FIGHTING THE HUNS AT SEA

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3143, 23 July 1917, Page 6

FIGHTING THE HUNS AT SEA

;-■ '" . ~~ ♦ . '/ WELL-KNOWN NAVAL WRITER'S ; OPINIONS j: .- V;' -_ KELENTLESS. OFFENSIVE ;- f - AGAINST U-BOATS ■';' '' ■ ■ •' .'. . —~ —T ~ ■ i ;;•■ 'A:.j>lia for a viforous -dfensiyo cain- : paign against the German submarines is -. made by Arthur H. Pollen, the wellknown .English authority on sea wariare, \ in utt' interview in the New York "Even'ihg Post." . "It was Mr. Pollen, writing ;'. 'in 'Land and Water,' of London (suyd the 'Post'),-who forced the latest reforms in the Admiralty, and in the course of ; liis determined efforts to bring about changes in the personnel of tho Board , : one iiumber r 6f his journal was confiscated by the' censor. Mr. Pollen believes 1 that, the submarines caii.be curbed oy ' the prosecution of a relentless offensive ' ;' ."against them and against, the German '•■:■ oases. If such a policy were adopted-by i - the British Admiralty, with the help of ■the American Navy, Mr. Pollen thinks , .■ that the war should bo over by a year : ;-from next August. On the other hand, • r . should siriKings of merchant tonnage continue, at the-present rate, he is free to admit, that. Germany could win the war '■' by about Christmas of 1919. "If I had my way,:'. Mr. Pollen put it, "I should stop shipbuilding to replace lost merchant tonnage in all shipyards In the Allied countries and concentrate ef- :,'■■ forts on putting out anti-submarine craft. That is'the way to stop the submarine. Don't try to replace continuing losses. •' First, .make the Tlinn ' you can begin building to replace sunk- .' . en tonnage.'' Mr. Pollen was full of ; praise, for tke American destroyer flotilla ■ ..under Vice-Admiral Sims, which is co-op-erating with the British naval forces in ■patrol work about the British Isles. Not Enough American Ships. 1 ' : "I saw a good deal of Sims and : the Test 'of your people," ho said. "They are i keen officers. They didn't come over ;'v. thinking that they knew everything. They wanted to learn, were glad to learn. i. ; Splendid officers awF crews. They are working ehoulder-to-siioulder with our ,- -people like brothers. Thev arc a considI ' erable help in that thes have been able iio increase by so much the chances of '-.■'■■" safety in a certain zone. But, on tho ;'»■■'other hand, I should be telling an absolute untruth if I were to say that their coming had shifted the balanco against '■;. 'the submarinEslu any appreciable degree. : ' fThere are not enough at them." | . "How about our boats? Can they stand up to tits rough-and-tumble as well • ■ - as yours?" I "Better," rejoined Mr. Pollen. "Finely- ; built craft." He was wary of discussing the details '.,'■ Of his plan for imoroving the administration of the Admiralty. ".-"I didn't succeed; in getting through 'bnie'or .two important reforms—changes i- . jn personnel, you know," ho explained. "But most of the changes I wanted have : - been effected, and I think the Admiralty :,. are awake to the situation. They lot the get a head-start on them. It '.'. ~'.was a wrong policy to meet the subraar- ' ines on the defensive. Tho Tight policy. ' . is the offensive defensive. That is, carry ' the war to. the submarines; don't let them bring it to you. j-1, "We are now. doing something in the : of counter-mining against submarines, a policy wo were late in taking up because were were not very well provided with mines at first; but, after all, : minefields are x not an altogether satis- :' factory • weapon against submarines, until •we have disposed of the German, battle • ' fleet"Now, whatwe need is an immense fleet of anti-submarine craft, suoh as your Government is building." We can't have 1- too many of them. And .the German submarine bases should bo destroyed. Of : course, you must understand, the mod- '. em Dreadnought is a highly specialised machine, devised for' fighting at sea. It is not built to attack forts or do blockade duty. We have got to.perfect and ■ devise machines and engines for this ■'■■■' other work, and I have every confidence. • that they can be devised. V .')■.'■.■' ! • Different Types of Monitor Needed. '.'We have the basis, for. one such weapon in the -new monitors - that have been built since the war began. But our I- monitors do not correspond to the -orig- ". inal monitor, in that they are lacking in i invulnerability against gunfire. Certain ; changes will have to be made in them ' that I am confident can be made—heavier armour, and so forth." Is the present anti-submarine campaign as effective as reported ? "Well, I should say that we aro sinkj! ing about as many submarines as the Germans are building—and they are building about three a week." He 6couted the theory that the uips and - ■ 3owns ~of merchant losses were attributable to-the.sending, forth, of immense :' sew fleets of submarines. "The whole thing is a matter of luck '■' largely," he declared. "Sometimes the !" Germans find themselves with a clear field and plenty of prey. Again, our : patrols are distributed so that they make effective work difficult. Last week we had. bad Juck, the Germans good luck. ; The luck had been running our way for some weeks, and it was about due to : shift. That ■ is the way things are bound to go until the warfare against the submarine is intensively developed. The tame law of averages governs the sinking of submarines......We might sink twenty . submarines one week, but in the long " run the average would work out." "Can the submarine win the war?" "Mr. Pollen reflected. . '.