RUSSIA'S PROBLEMS

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3072, 7 May 1917, Page 4

RUSSIA'S PROBLEMS

A somewhat disturbing account given by the United Press Agency's correspondent at Petrograd of the political situation in Russia is modified by a later message from tho same correspondent, which states that the situation has greatly improved. It is evident, however, that a condition of considerable tension exists in regard to issues which are vital both to Russia and to her Allies,, particularly as regards tho prosecution of the war. To-day's news points to tho observance or non-observance of Russia's undertakings with the Allies as tho leading issue between the contending political elements, and there is,_ of course, no doubt that it is tho immediate issue. But those who have recently written of conditions in Russia from a standpoint of intimate knowledge direct attention to other grounds of difference, which' lie deeper, and to which the present controversy, vitally as. it concerns Russia's future and tho outlook in the war, is probably incidental. The revolution did not arise out of .a simple and clear-cut division of parties and conflict ol aspirations. The forces, comprising in tho aggregate nearly the whole nation, which combined to overthrow the autocratic regime include more or less dissonant and conflicting elements which are liable,_ unless they meet in an accommodating spirit of practical compromise, to clash, with serious, or even disastrous, results. On the direct issue raised, tho fanatical extremists who desire to take tho shortest possible way out of tho war, without perceiving or without considering the consequences winch this insane ' policy would entail, probably command an inconsiderable body of support in Russia. But tho danger appears that internal dissensions on other grounds may weaken the nation and rob the Provisional Government of the united support which is necessary, if it is to carry out its expressed determination to fully and faithfully observe Russia's engagements to tho Allies. What the grounds of difference are which tend to divide and weaken Russia when, in her .own interests and those of her Allies, sho should be concentrating on winning the war is indicated in an article by Johann G. Oiisol, a member of the Second Duma, which was published in America at the end of March. _ For present purposes the article is not the less informative for being written from an obviously partisan standpoint. M. Ohsol declared that the crisis must come, in Russia,_ in the actual assembling of a constitutional convention. Delay of that convention, he added, would work for reaction—the reaction having as its object the formation of constitutional monarchy under control of the great landholders and the chief business interests of the country, allied with tho Orthodox Greek Church. An early convention would give advantage to the Group of Toil or Peasant party, represented by M. Kerenski (Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government"), and to the Social Democratic Labour 'Party.

If the majority of the present Cabinet feels safe.in doing so (M. Ohsol continued) it will urge the postponement of tho election and of the meeting of the convention. It is opposed to the spirit which animates the radical party. It does not want a republic. It much prefers a constitutional monarchy, in which property interests of the great landowners and tho merchant princes and large manufacturers will not be disturbed. The Tsar's regime hampered the development awl threatened the safety of business interests, and these interests were glad to see the Tsar fall, but they fear oven more the. programme of tho peasants, the workers in the cities, and the "intellectuals" who in the past have conducted the propaganda of revolution.: It should be remembered that over 150,000 men and women are now coming out of political prison and exile, and that almost !)9 per cent, of them are for the revolutionary programme of internal reforms.

Developing his argument, M. Oiisoi, pointed out that several members of the- Provisional Government were'large landholders or were connected with big commercial interests, and stated that M. K.erenski was the only Minister opposed to a conservative, scheme of government. It I would serve no purpose to discuss [ the merits of the- questions here raised. M. Ohsol's observations arc chiefly interesting _ where they are restricted to a recital ol facts, and above all in his suggestion that a strong radical section is likely to set up as an issue- taking precedence of all others the summoning of a convention to determine the form of the government to be established. To people outside Russia it seems plain enough that her rational policy is first to concentrate upon winning the war, if necessary deferring to that end the determination of her future form of government. But it is not yet certain that this policy will gain the united support in Russia which would ensure its application, and meantime each element of internal dissension, in'eluding the uneasiness of the peasants over the question of land distribution, must tend to weaken the Provisional Government, and to confer a morn iextended opportunity upon tlie anti-war party —which in itself, as has been said, is probably inconsiderable—and tu the extremists who are prepared to recklessly subordinate all other considerations to that of carrying the revolution to the utmost possible lengths, while revolutionary fervour is still art fever heat.

The situation as a whole is exceeding complex, and contains

grave- elements of danger, but the possibility is still quite open that the Provisional Government may retain such a command of the situation as will enable it to keep faith with the Allies and lay the foundations of orderly government. "Wo have hoard a great deal in recent clays of the agitation of the extremist elements, and it is probable that tho result has been to give an exaggerated idea of their strength and importance, relatively to the mass of their countrymen. _ There is at all events a deep patriotism in the Russian people, and almost universal hostility to Germany, which make powerfully for a strong war policy, and sympathy for their kinsfolk living oppressed under alien rule may be expected to contribute powerfully to the same end. Unless tho spirit of tho revolution is strangely perverted the Russian people will ultimately subordinate all other issues to that of destroying the standing menace of Prussian militarism and despotism. All save tho most infatuated extremists, or the hopelessly apathetic, must recognise that any other course would not only dishonour Russia in the eyes of 'her Allies, but endanger the liberty she has so recently won. >!Bufc it is distinctly possible that the political dissensions now in evidence may result in impairing Russia's effort in the present year's campaign, and so, perhaps, in lengthening the war.