RUSSIA AND THE BOLSHEVIKI

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 86, 4 January 1918, Page 6

RUSSIA AND THE BOLSHEVIKI

: THE SEPARATE PEACE ISSUE INTERESTING REVIEW OF THE SITUATION ' I Mr. Robert Crozier Long, to whom the New York "Evening Post" readers are indebted for some of the most illuminating and far-sighted corres-, pondenco from Russia published in any . American newspaper sinco tho beginning of the war, has just arrived in thai country. Mr. Lang has been in Petrograd since the Revolution of last March as a correspondent of the Associated Press. He has been an observer aud student of Russia at 'irsthand for twenty years. He waa sent to Moscow in 1898 by the late Mr. W. T. Stead to work for better Anglo-Rus-sian relations; _he has written books on Russian affairs, translated and first introduced to the English-speaking peoples the writings of Anton Tcherkhoff ; saw tho revolution of 1905-6, and was at the Russian front to see the RussoGerman battles of 1914-15. To a reporter, of tho "Evening Post" "Mr. Long pointed out that the Bolsheviki coup d'etat is not 'being quite correofiy judged by Americans. "The Bolsheviks," he began, "do not' demand a separate peace. Their obsession is an immediate and general peace; and their triumph will not n]ean entering into negotiations with Russia's enemies. It means demanding peace from all belligerent Governments, or, as is more likely, from all belligerent proletariats. There is no separatepeaco party in Russia. ' M. Kerensky told me during the Korniloff revolt that in Russia there is probably not even a separate-peace individual.

Their Peace Policy. "When, in Prince Lvoff's time—after Miliukoff's fall—the Council of Deputies forced upon the Provisional Government the policy of a speedy peaco without annexations and contributions, the Bolsheviks and the Moderate Socialists: (Mensheviks, Social-Revolution-aries, and Populist Socialists), both favoured this peace policy, Russia, they held, could induce all the Allies to make peace. Tho Bolsheviks soon af- • towards began to - complain that first Lvoff's Cabinet and later the Kerensky Coalition Cabinets did not press this policy on tho Allies with sufficient vigour, and that the Cabinets .•were not sincere. The Bolsheviks boasted that if their demand 'all power to the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies,' was realised, they would induce the Powers to make a general peace. That is their dream . now. If, as seems inevitable, they fail, they may threaten to make a separate peace; but not even Lenin or Trotsky has so far publicly championed a sep-arate-peace policy. i "On September 27, tho day of the opening or the Preliminary Parliament;, I talked with Trotsky on this subject. He said: 'Russia could not make a separate peace, because she could not face the problem of disbanding her Army and re-establishing her finances and economical stability. without loreign help.' "The. critical attitude of the Allies' " Press to the Bolsheviks is thoroughly justified. - The mass of Bolsheviks are not conscious traitors or paid German agents; hut they are impractical, pclitically ignorant, men. Some of them, like Lenin and Tcliernoff, late Minister of Agriculture (who is'nominally a Social Revolutionary), were in close touch with Germany; and some accepted German money, in the belief that cuy weapon against the autocracy was legitimate. But the Germans could not corrupt the millions of Bolshevik soldiers and civilians. The real source of Bolshevikism is to be found in the backwardness of Russians, and thoir trend towards political abstractions and supposed first principles ,of government. Tlfese first principles are usually only empty phrases, but they dominate the i innumerable sovieti, soviestheniya ' (councils), komiteti, fend other meetings which meet every day. The Moscow Congress and the Petrograd Pie-j liminary Parliament, .at both of which I was present, were almost 1 entirely devoted to renunciation of political principles.

