat has been circulated officially. tc Mr. Prothero points out that the w iill Pan-German plan, as stated again <JI ind again by prominent Germans dur- cl ng the course of the war, would in,'olvc the retention of all the occupied M ;erntories and the maintenance of tho « mp that Germany now has upon her tc lilies, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and « I'urkey. Germany would become tho c ' lominant Power in Europe and in a CI large part of Asia. She would bold " Belgium and 'the French mining dig- w tricts, and would threaten England °' across the narrow sea. She would rule Poland and Lithuania, would con- « trol the Balkans, and would _ stretch strong hands through Asia Minor to- & , wards Egypt, Persia, and even India. c < This is the fully-developed Pan-German «j plan, which some Germans appear to v" think even to-day may be realised « through the present war. ' ~ But supposing that the Germans are *' ready to abandon part of their con- " quests, the question arises what parts » might be abandoned. On this point u the Eastern and Western schools are [ " in conflict. ' Tlie Easterners, who re- u , gard expansion towards the east and * south-east as the primary aim of German policy, who dread, or pretend to : dread, Russia as tho great menace to Ji Germany, who have their eyes fixed on J ; Constantinople and the Bagdad rail- £ way—these men \yould be ready, in |- order to retain their eastern and south- ° eastern conquests, to givo up Belgium and Northern Franco,, insisting only on certain strategic rectifications of frontier in the West. Of these men, Prince von Bulow is, perhaps, the chief; c Hans Delbruck, a very important pub- v licist, seems to adopt similar views; the fl great bankers and others, who seo un- } limited possibilities for the lucrative a employment of capital in the Balkans r and iii- Western Asia, take the same , side. To abandon their Western conquests would, they think, buy off . tho opposition of the Western Allies, . and at the same time conciliate neu- 1 tral feeling. i f England the Enemy. , The Westerners, on tho other hand, ' who are not afraid of Russia, but regard England as the great enemy, < would cling at all costs to Belgium and the North-western French coast, . feeling that, if they could be in a position to threaten England and to overrun France at any moment, they < •could revive their advance in the south-east whenever they pleased. Admiral von Tirpitz and the Navy league are strong supporters of this policy; so also are the Colonial Party and the great manufacturers of Westphalia, who find the natural exit for their overseas trade ,in the North Sea'. In fact, all those who believe that "the future of Germany lies upon the water," in the Kaiser's phrase, would Cling to their Western conquests, especially Autwerp and the Flemish coast. Now, even if we leave the extremists out of account (says Mr. Prothero), there is no probability what- ' ever that Germany, entering a Peace Conference in tho present state of things, would go beyond making ono or other, of these groups of concessions. She would certainly not make all three. She might abandon either Belgium and Northern France, or Pol-* and and Courland, or Serbia, Montenegro and Wallachia; she would not dream of abandoning all these conquests at once. Why should she i She is not beaten yet. She holds these conquests still, and would make Full use of the principle Beati possidentis. ' political Results. What would be the political result of leaving Germany in possession pi any of its conquests, in the East, tho ' South-East, or the West? Suppose, first that' Germany retained the conquered parts of Russia,. Courland, and the Baltic Coast up to, and'perhaps including, Riga, and made Russian Poland an autonomous kingdom, as she has proclaimed her intention or doing. Russia wo/uld be left 'in a defenceless condition.. Strategically, the loss would be fatal, for Germany would take care to secure an impregnable line of defence. The new kingdom of Poland, which it is proposed to put under a Gorman or an Austrian prince, would inevitably gravitate to the Central Powers and he absorbed in tho German Zolverem; and , economical absorption would lead on to political. We must 'remember that the Central Powers have no intention whatever of releasing the Polish pro-vinces-Posen and Galicia r wh.cli now form part of their dominions. These are to remain as they were. Such a result would leave Germany free to pursue her machinations in the Balkans unchecked. . Suppose, next, that Germany retained the advantages she has .won in the South-East. The destruction of'Scr--1 bia the annexation of Montenegro and : the greater part of Albania, -s well a , of Wallachia, the enormous adcliP tions to Bulgaria and her alliance with the Central Powers, would make those powers dominant in the Balkans and would mean also the absorption ot Turkey into the Central-European sys--1 tern 'From Constantinople eastward. German influence would be extended by ' the Ba-'dad railway and its branches , over AsTa Minor and Mesopotamia, over Syria and Palestine; and British hold oil Egvpt and India would be gravely imperilled. It would be in tho power of Germany, whenever she felt ready , for a new advance, to deal a deadly blow at the British Empire in its most vulnerable narts. German writers like ■ Paul Rohrbach, Roventlow, and many ■ others, make no secret of the fact that , this is their principal aim in tho Dranp i nacli Osten—the eastward expansion ot Germany. The principle of nationality ' would be violated in Poland, in Serbia, . and Montenegro, in Macedonia and Rumania—in short, all along the lino. There remains the third possible comi promise. Suppose that Germany con- " sonted to give up hor conquests in the • East and South-East, but retained thoso in the West, at all events her hold on Belgium, with a rectification (for strategic purposes) of the French frontier. What would be tho result? In '• the first place, France, surrounded on ' two sides by the German Empire, would 1 be helpless before the advance of the 1 'German armies. Next, Antwern would • become what • Napoleon called it ' -a pistol pointed at the heart ; of England; and ZoebrOßffe. already " «. "real submarine depot, would bo 1 little less important. With Belgium > in German hands. Calais. Boulogne, and ■ even Havre, would hardly bo tenable m • the event of war. Antwerp could eas- ■ ilv be made,an impregnable fortress. 1 the Dutch would be forced to nb.inrlon • their bold on the Scheldt and wobably ■ on Flushing as well,' mid to allow free 3 passage for German ships of war and 3 commerce up and down the river. 1 The mouth of the Scheldt would be ■ converted into another and a stronger Wilholnishavcn, a great military har-

