JAPAN AND THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 86, 4 January 1918, Page 5

JAPAN AND THE WAR

' WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A TRANS-SIBERIAN ARMY The following article by Jacques d'Urville, in the "Pall Mall Gazette," suggests What might havo been but for the defection of Russia. Whilst the Germans proclaim from tho housetops the easy victory which the disorganisation of the Russian forces has permitted them to gain at Riga, from America, he say 6, comes a retort which has already visibly disturbed them._ The' reception accorded to the Mission o£ Viscount Ishii, the stirring words pronounced at Washington's grave and in the House of Representatives, leave no doubt as to tho importance of the jiegotiations in.progress in tho American capital and to be attached to tho decisions which are being arrived at. ' The /United States and Japan, to use tho picturesque expresßon of Mr. Motono, Minister of Foreign Affairs in tho Cabinet at Tokio, are working ardently to inaugurate the "era of the Pacific." '

In order to face the Gorman peril they are applying themselves fervently to the task, not only of reducing fhe demands of private interests —hitherto intensely at variance—but still more to find a practical means of uniting their resources with a view to helping the Powers, who for three years have been engaged in a merciless etruggle,, towards a. speedy completion of .their work for the salvation of the world. Once mora tho policy of Wilhelmstrasse, a monstrous, combination of treachery and force, lias ended 1 in drawing together two rival nations, whose quarrels Germany had prided herself upon envenoming to a point beyond reconciliation.

The Yellow Peril. It was, however, to be foreseen that the mere prospect of German hegemony over an enslaved or enfeebled Europe—a hegemony which might extend to the Asiatic countries—must cause tho Governments of Tokio and Washington "to rise up in defence of a common interest, and make their reconciliation an imperative political necessity. Japan, especially, by favouring the anarchy which reigns ill all the centres of Muscovito activity, would only admit German influence nearer and nearer to tho Far East; to avoid this, her course must bo to substitute an Allied Russia. The entry of America has considerably modified the, of the future. No secret consideration of personal 6afety prevents tho Government _ of tho Mikado from participating m the world war to-day. Even its political exigencies must ba reduced in so far as, apart from Tsing-Tao, Japan possesses the Marshall Islands, the y Marianas, and tho Caroline Archipelago. Two million Japanese are also said to be massed on'the Manclrarian frontier, ready to unfurl the standard of the Rising Sun. " 1■ •' ( But. in the meantime, obstacles present themselves. Certain spirits oppose the creation of a precedent by the intervention of Asiatics in European conflicts. "With disconcerting logic they ; blindly aocopt Japanese naval co-oper-ation 'in Mediterranean waters, but condemn tho setting out of the smallest battalion of "Japs" towards no mat- < ter which point or. the immense front, , where human lives are mowed down by thousands every day.

I Tho Transport pijfiouity. , ; Political preoccupations of the future must efface themselves before tho tragic realities of the moment. Certainly, the victory of the Allies is obtain, and but for the criminal follies of the Maximalists the intervention of America, herself need not have been necessary. But meanwhile the Russian giant staggers, blood-reddened with anarchy; the moral of tho faerman nation benefits by easy victories gamed over an enemy who yields th# ground; the million men detained b&vond tho Atlantic will not be ready for action till next spring; Rumania, despite her heroism, in agony awaits tna arrival of succour; Serbia, Belgium, and Northern Franco groan under the most odious yoke; dead, bereaved, ana ruins accumulate while a sign would suffico to range on tho battlefront two million Japanese, armed and ready, to shorten all this human misery._ "hat do all considerations, all prejudices, and even a few political sacrifices matter compared with tho result to be obtained? , , . An objection that will be raised is that transport difficulties aro the most serious obstacle to the use of Japanese contingents in the West. According to the possibilities of _ traffic on the Trans-Siberian in 1905, it would require, iu fact, five months to bring a million men to the Russian front. In spito of tho systematic disorganisation pursued by a certain Russian Minister during the last three years is it possible that these things havo not been improved upon sines then? If prodigies accomplished by the "Poilus or the "Tommies," who construct roads and railways in a ridiculously short time aro taken into account, what may one not expect from ten million Chineso labourers, drawing their equipment from tho United States or from Japan, and putting forth their maximum effort, under the direction of American engineers? It is quito certain, moreover, that there could not be a moro easy employment, nor one more immecliatcly productive, and perhaps moro rational, for the forces of our Japanese Ally than to reserve them only for tho Russian front? One or two Japanese armies at desired points would soon givo appreciable results. The essential thing is to hurry.