The Dominion. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1917. HOLLAND AS A FACTOR IN THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 16, 13 October 1917, Page 6

The Dominion. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1917. HOLLAND AS A FACTOR IN THE WAR

At first glance no very great importance may seem to attach ta an announcement that Britain has suspended commercial cable communication with Holland until' tho transit of metals .''and other materials/through that country from Germany to Belgium is stopped. During the last few months the Allies, with America playing a leading part in the matter, have been taking strong measures with a- view • to reducing to a minimum the enormous export trade to Germany which Holland and other neutrals have developed during the war period. To suppose that tho action now taken represents only a detail extension of this policy would probably be erroneous. "When the facts are fully disclosed it will no doubt appear that Britain, with the support of her Allies, is demanding of Holland an honest and complete fulfilment of the duties as a neutral she has notoriously failed to faithfully discharge during the past course of the war. Much more than the question of trading with the enemy, or the transport of enemy supplies through Dutch territory, is at stake, though it is chiefly under these' heads that Holland has offended and fallen short of impartial neutrality. A fact to be kept always in rriifcd iu considering the relations of Holland with the Powers at war is that the geographical location of her territory • gives it, from more than one point of view, supreme strategic importance. Since Holland is not a belligerent this importance is at present purely potential. The strategic advantages which list of her territory and, coast-line would confer are dented to both parties in the war, and this may continue to the end. But it is 'imperatively necessary that tho Allies should take every possible precaution against, these advantages being seized by the enemy. With Germany definitely in the condition of a beast at bay, the danger that she may attempt a drive to the Dutch coast cannot bo supposed to have disappeared. As we have recently noted, there is definite evidence that the Germans, granted a continued development of ,tbe Allied offensive on lines that jiave become normal, are doomed to defeat and disaster in the Western theatre at no very distant date. But while the decline in the enemy's effective strength and the failure of his defensive organisation and tactics (in contrast with the rising power and all-round superiority of the Allies) are factors of decisive weight, the situation; holds, within,limits, certain possibilities of variation. Uu-

