PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3115, 20 June 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

No really clear light has yet been thrown upon tho existing situation in Spain, but available news is to tho effect that revolutionary disorders have broken out or are imminent. Tho latest message in hand at time of writing states that tho Vatican has received very grave news from Spain. It is said that Senob Dato, tho lately-appoint-ed Primo Minister, lacks authority, that conflicts between Germanophiles and interventionists complicate the situation, and that a now general strike and a fresh crisis are imminent. Many essential facts arc obviously withheld by tho censorship, but it seems likely that Spain is in the throes of just such an internal crisis as threatened to arise in March, but was averted at that time by the action of the Romanones Government. According to news which reached America by an indirect route, the troubles which arose in Spain during March wero based on a manifesto signed _ by twenty-six heads of labour organisations in all parts of the country, reciting the grievances of the. workmen, attacking tho existing form of government, and announcing that a general strike would be inaugurated. The demand for a change in the form of government was regarded, as more serious than the threat of a strike, owing to tbo unrest that followed tho upheaval iu Russia, and the Government decided upon drastic measures. Sixteen of the leaders who signed the manifesto were arrested, charged with seditious utterances, tho labour exchanges in Madrid and the provinces were closed, and a Royal decree was issued placing Ijhe country virtually under martial law by the suspension of the constitutional guarantees for free speech, speedy trial, etc. A rigid censorship also was inaugurated, preventing mention of the manifesto or reference, to r he character of the movement. The manifesto which precipitated the troubles was the outgrowth of tho high price and scarcity of food and coal, the suspension of exports in Spain's wino and olivo oil trade bcoauso of Ger-

many's so-called blockade and tho general derangement of labour and industry as the result of the war. The dispatch which has been quoted stated that tho summary action of the Government had postponed development of tho revolutionary movement, if it had not entirely broken it up, and that there was evidently no organisation capable of coping with tho strong military and police forces under Government control. Late events, as far as they aro disclosed, suggest that tho trouble has recurred in formidable shape, and that tho authority of tho Government is at least very seriously threatened.

Various possibilities arc raised by these conditions. The most obvious is that Spain may fall into a state of internal chaos with some prospects of emerging under a Republican form of government. It is significant that conflicts between Germanophiles and those who favour intervention aro now mentioned only as complicating a generally troubled situation. It was asserted in rcforcncc to tho incipiont disturbances of March that German influences figured in stirring up discord, so as to keen Spain fully qccupied with homo affairs, and it is distinctly possible that cnomy agents and partisans havo had a hand in promoting tho existing state of affairs. Their motivo for exerting themselves to that end appears in tho fact that tho Spanish sentiment in favour of neutrality has been notably weakened in recent months. Before tho present crisis aroso a largo and growing ptirty had oponly declared in favour of taking activo measuros to defend Spanish lives and interests against German aggression. It is possiblo that tho friends of Germany by fomenting the internal troubles which wcro already simmering in Spain havo postponed tho day of Spanish intervention.

. . . c day to a statement by Captain Bathukst that there- is no diminution in the enemy's submarine activity, and that the main reason why fewer vessels are sunk is to bo found in tho arming of merchantmen. This, as it stands, suggests that the nayal counter-offensive is second in importance to tho arming of merchantmen amongst the factors making for the defeat of the enemy submarine campaign. As a matter of fact, thero is reason to believe that tho naval counter-offonsivo ranks, easily first in this category. In any case it is certainly impossible to substantiate by evidence an assertion that tho arming of merchantmen is the main reason why fewer vessels aro sunk by submarines. Such an assertion involves a comparison b'etweon tho number of vessels saved as a result of carrying guns and tho number saved indirectly as a, result of the destruction of submarines by tho Navy. As a matter of fact, no one is in a position to institute this comparison on really definito evidence. In the first placo, even tho British Admiralty does not know exactly how many enemy submarines have been sunk by British and Allied naval forces, because it sometimes happens that when a submarine Has apparently been sunk an element of doubt remains. • Even if certain \ information were available as to the number of enemy submarines accounted for it would still bo to detcrmino precisely tho relative importance of naval operations and tho arming of merchantmen as tending to reduce tonnage losses. Tho extent to which the arming of merchantmen contributes to this end is pretty definitely indicated in tho number of unsuccessful attacks recorded week by week. In. two recent weeks the number of unsuccessful attacks almost equalled the number of ships sunk; and throughout this year's submarine campaign unsuccessful attacks have been in a considerable proportion to the number of ships sunk. But the sinking or capture of a submarine indirectly saves an "indefinite number of merchant ships from destruction, and available evidence suggests that a very large proportion < of tho enemy submarines accounted for in a given period are accounted for by aaval forces.

Evidence on this point is admittedly something less than conclusive, but it cannot be disregarded. It includes tho facts supplied by Sir Edward Carson in a speech in tho House of Commons in February last. The First Lord stated that forty encounters with enemy submarines had occurred duringithe first eighteen days of February. From tho forty cases he selected nine typical instances. In eight of them single submarines wero encountered or ongagod, and on one occasion two enemy submarines cruising in company were brought to action. In one instance, out of the nine selected by the First Lord for purposes of illustration, a submarine was rammed by a transport and almost certainly sunk. In every other instance submarines wore attacked in the normal course of the naval hunt by destroyers, patrol boats, airships and seaplanes. Tho facts supplied by Sir Edward Carson indicated a strong probability that the enemy lost four submarines in tho nine encounters (included in the four were one submarine captured and another certainly sunk), and a likelihood that he lost a larger number. Taking it that tho instances cited by tho First Lord were really representative, it would.follow that the enemy probably lost sixteen submarines in forty encounters during tho first eighteen days of February almost'without exception as an outcomo of tho British naval hunt. Considering that the British antisubmarine forces are constantly and rapidly expanding, and are now being reinforced by America, it is 'likely that tho results achioved in February arc now being materially improved upon. It must bo supposed also that tho extensive minefields laid by tho Navy account for a proportion of the submarines which do not return to port. All things considered, though really definite and conclusivo evidence ou the subject is lacking, it is hardly reasonable to doubt thai, the naval counter-offensive is by far the most important factor tending to set limits to the enemy submarine campaign as. well as tho chief factor making for its defeat.

Mn. Bonar Law, speaking on behalf of the Imperial Government, has replied in somewhat non-com-mittal terms to questions regarding reprisals for the German air raids on London. Apart from pointing out that frequent British raids are made upon the enemy's depots and communications well' behind his lines in Franco, and that these raids arc being made more often and at greater rango as the British forces increase and machines are improved, tho Minister confined himself to the statement that the, Government

is consulting the military authorities and Sir Douglas BLug, and meantime retains an open mind regarding reprisals. Tho question, however, seems to he one that should be determined rather by statesmen than by soldiers. In attacking German military depots, including aerodromes, tho British air forces arc no doubt doing very much more effective work than is done by the Germans when thoy drop bombs on London. If only purely military considerations had to ho taken into account thero would bo no reason to depart from tho policy now ruling, which is to subject tho enemy to tho greatest possible military loss and damage. But the.r/estidn of doing everything possible to discourage enemy raids mado solely with the object of murdering non-combatants is entitled to consideration on its immediate merits. The case for reprisals is not that the change of polioy involved , would enable tho British air service- to subject the enemy to greater military loss and damage than ho is suffering at present, but that reprisals in kind would probably compel the enemy to abandon, so far as air-raiding is concerned, tho policy of terrorism by which he sets so much store.