DAYLIGHT AIR RAIDS

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3150, 31 July 1917, Page 6

DAYLIGHT AIR RAIDS

BRITISH AND HUN METHODS

COMPARED, (By a British Airman, in the "Daily Mail.") . Tho Hun method of carrying out a daylight "formation raid," as shown (a recent occasions, suggests some interesting comparisons between his flying service and those of tho Allies. 'The two parties are radically different, the cause lying probably in the nature of tho Hun pilot. Whatever his aeroplane and engine designers may .do for him, ho remains strangely unenterprising. This holds true whether you compare individual "stunts" or organised raids such as these. His efforts are tentative and mechanical; ours are determined and human. Tho recent raids are typical of his general method, his general inability 'to take risks. You havo a largo formation of machines—a plan copied from the Allies, but at least. 18 months after them. Instead of the human element, tho swoop down to 1000 ft. or 500 ft. commonly employed by the Allies to ensure direct hits, you have a hurried attack from an enormous height with relinnco for accurate shooting placed in bomb sights, which are not and never can be reliable. Tho very choice of such a heisht argues a greater interest in tho bodies of the pilots than in the objectives of the raid. One can just imagine the Hun sitting up there at 15,000 ft. or 18,000 ft., stop-watch and lever ready, eye glued to tho sights. One can imagine him pulling the lever and feeling sure something "frightful" must have happened. But that is not how Allied raids are done, nor how aerial success is gained. One sentence will illuminate the whole. After one highly successful Allied excursion, where real military objects and not. merely "moral" ones were achieved, I heard a British pilot say, "Did you vse vour bomb sight? I tried to use mine, but did not feel confident, so I just camo down to 500 ft. and looked down between my legs and pulled. It hit all right!" The risk that pilot took was infinitely greater, but the chances of success wero all in his favour. Had Polkstono Harbour been hit no doubt the result .would have been of "military value," but it was not. and it was not likely to be from that height. Wo do not know how many machines 'triod for it. but none nf tho fifteen 6ent out brought it off. Compare tho almost, sometimes entirely, unmentioned "shows" which have at timrs been a daily feature of Allied attack. They aro carried much farther across the lines, and they scarcely ever fail to briiiff about the total demolition of some object the loss of which is of serious account 'to the Hun. The casualties among Allied pilots are heavy, but the results are obtained. In these raids the Hun has, as usual, endeavoured to obtain Tesnlts without taking risks. In air work tho two are incompatible— and ho has had the casualties just tho same. Tho truth of the matter is that the Hun pilot is a "hero" whom a certain amount of time automatically covers v.ith medals. Despite tho fact that allied Hving has been the key of all Sun failure right throueh the war, he never seems to have got away from this idea that his pilots are "heroes" who are already doing more than could have been expected. The point of view of the Allies is strikingly the opposite. They have not yet begun to envisage the ultimate uses'of the aeroplane. For one thin?. Allied audacity is continually sustspsting new possibilities. On* may wonder how soon and how far the Hun will awake to his failure. His sudden change to aeroplanes by day instead of Zeppelins by night seems to' suggest a development.