THE LOSS OF THE CONVOY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 45, 16 November 1917, Page 7

THE LOSS OF THE CONVOY

"As regards criticism of the. Admiralty on two recent occasions, saw hir Geddes, "1 believe the criticism ]«' based upon and caused by incomplete internal. Taking first he Scandinavian convov, on October 16,, thei le. strovers Strongbow and Mary Eose, with thrco siuull.armed vessels, only ono ot ffhteh was fitted with wireless, escorted a convoy.of twelve ships bound for the Shetland* from Norway. During the ni"ht one of the smaller armed vessels, that which was fitted with dropped back to screen one ship of the convoy which had to stop owing to the shifting of the cargo. Ihe convoy was then accompanied by the Swoiigbow and Mary Rose, both of which were fitted witli wireless, as well as by two othei small craft not having wireless. About 6 am. on October 17, as day was 1 breaking,' tho Strongbow sighted two- ship southward which wero closing fast. Ihe visibility was about two miles. J-no Strongbow challenged. She received an unsatisfactory answer, and „. ordered action stations. The enemy a firat shot wrecked the wireless room and did other damage, and, despite the grea callantry with which she was fought by the captain, officers, and crew, she was sunk. The Mary Rose was immediately attacked by the wo Germans, and blown un by a shot in tho magazine. The enemy vessels, which were very fast slnps of' the cruiser class, then attacked the convov. sinking nine. Owing to tho fact that the escort vessel which was fitted with wireless, had been detached to screen a ship whose qaigo had shifted, and owing to tho Mary Eose being sunk immediately and the Strongbow's wireless being put out ot acHon by the first shot, no message reached the Admiral commanding in to Orkneys, the Commander-in-Chief of tho Grand. Fleet, or tho Admiralty that tho convoy had been attacked until tho surviving ships arrived at Berwick. Ihe Admiralty received no information^ imW 1 o'clock in the evening. A 3 regards tho raiders not being intercepted, h t House to recollect a few facts, ihe area of the North Sea is 110,000 square nautical miles; secondly,.wo ha f * £ ■iect to attack by raiders of SGG miles m length from Capo AVratli to Dover; thirdly, the area of vision for a light cruiser s'nuadron with attendant destroyers at St time is-well under five square miles—five square miles in 110,000. it is undesirable to state how many light cruiser squadrons in our■ positoncould possibly bo in the North Sea at the time; but it is practically impossible with the light forces at tho disposal ot the Navy, even if they were all devoted to this purpose, entirely to prevent sporadic raids of this kind either upon consts or isolated convoys like this.

The Odds of Chance. "The watching ficot must invariably be at an enormous disadvantage as regards tho disposal of its forces compared with a fleet which lies behind land defonces and plays a- game.of tip and run. By the concatenation of circumstances described, no wireless news of the raid was received from the escort or convoy, and between dawn and dusk, while tho daylight hours passed, the Navy got no wireless of the attack. Having regard to the disposition of our forces on October 17, we were entitled to say that it we had received a wireless message—and with three vessels suitably fitted it was reasonable to expect that wo should have •received that information—tho British Navy would have asked no better chance than they then would have had to intercept the raiders on the return journey. In this case tho opportunity was denicu

us. "The Scandinavian convoy system started in. April-1917, and more than 4500 vessels lind been convoyed. This is the first occasion upon which a single shin has been lost by surface attack in a Scandinavian convoy. This convoy is 1 mentioned particularly, but our other convoys are continually passing up ami down and across the North Sea, and our losses with them have been proportionately less. The enemy cruisers mado tho passage at night time, and, owing to the circumstances mentioned, wore unmolested in the day time, and slipped back again at night time. The arrangements for escorting this convoy ore in tho hands of the Convmand-jn-Chief of the Grand Fleet. With tho forces at his disposal, and, having regard to other duties and operations which have to be undertaken at the time, he makes tho best disposition possible. In this case, after the fullest consultation, wo are satisfied that tho best dispositions possible were made by him. Much as we regret the loss of brave lives and valuable shipping. which tho neutrals composing the convoy suffered, wo write it down as ono of the legitimate risks of war, where tho onemy has scored and sunk 8(W0 tons gros's, but that is insignificant compared with tho loss of brave lives.

A Tribute to tho Destroyers. "I will not leave the subject without paying a tribute, which I am sure the House would wish me to pay, to the gal-

lanh-y and devotion lo duly of His Alajcsty's vessels l escorting the convoy. The conduct ot tho officers and men upheld in tho fullest boiiso tho highest traditions of our Navy. They •mmcdiately attacked against superior forces. The Mary Hoso was blown up almost immediately. Tho Strongbow fought until her guns and engines were put out of action; and' Commander 1-Mward lirooko, who .1 regret to say lost an eye and a leg, alter his ship was helpless, and fearing she might fall into tho hands of the tuemy, ordered tho engineer oliicers to stand by to Hood tho ship, in order ihat she l.rplit bo sunk rather than captured. Alter the Strongbow was helpless, tho enemy ships returned and swept tho decks .vith small guns. Tho armed trawler Eliso most gallantly came up to tho Strongoow to assist in rescuing tho crew, but \>ns driven oil by the enemy, who returned twice and ewept tho upper dock tf tho Strongbow with gunfire. By this time she was bndly afire, evontunlly finking at 9.30. This is a summary of what happened aboard the Strongbow, but it is sufficient to show, if it were necessary lo show it, that history repeats itself at tho.present day, and the gallantry of the Royal Navy is undiminished. Tho officers anil crew of the Strongbow upheld the proudest traditions of His Majesty's service. As regards tho Mary Hose, we are dependent on information from Norway, but learn that she wns attacked at short range, and blown up almost- immediately by a shot in her magazine.