Trotsky a Good Speaker. "The, masters of this method on the two Socialist 'sides are Leon Trotsky and Tseretelli, who , are both orators of fire and temperament.. The ProviBional Parliament began as a conflict Jbetween those two. Trotsky is a firstclass speaker, who could inspire a mob [without harm in any country which is blessed with solidified parties and mogrammes; but Russia has neither: sii from mere orators like Tseretelli, Trotskyj and, indeed, Kerensky, she cannot get concrete proposals for reconstrac. tion. The titular Bolsheviki leader, ILenin, is a more capable and an even more dangerous man than Trotsky, and he is more in- German hands. "The fall of Kerensky was inevitable. The revolution of this week only registered the fact of his failure, known to every one in Russia before the Moscow Congress of August, The new revolution is not a conflict between the sound system of Kerensky and the riiimeras or treason of the Bolsheviki. The Kerensky system was hopeless, and it fell because its time had come. It was bound to fall either at the hands of the Bight (the Constitutional-Demo-crats and other Intelligentsiya' with the Moscow industriafgroup and military men of the Korniloif and Lukomsky type), or at the hands of tho extreme Loft, the Bolsheviki. ' It fell at the hands, of the Left because tho devolution, like the French Revolution, was destined to i\un its extreme course before a reaction towards common sense could set in. The limit seems to have been reached this week, as there is no .party worth mentioning more extreme than the party of Lenin and Trotsky; and the reaction ■will come as soon as the Bolsheviki have shown in practice their political incompetence. The Korniloif revolt came too soon; but a fresh_ revolt of similar character seems inevitable and next time it may succeed.

: "Kerensky's political career really ended last August.when Governmental anarchy and irresolution disgusted all Russia and enforced the summoning of the Moscoiv. Congress. I do not think thero is any chance of Kerensky's return to power. Not lie but tho bourgeoisie and the industrials are tho effective foes of Bolshevikism. Kerensky is a inan of personality, hut not a man of character. He dominates an assembly, hut has no policy in a coun- j cil chamber. He was in Korniloff's | plan to crush the Bolsheviki; but ho withdrew from it, according to a statement made to me by M. Gobetchiya, now Chief Commissary of tho Caucasus army, 'owing to lack of nerve.' If lie had' taken slieht risks he could liavo crushed the Bolsheviki on half a dozen occasions. I believe that the present defection of tho Cossacks is due to the fact that they saw ho would never strike. , ' Kerensky Irresolute. "At Moscow and again during the jKorniloff revolt, Kerensky repeatedly announced that ho was resolved to prush revolts, whether from Rigjit or Jjeft, 'with blood and iron'; but ho showed always indecision, as did Prince Jjvoff in the early stages of revolutionary disorder. It was not he, but his assistant, Savinkoff, Acting War Minister and commander of the Petrograd Military District, who organised resistance to Korniloif. In fact, Kornilolf svaa beaten because his soldiers refused

to fight, aud not because the Kerensky Cabinet was ready to tight.

".Korensky 1 have seen often, and I interviewed him three times during the Xornilolf week. He was accused of posing, aud thoro was truth in the accusation; but ho is a patriotic man, and ho could hold bis own under conditions wherein oratory alone dominated.' Ho is totally unablo to act. Tho one capable and practical man who has come to the front is Savinkoif. Savinkotf is an ox-Terrorist, an'd under the autocracy was actually organiser of assassination plots. When an exile in Paris, ho wrote under tho pseudonym 'Ropskiu' a novel called 'That Which Was Not,' which had tremendous success ; but he is primarily a man of action. It was he, not kerensky, who temporarily re-established army discipline by restoring capital punishment at tho front—ho was then chief commissary. Ho was a sworn foo of Bolshevikism.

"Iu the Korniloff week he told me: 'Now that we have finished with Korniloff, wo shall turn against the Bolsheviks.' This policy was a sound one, but Kerensky lacked tho nerve to support it; and, after being attacked by tlio 'Izvestiya,' organ of tho Petrograd Council or Deputies, Savinkoff was forced to'resign. The last story was that he had enlisted as a private. Hd is a man of middle age, with resolute features, decisive and simple manner of expression; and he may como to tho fore again. Ho said to me that 'victory in tho war for Russia is an absolute necessity. The blow to her national self-consciousness which would result from defeat would complote the process • of disintegration induced by the revolution.'' "I do not expect there will be civil war in Russia, or even anythmg like systematic disorder on a great scale. There are no two clear-cut opposing interests. Kerensky is unfit to overthrow tho Bolsheviks. Newspapers- are mistaken in representing Bolshevikism as dominating exclusively in Petrograd and in representing Moscow to be a centre of moderate (Menshevik) Socialism. 1

