The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1917. UNITY IN WAR AND PEACE

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 78, 26 December 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1917. UNITY IN WAR AND PEACE

The speech delivered by the British Prime Minister at the end of last week contained no more arresting passage than that in which ho named as a memorable event of the year the creation of an International Council. For the first time, as Mr. Lloyd George observed, the machinery of a League of Nations has been set up, and he is probably not wrong in his opinion that the effect upon international relations will be greater than most people now imagine. Undoubtedly the creation of an International Council, and of the military staff by which" it is advised, marks a big step forward, not only towards the goal of military efficiency, but over the ground which miist be covered before it will be possible to conclude, and afterwards maintain, a just and stable peace. : The year which is ending has brought some heavy disappointments to the Allies, but there is compensation in the fact that events m themselves untoward have emphasised as nothing else could have done the vital necessity of unity in purpose and-action. It is true that the principal factor leading to the disappointment of Allied hopes tliis year Was the political and military collapse of Russia, which no foresight or effort on the part of the Allies would have prevented. But it is to be admitted that the aftermath of the Eussian collapse would have been less serious if the Allies had been unitedly organised in Western Europe. The commanding fact of the Italian set-back is that tho Allies suffered a detail defeat in Italy at the hands of an enemy whose aggregate forces are decidedly inferior to their own. Probably if there had been no Russian collapso there would have been no Austro-German invasion of Italy, but it holds good that if the AllisJ lines from the North Sea to the Adriatic had been organised as a single front, the enemy would have failed in his effort against Italy as hopelessly as he lias failed to reverse the trend of the war in France

and Belgium. Precisely in what degree _ the Italian disaster was due to afajluro in Allied organisation, as distinct from weaknesses local to Italy, is meantime somewhat uncertain. But it seems hardly open to dispute that the Franco-British reinforcements which have done- so niiiclv to stiffen Italian resistance in recent days would have been even better employed in assisting to maintain the Italian lines beyond tho Isonzo, aud presumably these reinforcements or their equivalent would have been so employed under an organisation viewing the whole Allied line from the North Sea to the Adriatic as a single front. Suggestive light is thrown upon this (fuestion by Professor Bruno Eosellil (now a lieutenant in tho Italian Array, but granted leave of absence to lecture in America on tluv position of Italy in the war) in nn article in the New York Outlook Professor Roselli ■ does not deny that the moral failure of a proportion of her troops contributed to Italy's recent disasters, but he contends that one cause of this failure was that Italy did not receive material assistance which ehc expected, and had been promised by her Allies. Italy, he says, expected that, ammunition,\ big guns, coal, and shipping, would. bo provided in time, and her hopes were disappointed. "Our soldiers," he adds, 'knowing that definite promises had heen made, had gone forward to

• . . extreme points, relying on tho help pledged and supposed to Bβ already en route. The effect on these men can easily be imagined. The promised assistance did not appear—not only tho material assistance, but the moral support as well. It was obvious in conversing with the men at the front that, while their loyalty to the general cause of the Allies remained unshaken, their reliance upon help coming from outside of Italy ne : came less and less of a vital factor in their power of resistance." Even if it is considered that these observations make too little of the assistance her Allies had rendered to Italy before tho enemy opened Us , counter-offensive, they still have force as emphasising the absolute necessity of a real pooling of resources. _ There is no doubt that, after having developed an offensive of great promise, Italy needed strengthening, and that failure to strengthen her in time gave the enemy an opening for an attack tho I results of which are to-day felt heavily not only by Italy but by the whole Allied group. It is; undoubtedly by a policy of united control and by pooling their resources with a single eye to the' dofeat of the common enemy that the Allies will best insure themselves againbt a repetition of the Italian disaster, and make their weight tell with full effect. Military efficiency is -a first and vital consideration, but, it is very far from covering all the ground. The development towards unity which has been powerfully stimulated by events on the Italian front has a vital bearing on the issues of peace as well as on those of war. The sharp lesson which has compelled the Allies to recognise that unity and co-operation are indispensable in the conduct of tho war htls at the same time impelled and enabled them to mako definite progress towards the close interrelation which is essential if they are to dictate and uphold conditions of stable peace. Prior to the Italian disaster tho nhrase "League of Nations" had little more than academic value. To-day the machinery of a League of Nations is in existence. That so much has been accomplished definitely supports a hope that the machinery will bo nut into effective working operation. The hope is all tho brighter since the developments stimulated by the Italian reverse tend to bring "the Allies into_ full and hearty accord with the ideas bearing, on the settlement of the war which have been ably expounded by President Wilson on behalf of America.