A PROBLEM FOR WAR CRITICS

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 47, 19 November 1917, Page 6

A PROBLEM FOR WAR CRITICS

THE MYSTERY OF THE MARNE

yON KLUCK'S FATAL BLUNDER

(By tho London Correspondent of tho Melbourne "Age.") London, September 11. 1 After three years of war tho Battle of the Marue, which was decided in tho sixth week after the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and France, remains for France tho most momentous ovent in the groat struggle, which since those early days has brought every continent of the world into the conflict and has caused tho slaughter of millions ot men. It was the Battle of the Marne which saved Paris and' saved France. It was at the Manie that the French, assisted by a small British army, their first determined ; stand against the advanoing Germans, and .proved that German arm 6 were not invincible. live defeats &f 1870-71 had instilled into the French a great fear of their bullying neighbour, and when war broke out in 1911 the French had little confidonco in their own ability to break Germany s military pride. The victorious advance of the German armies through Belgium and Northern France, which compelled the.French and the British troops opposed'to them to retreat day after day for ten 1 days, had addod greatly to French fear that German amis were invincible. "At the Marne the French retreat ended, and they turned on their pursuers. Then followed a despeiate battle which lasted for six days jind ended in the 1 defeat of the Germans and their retirement to the Aisne, a distance of over 30 miles. The Battle of th? Marne began on September 3 and it ended in victory -on September 9, when the German General Staff issued the order for retirement. Bach successive yeai- the viotory has been celebrated in prance, and it will continue to be celebrated for TO any years. Theso celebrations have taken place on September fc, the date on which Field-Marshal 'Joffre struck with bis whole available fores ngaiMt the enemy.

Von Kluck's Change of Front. Tho victory was facilitated by tho extraordinary manoeuvre of General ™' Kluck, who was in command of the lurst German Army on the German right wing. It was this army which advanced through Belgium and Northern France ! and' drove the French and British armies ! before it- On September 8 von . Muck took the dangerous step of changing nis front. Instead of continuing his advance in a south-westerly direction on Pans, he marched in a south-«isterly dlreotion across the front of the French and Brit ish armies, who had fallen baok day after day since August 24. Thl3 ordinary manoeuvre left von M}> ck flank open to frontal g attact Z his lines of communication, and the French wero not slow to profit by it. Why did ' adopt this extraordinary mnnoemro. This riddle has not yet been solved -it constitutes the mystery of the M» Tne - Mj.ny books have been written about, tin battle of the Marno. especially m Franco, but none of them has explained this nrr& tery satisfactorily. Many explanations litiro been "givon, but thsy do not ftU ngree. British and French writers enn only guess at tho reason for T9n Kluck * manoeuvre. Some of tho most dis« tinguished generals who took part in tho battle of the "Marno have accounts of the battle, but there has been no authentic aocount from tho German side. And' without an authentic account; from the German side the mystery of von Kluck's manoeuvre must remain a mystery.

Lord Franch's Story. . Field-Marshal Lord French, who was in command of the British Armv at the battle of the Marne, gave an interesting account of the battle to a French journalist a few days ago, in connection with tho French colebrations on the third anniversary of the battle. In his interview .Lord French said:—

"After a ten days' retreat br forced niarches one idea possessed us all—Joff.ro, myself, and all the generals. That was to save Paris and avoid any engagement the issue of which might _be doubtful, or which might have ended in irreparable defeat. We passed days of uncertainty and the keenest anxiety. Nothing seemed assured. The plans on which we had counted soemed to be failing completely, and we had to abandon positions which we had confidently hoped to maintain. Where could we stop the retreat? I was of opinion v/e ought to fall back further, in order to gain time until our men had got their breath again, before attempting to bar the road to an onemy superior/ in effectives and material. Then one. day Joffre told me he intended to stop the retrograde movement and defend Paris on the Marne, The following day, ■ however, under the pressure of events, Joffre changed his' opinion, and decided that we nvust fall back to the Seine, where we would take the offensive.

