THE STRENGTH OF MESSINES

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3178, 31 August 1917, Page 6

THE STRENGTH OF MESSINES

WHAT NEW ZEALANDERS HAD ' TO FACE EFFECTS OF THE BRITISH BOMBARDMENT (Prom Malcolm Boss, Correspohdent • with the Now Zealand Forces in tho Field.) Northern France, June 12. As tho days go by wo are beginning to ascertain the exact strength of the position in and around Messines which the New Zealanders had to attack and capture on the morning of the 7th. It was indeed a strong one, but such was the destructive effect of our artillery that both its outer and inner defences suffered greatly during the preliminary bombardmonts, and also with the drumfire that churned the ground again on the morning of the attack. One of tho main advantages the enemy had in this position was tho splendid observation obtainable from the crest and the'forward slopes of the ridge. Looking back from Messinea now at the position wk held one marvels why the enemy did not blow our roads and tramways to pieces and hold lip our traffic a great deal more than lie did. Probably the enemy is no longer as flush of munitions as he was when at the zenith of his power. Perhaps it was that the vastness of our _ prepara. tions gave him such a bewildering array of targets that he could not make up his mind what was beat to do. But looking down from the ridgo we have now won it seems as if ho had failed lo make the most of hia opportunity. Tho Defences. The importance of Messines as tho southern corner of the Wytscfyaeto Salient was fully recognised by tho enemy, and in consequence, fully a month before the attack a permanent responsible commander—one Thomas—was appointed for the outer and inner defences. Looking back at some of our bombardments one wonders what happened to Captain Thomas. The outer defences ot Messines consisted of an elaborate system of trenches, tho principal of which were known to us as Oyster Reserve and Ulcer Keserve, the latter going right round the town on the right and behind it till it joined up with Oxonian trench on the left. In front of these trenches there was considerable wire. Even tho trenches behind the town wero wired on the side away from the town, this in case our attacking force steould get round the village and come in as it were by the back door. , The inner defences were based on five ooncrcte works which commanded tho lines of the streets. More of these were planned and were bemft constructed early in May. In the event of our getting through the outer defences the town itself was to be defended by sectors, the main defenoe being five concrete dug-outs, -which were connected ! by a close system of obstaoles. Each dugout was in itself a strong point, ana orders wore givsn that it was to be defended to the last—even, till the place was retaken, should our men have gained an entrance. In> the northern part of the town a company was held in roscrve in' cellars facing tho square. Thero were platoons in strong Lven tho cook-houses for tho companies .in line and in Messines were in .eellaw. Battalion Headquarters were similarly protected. Under the Institution Ejyflle, the most prominent of all the shattered buildings on the crast of tho ridge, there ■wero collars and deep dug-outs to "OKI considerable numbers of men protected from our shelling. These dug-outs took the form of long timbered tunnels, twenty Feet be:ow tho ground, and htted with 'bunks. Pioneers were still working at theiA some timo after tho preparations for our attack wero well advanced. The spoil was carried out in sand'bags at night. Some of the cellars were strengthened with roinforced concrete. Thero was oven a canteen in the cellar under tho Institution Boyale. The Germans took their usual pains to give thorough instruction to all leaders and detachments, and especially to their, machine-gunners, as to what they wero io do in case of attack, and practice drills in manning posts Wero hold. Anticipating Our Attack. We knew from prisoners that -we lind taken that an attack was expected. At first the enemy cxpected it at a much earlier date than the actual day. By the end of May they had narrowed their guessing down to a dato between, the 3rd and the 10th June. This idea they had probably obtained from some prisoners they had taken from our side. But the cxact date was, of coui-3e, unknown to them, as it was to our own men, and, above all things, the time of.:J:e attack was a close secret. By the end ot Maj a complete regiment of heavy artillery had arrived and was already iu position in reinforcement of the artillery already in the sector, and the resting btttaiion was no longer in the Divisional Reserve, but was available for regiment in the line. Every mau was notified tuat In must resist to the utmost in the front line, and was told that support wotiltt always be available to help him. Company leaders were impressed with tiio necessity for immediato counter-attack, which they wero assured would a.ways bo effectiv'o. Extreme precautious were to be taken against our gas attacks, especially in view'of the fact that another division had lost 100 men through one of these attacks. Emphasis was laid on tho desirability of determining the exact Moment of our attack, so that destructive hre iculd be brought down before '.-ur ntanfcrv advanced, iu'order to cause tnem heavy casualties, and special instructions, were i«ued as to the avoidance of our iieavy artillery firo. One other precaution t;ikcri may he cited as throwing huht 011 the declining German moral. Or. movements of companies into lino tin energetic officer was always detailed to maroli in rear of the column to prevent men from falling out, and every man who left the front or the reserve lines had to have a pass stating either that he was sick or was on a ration or otlici fatigue. In a captured order dated the day before tho battle, we read: iho enemy must not get the Messines Kidge at anv price." This order was issued to the 17t.1i Bavarian Infantry Etgiment. The regiment was instructed how to act in the event of our breaking through. The regiment was itself broken! it could not stem tho onrushing tide. It tailed to carry out its instructions. "I'f" says another order, the enemy 'has pushed forward so far that no liopo is left of holding out, then the lust hand grenade must be used for the destruction of the machine-gun. Then n e gun team must take their revolvers and <lo their best. It is the duty of every man to see that the machine-gun doe? rot tall into the hands of the enemy. As a matter of fact, long before the lust handgrenade was used many of tho German machine-gunners were holding their hauls up and crying "Mercy, Kamerad! -Iho New Zealand Division alone captured ..8 inn chine-guns. The haul in field and other guns was not so important for Hi reason that the Now Zealanders did not hav? to tfo so far afield as some other t,00 1 ,:> - "Destructive Shoots."

