PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3105, 8 June 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The latest weekly return issued by tho Admiralty shows a further reduction in the number of British ships sunk by enemy submarines. Fifteen ships over and three under sixteen hundred tons were sunk during the week, and the total of losses is tho smallest recorded save in one week (tho week ending March 11) since the presont system of weekly returns was inaugurated in February last. The number of ships over 1600 tons sunk, during the week is tho lowest recorded for twelvo weeks. Only one ship less was sunk last week than in the previous week, but only one of the 19 ships sunk in the earlier week was under 1600 tons, whereas three of the 18 ships sunk last week were in that category. The average number of ' British ships over 1600 tons sunk in each week since February 19 is a fraction over 20, so that the return of 15 for the latest week is considerably below the average. It is still below tho average even if'the latter is computed without reference to itlie returns of two abnormal weeks, in which the I losses of ships, over. 1600 tons were respectively 40 and 38. Another feature of tho current return is that, as was tho case last week, a very high proportion of unsuccessful attacks is disclosed. Eighteen ships were sunk and seventeen were unsuccessfully attacked. As a whole there are distinct signs of an improving position.

Bora French aDcl British communiques to-day report local actions of considerable importance. The British have extended their invasion of the enemy positions on a front of about a miie north of the Scarpe (east of Arras), and the French Tiavo defeated determined enemy attacks at various points along the Aisno plateau, their general success being varied only by the loss of some elements in a first-line trench. Interest still centres, however, in Flanders, and tiiorc are further indications that a big battle may bo brewing in that quarter. Tho bombardment of the enemy front in Flanders is passed over lightly in the official reports, though Sin Douglas Haig speaks of considerable artillery righting as far north as Yprcs and the French of a lively artillery, struggle

at Nicuport, where the battlefront touches tho coast, lout correspondents describe a tremendous bombardment of tho German line between Ypres and the Vimy ltidge, and declare that the British guns arc playing havoc with tho German front and support trenches.

Tnii existing state of affairs revives interest in questions and possibilities which were discussed in

tho early days of the Gorman retreat. It was pointed out at that time that tho Germans evidently expected tho position ■of the Allies on tho new front to bo ..much worso in regard to supplies than on tho eld. Their principal object in methodically devastating the country as they retreated no doubt was to throw the greatest possiblo strain on tho Allied transport organisation. In March the idea was widely entertained that tho enemy retreat on the front between Arras and tho Aisno might be preliminary to an offensive stroke, but oven at that time it was pointed out by an English correspondent that the theory of a projected coun-ter-offensive was hot. necessary to explain tho retreat. Ho added that assuming tho Germans to bo anxious about their ability to maintain their defensive position they might well wish to shorten their line where it would cost them least and saddle the Allies with a belt of devastated cittiiitry in which they would be faced with a heavy task of road and railway construction and repair. The retreat towards Cambrai, tho correspondent abided, might well mean that the enemy's real fears were for of his lino north of Arras, and this, raised an interesting question lis to tho alternatives before the Allies. Should they continue tho push in tho centre 1 Or should they bo content to hold the devastated district lightly, turning tho devastation effected by the Germans to thoir own disadvantage by attacking their flanks 2

To-BAr the conditions ivhich the correspondent quoted had in view have been very considerably modified by tho vigour and success with which the Allies have followed up the enemy's retreat and dislodged him froiii positions which he hoped to •hold after completing his retirement. The capture of Vimy ridge, the footing gamed on the Hindeiiburg line between Arras and Douai, and the conquest by tho Allies of positions In which they imminently threaten the St. Quentin-La Fere defensive line are outstanding developments which have demonstrated very clearly the failure of the enemy's general plan. It goes without saying in this, connection that he'hoped to retain the commanding positions on the heights of the Aisno and in the Champagne from which ho has been dislodged, and which Ho has striven so desperately to recover. His front has been laid open to ah extent for whioh ho cannot have allowed, and at the samo timo the Allies have had a period of some; two months in to organise their transport in tho area in which the enemy had hoped to so intensify transport nroblems as to create a defensive Barrier and gain freedom to concentrate in defence of other sections of his front' where retreat was out of the question.

There is a. good deal in the course of events aihco the Germans executed their retreat to suggest that the Allies have elected to, concentrate upon that "push in the ceihtro" of which the correspondent 'spoke. As a matter of fact, however, an attack upon the enemy's flank in Flanders quite possibly offers as definite advantages now as in the days' when tho problem of effectively following up tho enemy's retreatj had still to be faced. Tho achievement of the Allies in the Arras area and further south is that they have checkmated the. enemy's plan of creating conditions which would have made effective attack difficult or impossible along a considerable length of front. Their vigorous pursuit has compelled the enemy to fight heavily and continuously to keep his line intact. They have dislodgfcd him from formidable positions on which ho hoped to anchor his- defensive front, and it is a Safe assumption that they have so developed their transport that are well prepared to attack the enemy, on the line to svhich he retreated. It cannot be doubted, tiowever, that their preparations for attack; as i-ogards ; transport and other factors,, have been developed to a Still 4 more advanced, stage /in Flanders, where the battlefront has been practically stationary since tie early days of the war. From every point of view an attack in Flanders, which is perhaps now imminent, holds big possibilities. In the first place it would threaten from a new quarter tho'enemy's jjieat depot atLille, and the vitally important surrounding areas, which are already dangerously threatened on the south.

To-day's reports dealing with, tho German air raid on the Essex coast and the Thames Estuary show that more than half the units of tho.Ge'rman squadron were put oiit of action. In spite of tho precautions they took with a view to that fate tho enemy machines were intercepted and successfully engaged on their return voyage by naval aeroplanes from Dunkirk. The latter pursued the enemy home, and some of his machines were driven to earth on the Belgian coast. The total German losses in tho raid, out o£ a squadron of about 16 aeroplanes, are given as four machines completely destroyed and six driven down. Two at least of these six are considered to have been destroyed.,