bour within eighty miles of the inoutb' of the Thames. . Nor would the expansion of Germany stop there. Holland, thus encircled by German territory, would, even if sha did not in theory lose her independence, inevitably become, to all intents and purposes, part of the German Empire.' Rotterdam would soon be as much a Gorman port as Antwerp- Denmark would probably have to follow suit; Norway and Sweden and Switzerland would bo practically helpless before such a Power. IV principle of nationality would hn violated not only by the conquest of Belgium, but by the practical absorption of tho other small States. It "is abvious, then, that to leave Germany in possession of Belgium would be fatal to the security of Franco and Groat Britain; and I lay stress upon this fact, becauso the first duty of any State is. self-preservation—tho safeguarding of its own independence,; without which it can do nothing to protect its honour or the interests of its weaker friends and neighbours. But, quite apart from this, it is equally, clear that we could not, while we have breath in our bodies, abandon tho. cause of Belgian iudependonce, -which wo are bound in honour to defend, and for the sake of which we entered on this war. It was not only the prime cause, but, at tho outset, the solo cause, for which wo elected to fight. It was the cause which united tlra whole nation, without respect of creed or party, in one solid resolve. Our national honour was involved; wo could do naught else. Tho German attack on Belgium,; apart' from tho atrocities which a<y companied it, was as flagrant a violation of national rights and international law, of common justice and tho> dictates of humanity, as has ever beeti committed in the history of the world/ It is a test case, not for us only, but for all mankind. To condone such a wrong, to leave ithe plunder in the hands* of the criminal, would be fatal to the honour and to the interests, noli of Great Britain only, but of all be? Allies. Even neutral States—such at' least as are in a position to they consented to such a.failure of justice, would be participants in tho crime. The whole world may bo thankful thai! the most powerful neutral, the Onitcd States, has now come to see tho.neces-' sity of intervention, and has decided ttf throw its moral , weight and its, iuw monse resources into the scale. No Compromise Possible.

I conclude, then, that none of thtf compromises to which I have referred would be acceptable. And I would offer these further considerationsWhichever form of compromise wo adopt, thore would be no hope of manent peace in such a solution. ID would merely be a truce. Armaments would be redoubled; The utmost tension would and before lona another war or a series of wars would

break out, to end only in a crushing victory for one side or tha other—the* side which claims universal dominion, or x the side%hich supports freedom and nationality. Where, again, would be the "freedom of the seas," 'with Germany hold-' ing the Dutch and Flemish coasts in the hollow of her hand, and able bj her influence in Denmark to close the Baltic? We have seen a little lately, of the way in which Germany interprets the phrase, and can guess what sort of freedom seafaring neutrals would. enjoy .when Germany possesses a fleet equal to the British (as she would strive to make it) and a host oS U-boats, or rather submarine com-' merce-destroyers, as superior to those with which she began the war as a swarm of hornets is to a column o! gnats hovering in the summer sun.

Demooraoy on Trial,

Lastly, what would be the fate of democracy in Europe? It would hava failed—dismally failed—in the conflict with organised and intelligent autocracy. And it would have failed owing to the defects which seem characteristic of democracy—unpreparedness and want of foresight. Germany would have won, for a compromise of any 6orb would be a victory for Germany,'even if her gains were less than has been assumed. And she would have won by virtue of the advantages which an intelligent autocracy can offer—because she was organised and ready, and tho Allies were not. She won in the first fifteen months of war; the Battleof the Marne merely prevented her victory from being crushing and complete; and we have been trying ever since; so far without much success, to undo the results of those early victories. Democracy might retain the sympathies of all lovers of liberty as tlie best method of domestic government, but it would have shown itself to be a system ivnablo to sav6 the State from loss or even from destruction. •