PROCESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3116, 21 June 1917, Page 4

PROCESS OF THE WAR

f _ Sie Douglas Haig's dispatch dealI ing with the events of tho winter I campaign and with operations to tho commencement of the present offensive docs not bring many new detail facts to light, hut it shows very clearly that the armies which broke the enemy's resistance on the Somme and Ancro and afterwards followed up his retreat to the Hindenburg line worked throughout to an ordered plan, and did it with remarkable success. The Commander-in-Chief gives full prominence to the delays which were occasioned by tho enemy's systematic destruction of roads, bridges, and railways, and by tho muddy state of the countryside, but it is worth noting that on May 4, Mb. Balfour (then in Washington as head of the British Mission to America) received and made public a cahlegram stating that tho British forces on the Western front wero two weeks ahead of their attacking schedule. The advance, tho cablegram stated, had been much faster than expected, and the losses smaller. By May 4 tho Battle of Arras was well advanced, and tho British had gained an extended foothold on the Hindenburg line, but the fact that they were two weeks ahead of schedulo at that date means, of course, that they made faster progress than had been anticipated in the days when they were following ■up tho enemy's retreat through a devastated countryside in which the enemy had done everything possiblo to impede their progress.

It cannofc be doubted that tho British pursuit will rank in military annals as a very great achievement. That it was rapid and effective- beyond expectations does not mean only that wonders were accomplished in overcoming obstacles to progress. It is more important that the enemy was falling back upon prepared lines of formidable strength, while the British as they advanced left everything in tho nature of prepared defences in rear. There was much in these circumstances to favour a damaging coun- ! ter-stroke by tho enemy, and tho ! only convincing reason that no such I counte'r-stroko was delivered is that the excellence of tho British dispositions mado it impossible. Sm Douglas Haig has definite grounds for his statement that: "The prospect of a more general resumption of open fighting can bo regarded with great confidcnco."_ Facte bearing upon tho future which stand out prominently in ,tho Commander-in-Chief's dispatch are that bad weather materially favoured the enemy in the course of his retreat, and that he derived considerable advantage also from having carefully prepared positions at no great distance in rcar_ of bis original lino on which to retire. It is very possible that when the Germans next retire they may not be able to chposo their season, _ and _as_ to the second factor definite limitations apply to tho policy of constructing and improving defensive lines in rear of that on which fighting is in pro-1 grees. Trenches may bo dug almost indefinitely, but works infinitely more elaborate than a range of trenches <iro needed to constitute an effective defensive line in the AVestern theatre, and carried beyond a certain point the multiplication of lines would amount to a suicidal weakening of the actual fighting front.

To-day's reports dealing with current events on the West'front relate chiefly to small engagements, and discloso no material change in the general situation. The possibility remains well in sight, however, that the enemy may presently havo to execute a forced retreat in Southern Flanders, whore ho is awkwardly placed with the Kivcr Lys and the Yprcs-Comincs Canal meeting behind his front. The fact that tho enemy is clinging to this dangerous angle, with his transport bridges wider continuous shellfiro, is an indication of the apprehension with which he regards the prospect of a British advance across tho road, rail, and canal communications connecting his northorn front with the great depots ho has established at Lille. Tourcoing, and Koubaix.

Amongst other indications of an improving situation in Russia, a statement by M. Albert Thomas, the French Minister of Munitions, who lias lately been representing his country, as Ambassador at Poti'o-

grud-. deserves particular attention. M liiomas clccliij-ori that in a. few Weeks Germany will no lunger lie able to rr-Kko.n on the present quiet Oil file- Bussiad Front. Tho statement .is guarded and cannot bo ac'•fcp'ted as_a definite prediction that Russia, will open a vigorous offensive. But it certainly implies that the enemy will bo subjected to "definite pressure in Russia a few weeks henco, and oven limited activity by the Russian armies would greatly improve the existing situation. M. Thomas is well qualified to form a sound .inclement, and in the mission front which he is.now apparently returning has had exceptional opportunities of surveying conditions in Russia.

Though it has not been made under enemy pressure, the British evacuation of a limited area of low ground east of tho Struma can lnu'diy be regarded as a promising sign- of an impending Allied offensive in Macedonia. The evacuated ground is dominated by heights on the west hank of tho river, and it has been given up only because its occupation would be particularly unhealthy during the malarial season now at hand. The retirement suggests, however, that there is no immediate intention of attacking the enemy in the Struma Valley, which is ono of the practicable military avenues striking north through the Balkans, and it is likely that the enemy would bo pressed at all vulnerable points on his front if a general offensive were in prospect. _ The general position in Macedonia is that the enemy is established everywhere in strong positions, but on a long 1 front and with bad crosscommunications. It is therefore decidedly in the interests of tho Allies to compel the enemy to distribute his forces as widely as possible. The limited retirement on the Struma promises him a measure of relief.