The Dominion. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1917. THE FLANDERS OFFENSIVE

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 4, 29 September 1917, Page 6

The Dominion. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1917. THE FLANDERS OFFENSIVE

In ordci' to realise the full importance of the-British successes recently won in Flanders,-, it is necessary to consider what his occupation of that territory means'to the enemy and the penalties its loss .would entail. There is no possible question of measuring the battles of the 'Flanders offensive by tho standard of so much gained and lost in siege warfare: The results to the enemy, of-defeat in, this comparatively small -tract- of country which has-so often been «'■ cock-pit-of' war are hound to-be farreaching and cumulative, and to the Allies' victorious progress in Flanders will bring corresponding advantages in the. development of their great concerted, offensive. All that has happened in Flanders since the Allies opened their offensive in tho spring musfc.be considered.with the fact in- mind that a stable defence in this area is admittedly vital to the security of the German Western line as a whole. It was not' without good .reason that the en-, cmy, as one correspondent, puts it ■to-day, employed-,every man . and gun lie could scrape . together in order to try to regain a footing on the scarred hills beyond Yprcs. The Germans are striving with might and main to avert a deadly menace, nqt merely to the local defences which arc falling range by range, but to the part of. their lino.in the Western theatre. In the offensive 'which has now been developed to such a splendid pitch of tactical efficiency, .the Allies have dislodged the' enemy from almost the last elements in the comparatively wide belt of rolling country, dominating the adjacent plain, which he fortified in the hope of securely■ anchoring- his northern flank. At what pace thc_ Allies will develop their offensive is an open question, but 'the prospect before the enemy is that of-having to-copc on the open* plain with an attack which hollas been unable to withstand on high ground where he enjoyed an immense advantage]of position,, and'had done, everything that labour and a free use of material made possible to,make his front impregnable. The prospects of a flank movement on and'from the-.Flan-ders plain are, of course, to be considered with due regard to the state of'affairs'.'on. other parts ot the front. The enemy's prospects of retreating safely', when retreat becomes inevitable, are made negligible by the reduction of defensive positions to which he had pinned his faith on :othcr vital sections of his line. "Anyone can see," an English military writer remarked recently, "by looking at a trace of the front on the map, that the pushing back of the German lino north of the Lys (on the Franco-Belgian border) imperils tho mass of tho German forces. It would be different if they were secure along tho Aisno and in tho Champagne. They might then withdraw, as. they proposed,' zone, by zone:' But they arc not secure.' If .they move'.'they' will be crushed in on'.'all sides. All'this

has, long been foreseen. The Allied campaign is a great design." A still better and broader idea of what continued defeat in Flanders will mean to the enemy is given in 1 an article published some time ago in a German paper, the. Yosisisclie Zcilmuj. "A base in Flanders," it observed, "would enable England to ; annihilate with her air squadrons tho whole of our industrial basin, and to drive Germany completely from tho seas. German industry would bo at her mercy. We must hold our positions between the sea and the Lys, or we shall lose tho war entirely. The fate of Germany is now being decided in Flanders." This statement of the position may be accepted as substantially accurate. Failing to make.head against tho assaults which are now, stage by stage, overcoming tho best resistance of which' they are capable in ..Western, Flanders, the Germans, even if they contrivo to retreat unbroken, will hardly come to a stand short of a line extending south from Antwerp. Svfch a retreat would not only' cost them the fortified naval bases they have established on the Belgian _ coast, < but would shorten by a third the distance which British airmen must traverse in order to attack the great manufacturing towns which cluster thickly, in the Rhine Valley, the industrial heart of Germany. Apart from its place in the general scheme of the Allied land campaign, _ the Flanders offensive gains decisive importance from' the extent to which an enforced retirement of the enemy's northern flank would undoubtedly modify the conditions now governing naval and aerial warfare. Tho powerfully-fortified bases he has established on the Belgian coast have been a priceless asset to the enemy. We have 'Sir John Jellicoe's word for it that the destroyers maintained on tho fortified Belgian coast have made 'the work of guarding the Straits of Dover more difficult, and these bases play a -very important part also in the submarine campaign. Indeed, it has been said that the chief nests of the underwater craft are in Belgium.' This, of course, refers not only to the coastal ports, but to the canal svstem by which, they are served. * At a time when all the great belligerent nations are concentrating on a maximum production 'of aeroplanes and the effective use of air power is recognised to be one of the most, hopeful methods of breaking Germany's, resistance, there is no need to emphasise the decisive importance of a, development which would give , Britain convenient bases for attack on _the industrial centres of the Rhine Valley. All the results which have been touched upon—a powerful drive irito the northern flank of the shaken German line, the recovery of the Belgian coast and tho consequent limitation of the enemy s surface-raiding 'and submarine operations, and greatly increased opportunities of making effective use of the air-power the Allies are rapidly developing-aTe brought into clear prospect by the splendidly successful cffoTts of. the British armies in .Southern Flanders. Ihe Nemesis which has overtaken the Germans appears meantime in the fact that they are. condemned to pour out their declining , strength in efforts which serve at best to delay defeat. These efforts supply the best possible evidence of the apprehension with which tho enemy looks to the future and are Explained by the fact that in Flanders he is fighting with no margin of security to come and go upon.