STRAIGHT TALK TO THE WORKERS

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3090, 22 May 1917, Page 5

STRAIGHT TALK TO THE WORKERS

BY SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON

*'I BEGAN AT THE FOOT OP THE LADDER"

. i Sir W.'Eobertson ond Sir John .Tellicoe fecenftp addressed trade union deputations, and in the course of his remarks, tho former said; "I am sure you. are just as keen to torn the war as anyone else, and therefore what I am about to say is not meant for you in particular but for evflryone in the country. Inm a great believer in truth and publicity, for no war can be fought to a successful '.conclusion uiiJess it receives popular support, and this it cannot do unless the people are plainly told the need, of support. Labour huestions are no concern of mine, but .[ know - they are grave questions, and I iave always recognised them as such, and I want you to believe that I am in fereat sympathy with- the cause of I/abour. Just as non-commissioned offifcers are tho backbone of the .Army, so the working inen, as tlrey are called, are the backbone of this country. I ask you to accept me as a working man. I began at the bottom of the ladder, served . several years in the ranks, and I claim to know- now the -working man looks at these matters. "The War Office lias told the Governtnent what it ought to have, but it Tiaa always left the Government to devise the means of providing them to specify -.the number. It has also been said that the War Office does not make the best ' ■'nse of the" men it gete. The War Offioe makes mistakes. Who does not? But • look at tie situation with which we were faced at the bepinnig of the war. We were unprepared, as were all other najtiona except Germany and France. We \had to improvise as tto went along, and Vβ hare been Hying from" hand to mouth • 'throughout the war. ■ The consequence of improvising is oonfusion,. waste of 'effort, friction, and injnstice. ■: With tlie '■best will in the world, these things cotiid vnot be avoided; It is the fault of the system, or rather want of it, and tliat is .'■ 'dne to want of foresight and preparation before the war on .the part of the nation as a whole. ■■•■■.

"Our Critics." . "Another point I wish to refer to is the criticism of our military operations . which has sometimes Here again mistakes hare'occurred, but mcjrvellously few considering wo had to im- : provise now armies. The critics ere chiefly disgruntled and otherwise undesirable members of the community who, having failed in their, own professions, think they know all about the professions of everyone else, and instead of loyally putting their shoulders to tbo wheel employ most of their time in sowing discontent and distrust of those in authority.' Lot ua treat them with the contempt they deserve, as. dp the soli diere at the front. lam gratified to say that, more than iu any campaign in Tvhioh I have taken part, criticisms within the Army itself have teen practically non-existent, and this I regard as a great tribute to the loyalty and discipline of the nation which has produced the men of whom our new armies are composed. Our progress with the war is hound to be slow beoause of the colossal numbers engaged, and because Germany derived a great advantage at the start. It is a difficult and long business to make up for a bad'start. .

Why the Huns Go Back. ■ ■ "As to the retreat from the Soinme, Gcr- . many is Tetiring because_ she dare not Istand up to farther punishment in the positions she occupied. No one retires , in war voluntarily. But eho is not yet I beaten., She' is going back in the hope of becoming etronger, and numerically she is etronger now than at anjf time during the war. Sho has been preparing for war and nothing olso for years pas);, • and has recently made extraordinary efforts. She now has many more divisions in the field, than last year, and has in-, creased the' imnibev .of her .soldiers, by ,-about a million. She has beon able to ■ .do this by her domineering autocratic Government, acting in total disregard of theSnost elementary principles of humanity and international law. After ovor- ■ funning Poland sho compelled thousands of men to emigrate to Germany and to ~work in German mines and munition fac-

