PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3123, 29 June 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The disastrous collapse of British organisation in Mesopotamia in 1915 —a collapse which was not remedied until well on in tho following yearwas in part an outcome of the neglect of military preparation in tho British Empire in tho years preceding the war. But tho report of the Mesopotamian Commission, a summary of which was published in part yesterday, and is continued to-day, makes it painfully clear that the political and military authorities responsible for the organisation and conduct of the invasion of Mesopotamia fell in many respects appallingly short of an honest and efficient discharge of their duties. In its straightforward and plain-spoken report, tho Commission has laid bare the history of one of tho least creditablo chapters of Britain's participation in the war, and has fastened responsibility upon those who were guilty of blunders and failures which cost many gallant lives, and inflicted fearful hardships and suffering upon the members of tho Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, more especially upon those who wero wounded, which' due forethought and organisation would havo averted. Tho only ground for satisfaction that appears is that the Imperial Government has made the report public, and recognised that its obvious duty is to take- immediately such action in regard to those- whom tho report incriminates as will meet the ends of justice. Just how far tho scope of the- indictment extends is not yet clear, but it is evident that responsibility is not confined to the soldiers and political administrators who were in immediate control of the Mesopotamian expedition If the London Times is correctly informed, Mr. Atjsten Chamberlain (Secretary for India) is in some degree exculpated by his opposition to the advance on Bagdad in which General Townshend and his division were sacrificed. It is not, clear whether The Times is quoting the Commission's report in its assertion that the War Cabinet compelled Mr. Chamberlain to cancel his previous instructions and order Ihe advance on Bagdad (in October, 1915) to proceed, but Mb. Asquith's War Committee and his Cabinet arc at all events included by the Commission in its list of the persons and bodies who must share responsibility for the failures and disasters of the expedition. * * * *

In its broad features, tho history of tho Mcsopotamian expedition is familiar. It is known that it began well as an entcrpriso of limited scope, but was afterwards all but wrecked as a result of attempts to develop' it on a far more ambitious scale than available resources and existing organisation warranted. It is in showing how terribly shortcomings due- to lack of prior preparation were magnified and aggravated by responsible individuals both on the political and military sido that the report lote in a flood of light. Tho failures and disasters of 1915 and early 1916 in Mesopotamia havo since been splendidly retrieved under the brilliant leadership of Sir Stanley Maude, but this docs not in the slightest degree affect the guilt of those who not only "invited disaster by initial blunders and want of forethought, but brazenly defended their maladministration and even endeavoured to break and' crush able and enterprising subordinates who strove to promote reorganisation and bring about improved conditions: Tho report of tho Commission is in essonce a rovelationof crime which must not go unpunished. The ruling state of affairs in tho Western theatre is clearly, brought out in tho news to-day. It is a state of affairs which promises well for the' future. British progress obviously is not to bo measured by tho present gain of ground in the vicinity of Lens, in Flanders, and elsewhere, but in tho marked success which is being achieved in subjecting tho enemy to an almost unendurable strain, aggravated by uncertainty as to where tho next big blow will fall. News dealing with conditions on tho Russian front points generally to an improving outlook "in that quarter. There are definite reports of fighting, though not on a big scale, and It is reported from Itome that Austrian divisions have been withdrawn from tho Italian front, apparently in order that they may be transferred to Russia. Continued forward movement by tho Eussians in North-Wes-tern Persia has a certain bearing on tho general situation. As whole, distinct support'is lent to ttio ideathat the enemy's hopes of continued stalemate in tho Eastern theatre aro fading.' It is reported also that disaffection in tho Czech contingents of the Austrian armies—a factor which has more than once given tho enemy serious trouble in the past—is again attaining Serious dimensions. A claim advanced by the Anstrians 'that they have "completely recovered" positions lost, in tho Eastern Trcntino is almost certainly intended to deceive. I£ they had actually recovered Mount Ortigara and other formidable strongholdsrccently captured by the Italians, tho Austrians would ,no doubt havo furnished a more explicit and more detailed rcP° rt ' ,

The latest return of British ships sunk by submarine or raino shows a considerable drop from the figures of last week towards tho average of weekly losses since the Germans opened their present campaign ins February. The average has not yet been reached, but if tho more than a-vcrago losses of tho last three weeks havo resulted from an exceptional effort by tho enemy such as he apparently made at tho end of April and beginning of May, his second intensified effort has been much less successful than tho first. * s * *

Thb plan of tho United States Federal Shipping Board for tho construction of a thousand wooden

cargo ships has been discarded in iavour oi steel construction. This aunounccme-ut was made by (JENISIUL (joBTHALS, who has been appointed to organise America's shipbuilding resources, in a speech made at tho annual dinner of the American Iron and Steel Institute, on May 25. According to an American writer, the Shipping Board's project, which was advanced by tho Western and Middle Western members, met with pronounced opposition from shipowners and shipbuilders, who objected to it on technical as wtfii as rinancial grounds; but it required tho clear-out criticisms of General Goethals, after he had been appointed to take charge of tho national shipbuilding campaign, to convince the board and the Administration of the unpractical nature of tho undertaking. The. Shipping Board proposed that wooden ships of 3000 tons should be constructed at the rate of 200,000 tons a month, and it was hoped that this would bo accomplished without interfering with tho construction of steel ships. General Goethals's plan, wEich is now being carried out, aims at the production of 3,000,000 tons of steel shipping in tho next eighteen months. In announcing tho change of plan, General Goethals said that when he was called to tho Government service and confronted with tho problem of turning out a thousand 3000-ton wooden ships in eighteen months, ho found that contracts for these vessels had been let in all directions, but was unable to find Elans or specifications. "When," e added, "you consider that the 'birds are now nesting in tho trees that will go to build those ships that must attain a speed of ten and one-half 'knots, and several additional knots to escape submarines, why, the proposition is simply hopeless. I called on Mr. Farrell, of the United States Steel Corporation, and asked him if it was not possible to turn to steel. He assured me it would be possible. I had a second conference with Mr. Farrell, and he agreed to stand back of me'and see that the programme would bo carried out. On the- strength of this I went before Congress and said I would turn out 3,000,000 tons of steel ships in eighteen months. As these ships will go into the morchant marine, if they escape the submarine, they should be of steel. Apart from tho objections to tho wooden ship plan j mentioned by General Gogthals, it was contended that these- vessels would bo unfitted to carry such cargoes as coal and ores. Difficulty in fitting them with efficient engines as fast as they wore built was also foreseen, and it was asserted that they would bo so shortlived as to neutralise their relatively low cost. It was also denied that they could bo turned out so quickly as tho Shipping Board prophesied.