"Then about September 3 or 4 there came the extraordinary manoeuvre of von Kluck, who, instoad of descending upon us direct, moved obliquely towards the south-east. He was actually engaged in this manoeuvre when he learned of the presence of the British army, still firm, and of lie existence of the Sixth French Army, ' formed to protect the capital. He was then menaced on his flanlc, and before the troops of General Maunoury crossed the Ourcq lie had begun his precipitate retreat. Von Kluck saved his army, but I am- astonished that he did not continue straight forward and 'attempt to force a passage. We were then able by a converging movement to contribute usefully to tho Buepess of the great battle, tho full honour of which belongs to Marshal Joffre. • In this operation the British must be praised for the' rapidity with which they advanced, crossing the Grand Morin, the Petit Morin, and the Marne, and pressing the enemy so successfully that he fell back fifty kilometres (over thirty-one miles) in four days. Unfortunately my brave men by that timo numbered no more than 60,000 or 70,000."

Another View. Tho "Times," which has inner sources of information about tho great events of the war, gives the following explanation of von Kiuck's mistake—"The movements which led to the battle really hewn on September 3, when General von Kluck and the German first armr changed front before Paris. Von Kluck had lost touch with the second armr on his left. He swerved south-eastward, and crossed tho Marne, leaving a single reserve corps to guard his flank on tlia line of the Ourcq. The German General Staff thought he could disregard the British army on tho left of tho Allied Ttne, and evidently belioved»it to bo out of action. His object was to envelop tho French flank and roll up tho Frenoh armies eastward; while the rest of the German forcos frill upon tlifiir front. Paris and the British 'wuld afterwards be gobbled up at leisure.'" To the Sixth Fronch Army belongs the greater share of tho credit of driving back von ICluck. Tho .part of the Sixth Army was to defend Paris, and its proper place, according to the German military point of view, was to man the fortifications round Paris. That is where it would havo remained if von Kluck had continued his advance. tomber 1 von Kluck was only three days march from the advanced line of the entrenohed camp whioh was being finally placed in a state of-defence m order to save ■ Paris," states General Clergerie, who was Chief of Staff of the. Military Govornmont of Paris at the time. A otronraference of ovor 100 miles nan to be covered with trenohes, siege guns hurried up, munitions transported by nar-row-gauge railways, good supplies of all kinds collected for tho subsistence of a population of 1,000,000 inhabitants. On September 8, however, the Intelligence Service reported about midda-y that the German columns were swerving southeast, with tho apparent intontion of avoiding Paris." It was then decided by General Gallioni, the Military Governor of Pans, to advance with his army and attack von Kiuck's flank. This meant an advance of 40 miles from tho stronghold defending Paris. It was a risky manoeuvre, but ovents justified it; and in war victory justifies every risk. At noon on September 5 tho army of Pans fired its first shot. Von Kluck was taken by surprise. Ho had apparently regard-

I ed the British arinj; as out of action by its continuous retreat, and the appearance of another French army on tho left of tho British endangered his flank. He rccvossed the Manic when he realised his danger, but by that time the German plans yvero dislocated. On September 6 the whole of the French lino from tho Ourcq to tho Aisue 6truck at tho enemy in accordaneo with Marshal Joffro's plans. General Foch's army broko tho German centre, and this caused the Gorman wings to movo in for the purpose of reinforcing the threatened lino. Threo days later the Gorman retreat began. But why did von Kluck begin his extraordinary manoeuvre on September 3? Von ICluck's account of the Battle of the Alamo would be more in. foresting than any other aocount that has been given. French Captain's Story, An Australian who has just returned from a, visit to the United States brings an interesting story regarding the failure of tho Germans to reach Paris at tho timo when General von Muck's army was so near (adds the "Age" by way of supplement to the above). Ho says that a companion on the ]»at between England and America was a French captain, who was wounded in the early days of tho war, and who claimed to be fully acquainted with the /' facts concerning the failure of the .Germans to reach the capital. This captain asserted that the Germany Army could have simply walked into Paris at one stage had tha nttempt been made,, but just when the advance was about to be continued an imperative message came from Berlin to General von Kluck peremptorily informing him that a mere general could not enter Paris at the head of the Imperial forces, and that nobody of lower rank than a Prince could bo accorded such an honour. General ron Kluck was accordingly directed to continue tentative operations pending the arrival of the Crown Prince. In order to join forces with von Kluck, the 1 Crown Prince's arm had to pass through the Champagne region, and during its march it broke into all'the cellars, consuming and destroying 8,000,00(1 bottles of wine. - The result was that on joining von Kluck's army the men were in a state of utter demoralisation. The spell thus secured by the French enabled them to restore thoir formation, regain their morale, and when an assault was made to force the Germans back.