The Dominion. THURSDAY, JULY 5, 1917. THE MAIN CAMPAIGN

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3128, 5 July 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, JULY 5, 1917. THE MAIN CAMPAIGN

.'lt. is said, and there is no reason, to doubt it, that the enemy knew weeks ago that the Russians were preparing to launch the offensive which they are now developing successfully in Galicia. Obviously it is a fact of distinctly good promiso, in relation both to the prospects of tho Russian offensive and to the general situation and outlook in the war, that Hindenbtjrg and his subordinates, though well informed as to the course of events in Russia, were able to devise no better policy than that of. passively awaiting the onset of General armies. Wei may best gauge the cneniy's ability to cope- with the Russian armies which are now attacking in -restored efficiency by the fact that ho remained inactive during a period of many weeke in which these same armies were reduced to a very serious state of demoralisation. To suppose that the Germans and their allies underestimated Russia's powers of recovery would probably be doing muoh less than justice to the efficiency of their espionage system. The more obvious and more convincing explanation is that they refrained from attacking Russia at a time when she- was made vulnerable by internal disorders because they were unable to do so without laying themselves fatally open in the Western theatre. It may bo that the Germans feared that if, they attacked Russia contending parties..- in that country might lay aside their differences and combine against the external enemy. But once it had become clear that Russia was preparing to resume the offensive it was obviously in Gormany's interest to make the first: move and if possible throw the Russian enterprise out of gear. > That she did not do so can only bo taken to mean that she was unable to find the necessary men and material. Apart from the obvious relation between events in the- Western and Eastern thoatrcs it is likely that the tremendous demands of the Western campaign have set limits to the enemy's action against Italy. There is still talk of a great Austrian offensive in the Trcntino, but the Austrians certainly had a better opportunity of attacking Italy five or six weeks ago than will be open to them henceforth i unless the Russian offensive belies its opening promise. The offensive in Galicia opens with the enemy very definitely! thrown back ( upon the dofensiyc in all theatres. At the lowest estimate it is likely to confirm this state of affairs. It may reasonably be expected to do a grealt deal more. Meantime it arrests attention not merely as an important contribution to the general Allied effort, but as going- far to confirm the view that the , enemy is now so hopelessly in the toils in the Western theatre that aggressive action is no longer in his power. conditions in ' the Western theatre already made such an estimate of the situation plausible. There is perhaps no better way of bringing out the truth than by contrasting the position in which the.enemy now stands, and what is known about tho depletion of his resources, with the hopes that wero admittedly entertained by the Germans in tho carJy days of Hindenburg's. retreat in Northern Franco. What these hopes were is very clearly indicated in a series of extracts I from- officially inspired German newspapers which were quoted by 'Mis. HitiAiiiE Belloc in a recent article in Land and Water. It is noteworthy that the earliest of these ■newspaper statements was published less than three weeks before tho. British opened their offensive on tho Arras front on April 9. Some of the newspapers confined themselves to 'such suggestive statements as that in a few weeks the course of operations would make tho reason of the retirement quite clearly understood, and that HiNDENRURO was giving himself elbow room for free movement, from which he knew hoiv to get

glorious results. But tho principal newspaper of Baden spoke in more definite terms:

All tho projects of our enemy (its military critic stated) are now in disarray, and tho initiative has passed into tho hands of tho German generals.

Tho Loknl Amcigcr, which is open ly official, went even further:

The ono point (it declared) on which no further doubt is possible is that the fundamental idea of Hindenburg, as in tho case of the Russian campaign, is an offensive

Statements of this kind scattered broadcast through tho German Press arc not tho only evidence of what the Germans hoped and believed would result from tho retreat. Only ten days before the victorious assault on Vimy. Ridge the Imperial Chancellor stated that.:

On tho Western front tho operation of retirement continues according to plan, and is giving a liberty of action which increases with every day that passes. All tho world knows that these hopeful anticipations, voiced by tho German Press and the head of the German Government, have been defeated by events.

If tho Germans planned to bring on a manoeuvre battle in conditions of their own choosing, the plan collapsed. They gained no liberty of action, and no real respite, by (heir retreat.. As Mr. Belloc puts it: Instead of a respite of two months there was no real respite at all, but continuous fairly hard fighting, and only an interval of three weeks between.- tho main retirement and the first bombardment of tho renewed offensive." Even tho enemy's secondary plan of an orderly retreat by-stages has been thrown hopelessly into disarray by tho skilfully applied and relentlessly maintained pressure- of the Allied offensive. It is simply unthinkable that Hindenburg would elect to cling to his present line in Franco and Flanders if he had tho alternative of an orderly retreat. , The Germans arebadly outclassed in artillery; their infantry is markedly inferior to that of the Allies, and they arc constrained to sacrifice masses of men in tho counter-attacks made imperatively necessary by the loss of vital tactical positions 'and the consequent weakening of their line. That the Allies are holding tho enemy to battle under theso conditions triumphantly attests tho success of their strategy. It has been impossible since the offensive was renewed foy tho Germans to repeat the claim, made so confidently until the end of March, that the retreat would give Hindenburg the initiative'and liberty of action. On the contrary, there is convincing evidence that in the 'maelstrom- of battle and bombardment which continues without ceasing in tho Western theatre the Germans have already sacrificed a very great part of the "strategic iescr.vo with which they opened tho summer campaign. Tho terrible grip which tho Allies have fastened upon the enemy in tho Western theatre is tho central and commanding feature of a war situation in which the Russian offensive now . takes its place as an additional factor making potently for the enemy's defeat. The path of the Russians has undoubtedly been smoothedi to a material extent by the splendidly effective tactics of the Western Allies. On the other hand, the Russian enterprise, apart from its immediate importance, promises a measure of needed relief to Italy, and should also facilitate effective'action by tho Allies in the Balkans and in some of the Turkish theatres. Granted a sustained effort by Russia, there should bo a very great improvement in the general war outlook during tho next few weeks.