tones, thus releasing! large numbors of ■ Germans for. military service. By her ' 'Auxiliary Service Law last November all persons, both malo and female, in Germany between the ages of IT and 60 were "placed at the disposal of tho Government. This measure .nlono has probably Bet free for '■ military service considerably over ono million -men, Sho has adopted t slave-raidinp in '■Belgium and Northern France whereby thousands of Bolgian. and French civilians have been compelled to work as elaves for their enemies in Germany, Jthns• re'leasinc still more Germans for military service. Wo must meet this 'desperate effort the enemy has made, - and to meet it wo must ..have men. Y"U ask how many men do we -want? My answer is the same as I mode to tlio iGovernment a few days after'takintfiin. • my present post. It ie that we oueht not to expect to win a war such as this unless,and until every man and woman in the country does a full work of an essential nature. . ' ; . What He. Told. the. 23. "Many time 3 during tho last sixteen 'months the question of man-power has been considered, and I have never varied my statement to the Government. 1 have always said'that it ia impossible to put a limit to th'e number of men needed for the Army, because the task is so hu<?e that we must have all men who_ can be spared from the Navy, the various industries,, agriculture, and other employment essential to the prosecution of the , -war. Surely it should be possible, seeing . the great reserve -• of men etill in the country, and with a proper adjustment of men-power, to give.the Army the men. needed, and our immediate needs are half a million if men between now and July next. The failure to get these men ■will undoubtedly involve a prolongation of the .war and consequent prolongation of hardship and misery. We have done much. Our troops at the front are the wonder of the'world. No one has ever approached the colossal task that we have go successfully accomplished. The question is, HaTe we done all that we can Germany is not yet beaten? I am perfectly confident of success provided we remain determined to win, but the way to victory may be long and certainly will be hard. We havo been saved, by our Navy from the horrors of war being brought into our own homes, with the result that many people in this land are still ignorant of the urgency of our position. I, for my part, feel that an. enormous responsibility rests -upon me, as I am asked to win the war, and it is impossible to do that .unless sufficient men are forthcoming. "In order to obtain the men needed it Seems to. mo that, for the duration of the war, we must one and all be willing to subordinate our personal.liberty and , ■jivill to that of the State. After all, what is demanded of us at home in com- „ parieon with what is demanded of our men at the front, many of whom are every day making the supreme sacrifice? Or what are our privations as compared with those of the countries which have been invaded and devastated for generations to come, homes broken up,. industries ruined, men deported as slaves, and old people and children left without food or shelter? It is upon these methods of outrage that the Germans are relying to induce the Belgian and French people lo submit to their terme. Aβ I have said, it is diffioult for us at thie distance "lo realise what these things mean, but wo may realise them one day if we' do hot before it is too late take every means in our power to crush that overbearing ipirit which has degraded a great nation, lias brought all tnis misery upon the world, and has defied every law of God iuid man. We must, in fact, win. The rint is, What do we mean by winning? doubt if it is properly understood. I take it there is no desire on the part of any one of us to crush the German nation, and the sooner the German people know that the better. Our aim ie, as I understand it, to deal German despotism finoh a blow as will for generations provend a recurrence of the horrors of the last two and a half years.

In short, we arc fighting in the cause .of Freedom, and before we can get Freedom Gonuany must l>e taught to realise that might ie uot right. Until that is 'done there can be no true Freedom either for individuals, or families, or societies, or for tho Empire. .Wo are a law-abiding , race, and as far as I know my countrymen, all they need in a situation like this is to be told'the truth and what it is they are required to do. .1 have told you all that it is possible to tell you , , with regard to the number of men we' require, and although a great strain has already been put upon us, I must also tell you that we must be prepared for a. still greater strain before we finish the war. I know you are ready to face that strain, and if we all. face it, Tesolutely set our teeth, nnd are true to ourselves, we shall with God's help secure that freedom for wliich we have been compelled to fight." .

Admiral Jellicoc's Speech. • "The Navy," said Sir Johu Jellicoe, "cannot win the war; the war has to be won on shore. We cannot get at tho Germans. Their ships stop inside their ports, and if they come out to light they.will not go back again, I hope. I'o win the war wo .must have, as Sir William Hobertson says, men for the Army. Some directions in which the Navy exerts its power a.re to defeat the High. Sea Fleet whenever it appears; to sink euemy submarines whenever they are fowid (as difficult' a task, I suppose, as was over put before any Navy); to keep open communications tor our food supplies and munitions, and to stop supplies getting into tho enemy's country, and to see that any enemy ship which gets afloat has a very short life. The enemy .is now forced >to attack under water* and although that as limited very much the activity of the submarine the counter to that attack" is much more difficult. To give security we want not men but large numbers of small craft. We want every man who takes part in the building of ships to do his -utmost, because a lieet oi , small craft prevents losses and the building of merchant ships replaces those lost. "The gravity of the submarine menace should not be minimised by anybody in this country. There is no one remedy. The methods for dealing with submarines are a combination of devices and fresh schemes are' daily introduced. Enemy submarine losses are not published, because of the difficulty of being quite certain when a submarine has gone down. You know that the submarine's dive has been involuntary when some snrvivbrs are picked up. But the cases of that sort are not many, because when a submarine is attacked she gets all hands inside as sooa as possible ready to dive. At the same time, while the submarines are by no means getting off scot free, there is undoubtedly a serious time beforo the country, and economy in food consumption should be the order of tho day. It is due to ■ those who are fighting so gallantly in the Army to see that no negligence on. our part ashore shall nullify their efforts. It is also due to those gallant fellows in the mercantile marine—(applause)—whose ships are sometimes sunk 300 or 100 miles out in the Atlantic, to see that we put forth every possible eft" ort to combat successfully the menace. ; Wo can do this by keeping our consumption down to real necessities and by working- hard each in his own sphere with one end in view—to carry the war to a successful ending at the earliest,possible moment.-