PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 5, 1 October 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The enemy's latest air-raid on England appears to have encounter" ed a particularly efficient defence, and the circumstances suggest that the land'defences have proved more effective 'against night-raiding by aeroplanes than had-been thought possible. According to ■ reports in hand,' about twenty aeroplanes in three parties attempted to cross the coast. Somo failed to do so, and of those which headed for London none reached the metropolis. . iSfo casualties are as yet reported, except to the enemy, and the_ damage. done is described as insignificant. As regards the enemy casualties, a Press Bureau communication states that one of the aeroplanes was shot down in the Thames estuaryi and another off the coast. This sums up as a very tine performanco by the defending forces, and tho enemy will nW. find the experience encouraging.

Conditions attending; night-rairl-ing by aeroplanes were'interestingly. discussed at tho end; of July by the well-informed aeronautioal 'correspondent of the London Observer. At that time no extended raid on England had been mado by enemy aeroplanes during the hours of darkness, but on two or three occasions they had visited tho Kentish coast by moonlight. There was no doubt, the correspondent remarked, that night-raids would be niade. "In the execution of such a; plan," he added, "the enemy would increase his risks in one direction, lessening them in another; finding the way and keeping the course wbuld be less easy, and more serious results from enforced landings due :to engine failure would be a calmly faced contingency. On the other hand, the danger from British shell fire or from defending aircraft would be less than in daylight raids. Tho big Gotha. biplane could oarry enough fuel for a voyage of eight hours, and as big a load of bombs as on past raids. And so small would be the risk of fighting in the air that weight could probably be saved by reducing the number of maohine-guns carried. Perhaps, too, instead of a crew of -three, two would suffice. Possibly the raids would be timed so that dawn would be breaking when the raiders, having finished their task, "descended to their aerodromes in Belgium. This, however, although a desirable condition, would by no means be indispensable ; perhaps such a time-table would be adopted for J the first attempts. i A glance at the almanac will show, that there are Jtbout eight hours of darkness every night this week (at the. end of July), and the duration of darkness is, of course, steadily increasing. The days are rapidly passing for this year when Gorman machines, starting by sunset, could delay landing until the following dawn. Probably the point is immaterial, and on a night raid the enemy would start under cover of darkness and aim at getting back before the light waß good_enough to enable our squadrons in Flanders to challenge them. Choosing settled weather, navigation _ difficulties should lie no more formidable than they were to the Zeppelins. But a# to the effectiveness of the raids, the bomb-dropping would be handicapped, as before, by • the fact that our cities are uot illuminated at night; It may soon be found that our lighting restrictions must, not be modified, even though the Zeppelins are no longer likely to trouble us. Erratic bomb-dropping, however, is evidently no drawback from the enemy's peculiar point of view. The risk of enforced landings from engine trouble is very trifling with the reliable motors employed nowadays in 'aeroplanes, in* which respect the . Germans are at least as /yell provided as are our own airmen.'

"We must frankly acknowledge," the correspondent continued 1 , ' the great difficulty at present in the way of 'fighting hostile _ aeroplanes at night with defending aeroplanes. 1 Attacks on Zeppelins were quite another matter, i In that case it was possible, although not always easy, to keep these big craft in the searchlight beam long enough for a Robinson or a Brandon to let loose his all-destroying flaming brand with precision. But the searchlight had to do itswork. Wo do not yet know, hut'we can imagine the difficulty of keeping aeroplanes under the searchliglit. Moreover, aeroplane versus aeroplane is usually .a much longer combat than aeroplane versus airship. Nor will the question of moonlight matter in the least. Our only remedy and safeguard is to carry out more vigorously than ever the bombing of German aerodromes by day and night fn order to make it impossible for the enemy, to keep prepared squadrons of maohines for long-distance work. This, with raids on their depots and towns, compelling them to keep for their defence, is. the only course to pursue while aircraft warfare is governed by present conditions." It will bo seen that these anticipations were considerably improved upon m coping with the raid under notice. Guns and searchlights evidently proved highly efficient against the attacking aeroplanes, since it waa presumably tho fire of the land batteries that brought down the two enemy machines accounted for. Aeroplanes also rose in pursuit of the raiders, but with wh?,t result is not stated. Darkness of course very'greatly favours the aeroplane which is trying to get away. That the essential work of harrying the enemy s aerodromes in Belgium is not being neglected is made fully manifest in reports. # #

The Germans were somewhat more successful in a second raid reported in a labor message. On this occasion some of the. aeroplanes reached the south-eastern and northeastern districts of London. What casualties and damage resulted is not stated at time of writing. This raid, like its predecessor, was made under cover of darkness, the raiders reaching the coast about two, hours ■ after sunset. # Sir Doubt as Haig's reports show 'that infantry fighting' has for tho moment subsided in Flanders. 11c mentions the defeat of enemy raids in the vicinity of Hill"7Q, north of Lens. Some observations, recently made by the military contributor to the Fortnightly Review _ regarding the position at Lens are interesting, though they tend to confirm the view that the centre of) gravity has for the time being to Flanders.. Lens, he remarks, is impor- , tant for strategical, and economic reasons. ihe roads from all. the_ large neighbouring towns, Lille, Bethune, Arras, and Douai, converge on Lens, and its occupation is an antecedent necessity before operations can be undertaken to recover Lille. Lens, moreover, is a northern outpost of Hindenburg's line, and as long as it remains in possession of the enemy the Moricourt-Oppy 'switch,' or whatever name may be given to.it, oannot be turned from its right flank, which is tho weaker of the two, and the most exposed to attack. . . After clearing the (Viiny) ridge on April 9 tho Canadians wished to take the town by a coup de main, but they were wisely restrained, for the phwe is packed with machine-guns, and if they had attempted to rush it they would doubtless have succeeded, but at a cost which .would have : peen greater than the victory would have been worth. If Sir Douglas Haig was willing to demolish the town by artillery bombardment the case ,would be altered, but short of this there is nothing to be done but to nrocced by the slow process of sapping and mining, till our troops have worked their way step by step into the streets. The disinclination to resort to bombardment is

sentimental rather than practical, as the Germans will lay the town im ruins before they finally evacuate it, but weare fighting with Allies in their own country, and sentiment is a factor of the situation which cannot wholly be ignored."