IN THE BALTIC BIUTISII ASSISTANCE UiPKACTIC- . ABLE. Ecplying to tho criticisms of the Navy for not Bending a fleet into tho Baltic to assist the Russians, Sir Eric Geddes said the matter was best dealt with by a study of the German naval operations in" the Gulf of Itiga, because tho measures' which would bo necessary for tho British entering the Baltic would obviously be somewhat similar to those adopted by the Germans. In ontering the Gulf-of Eiga tho Germans assembled a considerable proportion of their high seas fleet, with a large force of attendant cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mino-sweopers, and escort vessels, together with a large force of troops in transports, at somo point within reach of the Gulf of Riga. The Germans then seized tho' islands of Oesel, Dago, and Moon. It should be remembered in connection with these operations that on the southern side of the Gulf of Riga Courland was in German occupation all the time. Conditions at tho entrance to tho Baltic are somewhat similar to thoso in the Gulf of Riga, but' the islands commanding tho entrance to the Baltic belong to a neutral Power, Denmark. It would be madness for the British Fleet to pass into the Baltic with tho certainty that the Germans would occupy and fortify these islands in their roar. The German objective was clearly, first to command the Gulf of Riga in order to gain facilities for an attack on Roval and advance towards Petrograd, also to be in a position to command the entrance to tho Gulf of Finland.

If We Did Attack. Onr main objective in the Baltic would be the destruction of the German Fleet, participating in these operations, but if we did pass into the Bnltio should we find the German Fleet there on our arrival? It must be remembered that the operation of passing through would occuny a considerable time, as thoro were most extensive minefields to be cleared, and tho leading vessels of a fleet debouching from the Great Belt, which, is the only possible passage, in necessarily deep formation on a very narrow front, would find the whole German Fleet deployed and concentrating their fire on them. No responsible naval officer supportedsuch an enterprise Sir Eric Geddes also emphasises the 'Ungth of the lino of communications to be maintained with the Fleet when in the Baltic; also that, as every supply ship must pass within 30 miles of Kiel, only a small proportion would get through unless strong forces wero detached to protect them. Our fleet, if it entered tho Baltic, would soon wither to iuipotenco with its vital communications cut. Russia could not supply it with fuel, ammunition, or 6tdres.

Sir Eric Geddes dealt with the complaint that the Admiralty was contenting itself with concentration on a defensive role, instead of adopting bold offensive measures. Ho pointed out that it was always difficult to coax an unwilling onemy to come out into tho open ail! fight a stronger naval power. "Tho rolo of the British Navy to-day," ho said, "is both offensive and defensive. Wo defend tho trade routes, and tho decrease in losses owing to submarinism has boon brought about, partly by offensive measures against submarines, which aTo yielding increasing results, and largely by defensivo measures causing a groat strain upon the light forces of the Navy, but which will presently give considerable success. In September, !l(l per centum of tho total vessels sailing in all Atlantic trade routes wero convoyed, and since the convoy system started the total loss was fivo per thousand. Sir Eric Geddes acknowledged the American Navy's . valuable, assistance, which 'Was gradually extending. While tho German fleet was sheltering behind powerful land dofences, the British Fleet kept at sea, not relying on any shore defences, but solely on its own strength. During one recent month, the. fleet had steameil a million ship miles in home wators. Referring to naval activities further afield, ho mentioned that during a recent month blockading squadrons had norformed in the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean the almost incrediblo feat of intercepting and examining every single merchantman trading with neutral countries. The displacement tonnago of tho Navy in 1914 was 2,100,000 tons. Today, it was 71 per centum greater. At the. outbreak of tho war there were 18 vessels employed in mine-sweeping. Tho auxiliary patrols to-da.y numbered 3300. The personnel of tho patrols before (he war was 146,000. To-day it was 390,000. Prepare for a Long War. We must lay our plans for a long war. He saw no signs uf its being a short one. Wo must also be ready to provide shipping for maintaining the transport of the huge army which America was preparing. Regarding merchant ship uonstruotion, Sir Eric Geddes said: "Notwithstanding the huge munitions pioduclion, and the reduction to a minimum of man-power in 1917, we shall have produced naval and mercantile tonnago practically equal to the best year ever recorded in our history, and in 1918 it will certainly be very much greater" The output of merchant shipbuilding was now being expedited. The responsibility for the programme of the naval and mercantile marino was -under Admiralty control in order to avoid clashing between the vital interests of each. Sir Eric Geddes detailed elaborate plans for grappling with the shipbuilding problems in the most effective manner, and said it had been decided that at least four now national yards were necessary in order to make use of the material and labour which had been collected. The output of merchant tonnage for tho first n:no months of 1917 was 123 per centum higher than in the corresponding period of last year, and was very considerably higher than the output for the whole of 1915. The standard vessels now ordered represented nearly a million gross tens of shipping. Over half of these already are being constructed, and the remainder would be taken in hand as soon as the vessels now on tho stocks wero launched. A limited number of standard vessels had lioen complete 1 and commissioned, but the whole of the yards suitable, fr.r building standard ships could not yet entirely be devoted thereto, because tho stoclcs already wero occupied by oilier craft. The programme of warship construction now m hand was infinitely larger than any ever undertaken in piewar history Tho country's output of naval craft in the last twelvemonth was threo to four times as great as the average annual output for the few years p: e. ceding tho war.