-■-■■ "Well," he said, "you might put it • this way: If the Allied Governments push the campaign against the submarine as I think they will and the : , Allied armies continue their successes,. ■ '•' ithe war should bo onded victoriously by a year from August. But if the Germans aro able to keep up their present rate of destruction of .merchant tonnage, then it is conceivable that, they.will bring ! nis:: to admit defeat by about Christmas of-1919. I consider it -quite useless to attempt to keep pace with the losses from ■submarine operations. That is not the way to meet the problem. We are losing, in round numbers, about 7,000,000 tons of shipping a year, including neutrals, and we can't replace that amount I at'the same time that we are supporting '' great armies and provisioning nations. i- We' minimise it, but we iah*t keep pace with it. What we must do is to hunt idown the submarine." Expects German Fleet to Fight. "What is the role of the Grand Fleet In'this situation?" ._ "The Grand Fleet's role is to fight the German High Seas Pleet whenever it puts to sea—and I am quite confident that the Germans will como out again. IThe German naval officers are a magnificently brnvo and skilful body, with splendid ships and courageous, welltrained crews. Their valour is not our valour, but it is effective. In the languago of the bridge-player, they are not going to bed with a handful of • : -trumps. They are going to make one last effort to play their trumps and win the game before they quit. In Sir David ■Beatty we have a sea-commander who is alert, dashing, quick to iierceive the iHit course of action, and a fine leader of men, a man in whom the whole fleet has the utmost confidence. They all believe that he will smash the Germans ' [when the chance comes to him." "uoes the availability of tho American battleship fleet represent a gain for the Allies?" ''It certainly does. Tour magnificent ships represent reserve strength, and there, are perfectly good reasons, beyondthe control of your officers, for their Tidt being in line with our Grand Pleet to-day. . 'there is the difficulty of dil Tortiiig the necessary amount r;f tonnage i ' to; coal, oil, and provision them should thev cross the Atlantic, a very iiuportaht'v difficulty, which I hope may be solved soon. But at the same time it must be remembered that the mere availability of surplus ships to replace sunken vessels, would not justify us in ' throwing tho Grand Fleet against fortii. iie'd bases or in embarking upon offensive operations in German waters. Such i operations are only justified when they can be pressed to a victorious conclusion, and German waters aro shallow, unmarked, and excessively dangerous for pur big ships to operate in. As I have

said before, special engines a>e r.oces:sary to attack the German bases, and I ,hqpo they will be developed." Ihe changed spirit in the administration of tho Admiralty Mr. Pollen illustrated by referring to tho appointment of an English railroad man, A. C. Gedde.3, as a vice-admiral to tako charge of all .naval construction work, and in general reorganise Admiralty methods. £i_eddcs formerly was employed by Sir .ijouglas Haig in organising the railway svsfem x behind the British front in Trance, a system which, since the war, lias "built up a trackage equal to that of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Geddes is looked upon as a genins at effecting reorganisiiHons with tho minimum of disturTSinoe, and to Trim the British look to_ complete the modernising <f tho Adm'raicy. "Don't worry about the war," was Mr. i'o'Uen's parting word cf advice.. "Keep your head, do what your Government asks you to do. When the Germans adopted elaborate field fortifications in combination with their policy of the nation in arms, they thought: they had created a stalemate in land, warfare. But we have perfected a system /of attack by which we can destroy and pierce any fortified line .they hold. ' They think that they can create exactly the same sort of a stalemate at sea, pin- | >._ ; .iig ns to defensive tactics by snbma--1 .rine attacks, but we shall develop often--J sfve tactics at sea as we have on land. r And then they will be beaten."