"The position is tbis: Formerly in both'cities the Bolsheviks were in a minority in the Councils of Deputies. The Kornilolf Tevolt led to a panic rush towards the Left by all who feared military despotism or a new autocracy; and the Bolsheviks, in a reelection, captured tho Potrograd Council. A week or so later they captured the Moscow Council. Moscow is Bolshevik, if loss so than Petrograd. In the Pan-Russian Executive Committee of Councils (representing councils all over the Empire) the Bolsheviks are still id a minority; and in the Council of Peasants' Deputies, which sometimes sits with and collaborates _ with the Pan-Russian Executive Committee, the Bolsheviks make no show. Dominant here are the relatively reasonable Social-Revolutionaries, who are essentially a peasant party. /

Bolsheviks do not Dominate. "It follows that in all Russia the Bolsheviks do not dominate. But revolutions are decided on the spot: Petrograd made the revolution _ of March, Petaograd overthrew Prince Lvoff, and I'otrograd alone could overthrow Kerensky. Moscow, unless there has been some change since I left, will support Petrograd. By\ Moscow 1 mean tho workmen and soldiers represented in the Council —in both cities the Intelligentsia aiid tho bourgeoisie are disgusted with all forms of Socialist domination. ' I do not see how ,tlw fact of a, Pan-Russian majority against the Bolslieyiks can upset- MM. Lenin and Trotsky—it would upset them if there was organised civil war, but there is not. "Bolshevikism will probably kill itself, as did the system of Prince Lvoff and the system of M. Kerensky. It has not the material force behind it to carry out its chief programme item —to expropriate land systematically and immediately; all it can do is to incite the peasants to agrarian rioting; but such disorder will recoil on its own head. It has not tho prsstigeor experience to influence the Allies to'wards'peace. It cannot collect taxes —even the relatively sensible Kerensky Cabinet could not do that. Possibly power will give it a'little responsibility ; already' there are signs of that. Four months ago 1 its organ, the "I'ravda," threatened a massacre of the bourgeoisie, but present reports show that it is being compelled to make a show of keeping order in Petrograd. ' "The danger is not from its extremism, .which it may grow out of, but from the complete political incompetence of its leaders and rank and file. Its triumph will undoubtedly ■ weaken the Allies, as the arrests and depositions of competent officers on political grounds must injure the Army, even 3' there is no wholesale ;Arniy dissolution. This, however, like other Bolshevik blunders, is merely a continuation of tho Kerensky system. After the Korniloff revolt, Kerensky, in order to propitiate these same Bolsheviks, removed hundreds of competent officers. M. Kerensky and the so-called Moderate Socialists were members of (and even leaders of) the Council of Deputies wllen it, set itself to undermine Army discipline by, framing the notorious Army order No. 1; they had a majority in the Council, and they allowed the Council—as Korniloff rightly put it—'to sell Russia's Army for a mess of rhetorical pottage.' When tho fruits of their ill-advised measures became ripe in the shape of Army indiscipline and anarchy, they tried to mena matters by reintroducing capital punishment, and by executing soldiers for doing exactly what they had advised or condoneij.

Many Political Blunders. "All the Left parties have blundered hopelessly. They blundered through unfitness. The Constitutional-Demo-crats and other non-Socialists when in power blundered, not through unfitness, but through lack of power. The first revolutionary administration of Prince Lvoff was ideal; its measures were just and progressive,'without being anarchial and visionary; but it had no forc,e behind it. Force was in the hands of the Councils, that is of scandalously incompetent and. visionary groups. The more reasonable Socialists, notably Tseretelli, rightly resisted the handing over to the Councils of all power, because they knew that the Councils were "lot fit to rule. Now this tragedy has taken place. Probably in the end it will be no misfortune. The weak Kerensky system had to go; its continued existence retarded the natural process of decomposition which must precede reconstruction; anl now that the decomposition is proceeding at full speed, wo may hope for a recovery. "Tho personalities and the processes by which recovery will be achieved are not yet in sight. But they will come. Russia is a voiine; and healthy organism, temoorarilv diseased; but the Russians, though they lack the Euronnar instinct for order. have freat qualities —notably a belief, in " ideas nwl hatred of violence, which most Europeans lack. I do not believe that Russia will nerish: but I believe that things will get,-worse until they reach the stage at which they bpcoroe unbearable even to long-suffnrina Russians; and then the nation will revert towards order and Dolicv. It is doubtful onlv whether this will come before tho end of the war.''