Having given in some details an idra of the "rent strength of the enemy position in itessilie's, and the efforts made to hold it. I shall now give some information regarding the steps we took to batter i f down, reserving for subsequent articles particulars of the part played m the attack bv individual units of our infantry. Wliftt our artillery wlescnb© as their "dcs'ructive shoots" indulged m beforo the battle proper, did groat dnni■ige to the enemy trenches, to his wtro entanglements, and to his strong points. Tin* concrete emplacements were often broken, and the wire, in the language of the field, was "bio wto blazes." The trcncli mortnrs did particularly good work, both mediums and heavies. The personal of this section of our division is of a very high order, and ono can J r . ir( .,.| v pry'-!' I !>eir c'Vorts overmuch. One dav, when they fired over two thousand rounds, vos probably a record dav for any division. One dug-out received seven direct hits, and the mortar men made things so uncomfortable in that quarter that finally a dozen Germans wore seen to mako a hurried bolt l],<. blue. These were promptly fired upon by one of the trench inor-i-,"s a: 1 -! one round that was seen to fall'in thoir midst accelerated tlieir retreat ami caused several casualties. Our artillery shot practice barrages and many enemy routes and tracks were kept under fire at night. The heavies ,

further behind our lines engaged many hostile batteries, and great explosions were caused. We watched the smoke clouds rising two and three thousand feet in the air, and knew that for the enemy the worst had happened'to some ammunition dump or traiu. Enemy batteries and roads to the south-east of Warneton were damaged. Tho Chemin du Templo was badly strafed, and Warneton itself was damaged. The enemy went on digging new trenches and putting up new wire, but as fast as his new work appeared it was shot away, or at least partially destroyed. Ho used smoke screenes to hide his operations. We learned from prisoners captured on tho night of June 2-3 that his trenches had been badly knocked about, and, in places, almost obliterated. Communication trenches were blocked almost every few yards, and reliefs had to come up overland. Tho moral of these prisoners was poor, and they seemed resigned to their fato. Gas shells were used on particular spots. Aeroplane photographs confirmed these statements. It was interesting to contpare these photographs from day to day. All this time tho hostile shelling wa3 fairly heavy, and we did not, of course, escapo casualties. Some of our dlimps also "wont up," affording thrilling sepctacles. .Field guns, heavy howitzers, and guns of the naval typo were in action, against our front lines, support/', and back areas. Gas and tear shells came back at us, making work in certain localities difficult and dangerous. But wo kept on the even tenor of our way, and the fire from the enemy guns was nothing like as heavy as the fire from our side. In 6hort, the weight of our artillery was infinitely superior. _ It was not to be wondered at that tho Germans had difficulty in getting up ammunition and food supplies. The following extract from a diary, three days before the battle, is illuminating-.— "Mid-day. Wervicq bombarded, whereby a direct hit* on an artillery ammunition dump caused it to explode. In a neighbouring stable there were twelve horses killed. In the evening we went in and fetched a piece of the meat. We had cooked meat. It'was splendid."