The Dominion. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1917. WHY THE BOLSHEVIK PEACE PROPOSALS WILL FAIL

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 79, 27 December 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1917. WHY THE BOLSHEVIK PEACE PROPOSALS WILL FAIL

To-day's news relating to Russia has two main points of interest. It is indicated that a serious hitch has arisen in the negotiations between the Bolsheviki and the Central Empires, and at the same time it is suggested, with every appearance of probability, that the latter a.re merely utilising the peace negotiations as a cloak, and are industriously scheming to extend their present hold on Russia as far as possible while the Bolshevik regime continues. As regards the hitch in negotiations it is stated in a Petvograd message that the Russian peace proposals include a demand for the speedy evacuation of all occupied territories. To this demand the Central Powers will most certainly refuse to accede. ■ They have made it quite plain that they regard Russia as a conquered country, and do not intend to treat with her on any other basis. _ Yet there is every reason to believe that the Russian representatives will decline to modify in any way their demand for the evacuation of occupied territories, and the latest and most reliable information, regarding political conditions in Russia and the nature of the precarious authority exercised by the Bolsheviki indicates that this is not by any means the only obstacle to such a peace as Germany and Austria desire, and, Lenin and his associates arc no' doubt willing to promote. Looking at events only in their immediate, and surface aspect, it would appear that negotiations between the Bolshevik leaders and the enemy have made considerable headway during the last few weeks. But, apart from the armistice, which entails no great change from the conditions previously ruling on tho Eastern front, all that has really been accomplished thus far is that certain individuals who do not represent Russia, but for the time being arrogate the right to spea'c in her name, have agreed to talk with enemy delegates on the subject of peace. The terms of an agreement have not been reached, and if they had the agreement probably would not be worth the paper it was written on. With matters at this stage, the first point to bo noted is that there is no reason to suppose that the Bolshevik leaders could carry even their immediate following with them in accepting such terms as Germany and Austria are likely to concede. There is a most important distinction to be drawn between the Bolshevik leaders and tho Bolshevik rank and file. Lenin, Tbotsky, and their colleagues can only be regarded as German agents. An American journalist, lately returned from Russia, sums up Trotsky as "the Jewish agent of the German Government, expelled from France and Spain for his pro-German activities, given an American passport to return to Russia in March." There is ample evidence also that Lenin, Tchernoff, late Minister of Agriculture (who is nominally a SocialRevolutionary), and other members of the Bolshevik group were, and no doubt are, in close touch with Germany, and t.hat. some of them accepted German money. These men undoubtedly, are quito ready to

conclude peace on any terms Germany cares to dictate, but it is a striking fact that they have never dared to advocate a separate peace, much less a separate peace which would involve handing over a considerable part of Russia to the Cen- ' tral Empires as spoil of war. flic explanation, according to those- who speak of conditions in Russia from recent and direct observation, is that no considerable section or group in that country would for a moment tolerate the idea of a separate aud dishonourable peace. It is true that the Bolshevik i have been advocating peace' since they first appeared, but the leaders of the group have demanded invariably not a separate but a general peace. In its full scope "the Bolshevik peace programme covers the whole ground (as one writer puts it) from Panama to Persia. Amongst other things, it requires the Central Powers to evacuate Russian territory, Rumania, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. It is plain from the cabled version (presumably a summary) of the Russian proposals presented at Brest Litovsk that these aim at a general and not at a separate peace, and the first item, "No forcible acquisition of territory," in itself provides the material of a deadlock. An appreciation of the situation is assisted by considering- the relation in whsfh the notoriously corrupt Bolshevik leaders stand to their' followers. The truth is that the same root cause accounts for the downfall of more moderate parties and the elevation of the Bolsheviki. The first products of the Revolution were enthusiasm and enthusiastic hopes. A considerable part of the Russian population expected the collapse of autocracy to bo followed by tho introduction of millennial conditions. The moderate parties, including the less extreme Socialists, were unable to satisfy these expectations, and Lenin and. his associates were ultimately enabled to usurp authority simply because they freely made much more extravagant promises than any other faction. They promised to bring about a democratic peace, comprehending not only Russia and her enemies, but all the countries at war, and in the realm of internal- affairs they promised, amongst other things, to satisfy.the land-hunger of the Russian peasantry. They are as unlikely to compass one achievement as the othor. The plain fact is that they have nothing to offer but words and phrases, and their reign will terminate, if it docs not terminate sooner, when the more ignorant masses of Russia realise that these are not satisfying; fare. These facts and considerations have a close bearing on tho current peace movement as well as on internal politics in Russia, and it is particularly to the point that the corruption of the Bolshevik leaders and their immediate supporters—the fanatics, escaped criminals, released political prisoners, and expatriated Russians whom political amnesty brought back to their country—docs not extend to the Russian masses. On this point authorities seem to be unanimous. A well-known English publicist remarked on his return from a recent visit to Russia that the mass of the Bolsheviki are not conscious traitors or paid German agents; but they are impractical, politically ignorant men. The leaders, he goes on 1o observo, are corrupt and under German influence, but tho Germans could not corrupt the millions of Bolshevik soldiers and civilians. "Tho real source of Bolshevikism is to be found in the backwardness of Russians, and their trend towards political abstractions and supposed first principles of government." Besides being abominably corrupt, the Bolshevik administration, if it can be so called, is based on a deception which cannot last. There is as great a gulf between tho peace the Bolsheviki 'leaders havo promised and tho peace at present attainable as there is between what they have promised and what is possible whero internal reforms are concerned. It is reasonable to anticipate the collapse of the peace negotiations and the collapse of the Bolshevik regime, and the first event may hasten the second. This does not mean that Russia is likely to recover speedily from her present disorders. It is quite possible that Germany may be enabled tp develop her schemes for the exploitation of Russia, by the establishment of a "Germanised" • monarchy or otherwise, with considerable profit. But she has no visible prospect of reaching such an agreement with Russia as would enable her to withdraw the armies she is still under the necessity of maintaining on the Eastern front.