The Dominion. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1917. JUSTICE TO THE NAVY

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3184, 7 September 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1917. JUSTICE TO THE NAVY

In a recent House.of Lords dobatc Lord Charles Beresford made out what has every appearance of being a strong case- in support of a charge that something , less than justice has been done to the- officers and men of tho Eoyal Navy in the matter of the allocation of decorations and wards for war services and deeds bf gallantry. As the facts were outlined by Lord Beresford tho system of awards under the Admiralty administration rests upon ah ab'solutely unfair basis. Tho number of officers and men to bo mentioned in dispatches in a given period is not determined, as it undoubtedly ought to bo, by deeds of gallantry performed and services rendered, but under a hard-and-fast rule which sets a maximum in no circumstances to be exceeded. Tho result is that acts of conspicuous heroism and devotion are on occasion passed over without recognition. Another glaring injustice was exposed by Lord Beresford when bo mentioned that although three hundred boys under the ago.of eighteen were killed or wounded at tho' Battle of Jutland a ■rule is in force that service rendered while under the age of eighteen shall not count for pensions. Ho contended also, with much show of reason, that the men on the lower deck should be afforded much freer opportunities than at present of winning promotion, and that it was unfair that civilians should enter'the commissioned ranks of the Navy over tho heads of petty officers of long service and three years' experience of war. Lord Lytton, who replied for the Admiralty, did not rebut these charges. From available reports it appears that ho did not attempt to defend {Eb practice followed in regard to boys under eighteen, and offered no better defence in the matter of honours and decorations than that if they were to be worth having it was necessary to maintain a high standard in giving them. This is unexceptionable in principle, but the accusation he was called upon to- answer was that deeds of conspicuous heroism had been ignored. As to promotions, Lord Lytton said that it was not the policy of the Admiralty to promote ratings from the lower deck merely on account of bravery, as other qualifications were also required in an officer, It seems much, more important that many petty officers and seamen are likely to be on all grounds better qualified _ for promotion than inexperienced civilians. It is worth while to pick out the salient points in Lord Lytton's speech in this way, because in its total effect it demonstrates as clearly as tho critical strictures of Lord Beresford that in some respects the treatment meted out to tho officers and men of the Navy falls far short of what they have a right to expect and public gratitude for their signal service demands. Fortunately the spirit of ingrained and inflexible conservatism which permeates Lord Lytton's speech is on the wane where the administration of the Admiralty is concerned as in other departments of national affairs. One outcome of the sweeping reorganisation of the Admiralty which was inaugurated a few months ago will no doubt be a more liberal and enlightened treatment of the officers and men of tho Navy than has hitherto been the rule. The general trend warrants a belief that tho rather narrow and conservative views expressed by Lord Lytton are those of a school which has had its day and is rapidly being displaced. No fighting service has ever deserved better of its country than the British Navy, and the more exposure of such abuses in the narrow and j illiberal treatment of its officers and men as Lord Beresford criticised should be enough to ensure their correction. It is a fact to be kept always in mind that tho claim of the Navy 'upon the nation is that of a splendidly efficient fighting, organisation to which the nation owes its very existence and the possibility of prosecuting the war to victory. A great deal has been heard in recent days about the necessity of adopting a new offensive strategy at sea, but the largely theoretical discussion under this head should not bo allowed to cloud our appreciation of what tho Navy has actually accomplished. Although the Gorman High Seas Fleet is still in being, behind its minefields, and the enemy contrives to continue his depredations on commerco through the agency of the elusive submarine, it is probably well within tho facts to say that Britain has to-day a more effective command of tho sea than was achioved in any war. Answering those who criticise- 'tho failure of tho Navy to destroy the enemy's armed ships and end our present submarine difficulties," Mr. Archibald Hurd remarks that tho subject of a decisive battlo at sea— a naval action ending a war—is oi great interest, because in the history of the British Navy thovo has never been such a battlo. Mr. Huiib supports his view with a body of unanswerable historical evidence from which it may suffice to quote hero

tho fact that in the years which followed Trafalgar a, tremendously heavy 101 l was taken of tho British mercantile marine. From 1803 (two years before Trafalgar) to 18M the recorded British losses in prizes were twelve times as heavy «s those of the French, the figures being: British ships captured by the French, 5314; French captured by the British, 440. "The idea that at any period its (Britain's) capital ships .have been concentrated, and that an action has been fought which has resulted in the annihilation of tho enemy," Mi , .. HuitD remarks, "is ono of those myths which it is well should be dispelled if we of this generation are to reach a correct appreciation of tho services which British seamen have rendered in the present struggle against the second sea Power of the- world, with forces superior to thoso of all our European Allies combined." Since the days when it drove the German fleet into retirement and gained dominion of the seas for Britain and tho Allies, our Navy has lost no opportunity of offensive action against the enemy. Its infrequent opportunities of engaging tho enemy's capital ships have confirmed and strengthened its command, arid _ at Jutland the enemy escaped annihilation only by refusing further battle and retreating under cover of night. To a very great extent tho Navy is reduced to keeping watch and ward, but in its encounters with the enemy's mobile craft, sometimes in his own coastal waters, in its attacks by sea and air on the Belgian coast, and in air . attacks as far afield as Adrianople, visible proofs arc given of the spirit and determination in which it is prosecuting its task. It should not to overlooked that although American cooperation was'necessary to the end of a really effective blockade of the Central Empires, the power of tho British Navy is the essential factor which makes such a blockade possible. Tho British people' owe so much to their Navy that they should count it less a duty than a privilege to moot all obligations _ where tho Navy is concerned, and insist upon tho correction of such shortcomings as were cited by Lord BeresFOEB in tho debate we havo mentioned in the House of Lords.