AN IMPERILLED AUTOCRACY

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3139, 18 July 1917, Page 4

AN IMPERILLED AUTOCRACY

It is a plausible explanation of recent political events in Germany that the Kaiser and his Junkers are solely intent upon hoodwinking the proletariat, with a view to maintaining their power. To call this a deep game, however, as one correspondent does to-day, is to put rather a strain on language. It would probably bo nearer the truth to call it a shallow game. It is certainly a. somowhat dangerous game, and one in which the principal players can see only a little way ahead. The feature of the situation which commands attention is that the Ministerial changes recently carried out have done little, if anything, to modify the tension of existing conditions in Germany. It must bo added that tho Kaiser has poor prospects of relieving this tension by any practicable development of his. present tactics. So far as agitation in the Bcichsfcag is concerned, he has perhaps gained a temporary respite by Ministerial readjustments which entail no surrender of autocratic power. Even this, as news stands, is doubtful, for the "reformers" are said to be protesting bitterly against the continued refusal of a Ministry responsible to, the Reichstag. But even if the Kaiser's policy of political trickery had succeded brilliantly in the matter of stilling Parliamentary agitation he would still be as far as over from finding a solution of tho essential problem ny which he is confronted. That problem obviously is to convince the German people that they arc on the whole better off under a 'regime of autocracy than they would be if their autocrats were overthrown. Before tho war and in the earlier stages of the war a very large proportion of tho Geman people were undoubtedly of this opinion. It would be extraordinary if tho events of tho war had not inducod a tremendous levulsion of feeling, and there need bo little difficulty about accepting ■ as generally accurate an account of internal conditions in Germany transmitted a day or two ago by way of Switzerland. It described the Ger/man people as irritated by the unsuccessful conduct of the war and the systematic dissemination of false official news, and .seriously depressed by the Russian advance. Mention was made also of gravo disorders in forty Gorman towns, indicating that the people arc dangerously near revolution. Possibly this summary of tho situation may contain an element of exaggeration, but that it affords some general indication of the truth cannot reasonably bo doubted. It 'would be absurd to suppose that the long strain of an unsuccessful war, realisation of tho over-increas-ing power of the Allies, the entry of America, and the renewal of tho Russian offensive havo not bred despair and a spirit of revolt in the German people. Tho only question open is how long this spirit is likely to be held in check by tho machinery of Prussian rule. That admittedly is a question to which no imimmediate answer is possible, but it would hardly be wise to measure the prospects of a popular upheaval in Germany by the success or failure of the Kaiser in dealing with tho demands of the Tho reconstruction 61 the Ministry is an interesting aud significant indication of uneasiness and uncertainty, but it can hardly bo regarded as promising a solution of the problem of keeping the Gorman people in subjection. The entire failure to approach, any real reform emphasises tho inability of tho Kaiser to cope with the natural resentment awakoned in his peoplo by tho terrible misiiortunes into which he has led them, and by the prospect of still greater misfortunes as time goes on. In the earlier stages of the wav bombastic promises of victory served to hold the people in restraint;, and when other hopes faded the Germans were taught to believe that the submarines would do what their, armies had failed to do on land/. When this hope in its turn has disappeared, autooracy in Gormayiy will bo definitely put to the tcs,t So long as the War Lords woro able to maintain a semblance oj military success, the prospects of a, revolution in Germany were doubtful. But tho position will be radically altered when the German people fully grasp the fact that defeat is inevitable, aud that all their privations and sacrifices have been borno in vain. It is possiblo that the last impulse needed to drive them to revolt and. overthrow their autocrats may bo provided in the military success of the Allies in the not distant future, even if that success should in itself be something less than decisive.