loss the Allies make a mistake, Gei many cannot escape crushing clefea in the near future. But we do no know what she may attempt in th< way oE retreat and readjustment o line, though it is prudent to as sumo that her. controlling .authorit ies may he prepared to resort to anj expedient, however desucrate, thai seems to offer even a forlorn-hope •hance of averting, or staving off, ;lefeat. It is on account of these possibilities that the strategic po :cntialities of Holland are investec ivith an importance certainly no ixcellcd at any stage of the war, tnd that the Allies,'as we must hope, ire keeping a more than ever vigiant ejT) on that country 'and de nandifjg of her guarantees of sounc ind unswerving neutrality. It maj le argued that since Germany die lot attempt to invade Holland whei ;he had a margin of force to draw ipon, she is-unlikely to make the ittempt iii the last phase of th< var. Apart from the fact that Hoi and was formerly a most valuabli ihannel through which Germany ob ;ained an enormous volume of sup ilies and that her services in thi: •espect are now reduced to a mini num, the possibility to be faced ii hat the occupation of Holland ma; igure in a German scheme aiming imongst other things, at retreat anc :onscrvation of force. A successfu. iccupation of Holland would hav< •onferred immense military ant laval advantage on Germany ii [915 or 1916, but it would have in ,'olvcd a serious diversion oE forc< ind a loss of supplies from the out ;ide world through Dutch channels [n the- event of a- general retreat bi ;he enemy Western armies, the occu lation of Holland might form par md parcel of the German man -ilan of campaign. It. is evidem ilso that possession of the Dutcl :oast would much more than rccorn icnse the enemy for the loss of th< 3clgian seaports on which his sub narine campaign is at present lased. Commanding a range o. •stuaries debouching on the south >rn North Sea, Germany would havi : ar better outlets for submarine! md far better bases for surface tor iedo craft than sho has at presen n Ostend and Zcebruggc. Obviously immense importance at ,achcs to the attitude Holland i: ikely to assume in the event of «' icrrfian invasion or demand for ac :ess to the sea. Fortunately, thougr icr record- as a neutral is bad, then s no reason to ■ suppose that sin vould violate her neutral, qbliga ions to the extent of submitting t< my such demand. It is a point o: Teat importance in this conncctioi : hat tho serious departures Iron mpartial neutrality of whicjr Hoi and has been guilty arc chiefly tt ,e laid at tho door of her trader: md that of the Government whicl las given unchecked rem to then lommercial greed and rapacity The commercial policy.of HoIUM hroughoub the war perioel .has beer lomina!ed:by. the fact hat Gei nany, being harder pressed for sup "lift -than the Allies, has .offeree lijrhcr prices. This has induce! Dutch, traders to export to Germany :vorv ounce of foodstuffs and e-thei lommoditics . they could lay thei: lands upon, including supphe .rgentlv needed for home consump -ion. Much .of the export to Ger nan vhas been maintained ni clircc illation ■of trading agrcomeui vith Britain-.■ Official .statistics v'hic-h take no -account of grea (uant'itics of .foodstuffs smugglec n'fo Germany, show thafr.r, m> ~nd 1916 Holland, exported to tha •ounfrv an amount of foodstuff: iixt'cen times greater than tw i-iriourifi exported in tho same pcno< 0 the United Kingdom. -German' n the two years received from Hoi and through regular channels raon han a million English tons of food itufts, in addition to smugglec ;oods; as against just about sevent; housand tons sent to Britain. A ,ho same time, Holland has tamclj aibraitted to the destruction of, . arge part of her mercantile rnariin , v German submarines, though sh« vas muck to protest against th, Mhnical offenco of a British dc itroyor flotilla which chased a Ger nan hlockado-runnine convoy mt< ,er coastal waters. This is a shame ul record, considering that Hoi and, as some of her own citizen: lave been honest enough to declare vas saved by Britain's intervontioi u (.he war from falling, after Bel -him, a prey to German ambition Phere is, however, the less rcasoi or supposing that this record re lccts'the general attitude of Dutch ncn since the policy of conductin; 1 roaring' trade with the enemy ha nflicted serious privations ant uirdships upon the mass of tli< jopulation. Those who know Hoi and well declare that her pcopli ire anxious above all things to kcoi ,ut of the war, but that in case p iced thc-v will fight to the last n lefence of their neutrality and in lepondence. An authority worti nioting on the subject is Mil. Johi "J van deb Veer (London editor o he Amsterdam Tcl-eijraai), who ha •re'ely denounced the commercia lolic'y of his country during th< var and its toleration of Germai mtrages. Commenting recently oi he possibility that Germany might or such reasons as have been out incd violate Dutch neutrality, oi rv to push Holland into the wai in her side, he declared himself con ident that she would never succeec n hoodwinking the Dutch pcoph md gaining their active support. Tho overwhelming purt of the Dutcl .eople- (lie added) have too great a conemiit for Germany. Besides, the Dutcl mderstand fully that they would as i lation commit suicide by taking hermuy's side, and ultimately share ho loom. Holland could be effectively dockaded to cut oil all her supphe: ram outside, and all her colonies woult >e taken away. Heaven help our ruler: n that ease. But, apart from all tkesi ■rounds, Ii trust my own people tot mush to believe that they will ever alow themselves to he duped in hocom ng tho ally of the ruthless invader ol lelgium, who is also the arch-enemy o: ur°frec nation. Should Germany trj o make use of the. Scheldt, she wil orce Holland into the war against her iluch us I dislike tho policy of the )utch Government in submitting toe eadily to Germany's ruthless methods : feel certain that they will never at ow her to violate Holland's neutrality Ud, in view of the foregoing, it ii ather significant that Queen Willie! Nina said recently in her epeech iron he Throne: "Our people may yet hi ailed upon to exercise their ntmosl trength for their \freedom and inde icndence." Virile the military possibilities cen ring in Holland demand unrclax ng vigilance on the part of th illies, it will be seen that there an [rounds for believing that if he at empted to carry the war into that ountry, the enemy would he likely o encounter such p. resistance as

would give the Allies time to bring their strength to bear. Successfully checkmating a- German attack on Holland, tbey would at the same time gain a new and advantageous opening for attack. They would be affor.dcd an avenue into the industrial heart of Germany well behind the German line as it is, or is likely to be, constituted.