The Dominion THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1917. AMERICA AND FRANCE

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3069, 3 May 1917, Page 4

The Dominion THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1917. AMERICA AND FRANCE

Whatever lines she may ulti- . mately oloctto follow in raising an i army, America's assistance under- ™ of value to the Allies as guaranteeing them a Powerful yfcinforcement noxt year, if the va,r is still unfinished when anothsi- summer and winter have parsed. It is unlikely that the proposal to send drafts of men to I'ranco at monthly intervals to be trained there instead of being train- . Ed at homo would alter the position to any greater extent than to make a certain _ number of ■ American troops _ available during the winter campaign. This would hold good Wen j if France supplied the artil- . lery/and tho specialist branches in each divisior' which need longortraining than the infantry and the supply corps, which constitute a very large proportion of its total strength. There is, of course, no doubt that America will bo enabled to more speedily assist tho Allies in the field if she decides to send periodicaldrafts to France for training than if she adopts the alternative policy of training a big army on her'own soil. 'But if tho. first draft of untrained mon were to leave in a few weeks (and "before August," as mentif-ned by one Washington correspondent, aa the poriod at which it is proposed to send away the first draft), it would hardly see service much before winter. In view of tho statements by Marshal Joffre and othors which have lately been published, it seems rather doubtful whether the idea, tentatively entertained, of training a big American army at home was practicable. It is at all ovents far from certain that an army, so trained would have been available in tho spring of 1918. The plan now under consideration should make a limited American force available by next winter, and a considerable number of American divisions by next spring. It is not to be supposed that the_ strength of the American drafts is intended to be restricted for any length of time to twenty thousand men a month. The arresting feature of the discussion which has arisen over the French proposal is not any. promise that America will bo able to bring lier strength to bear in the field much sooner than was expected, but the evidence it affords of spontaneous readiness on I tho part of the American people to consider their military problem: from the common standpoint of the Allies, and of their honest anxiety' to take up their share of the actual military task as soon as may be possible. Eeadincss to consider on its merits the proposal advanced by the French Commissioners, anct wholehearted sympathy for France, are . the dominant notes in the American newspaper and other comments which have been cabled. The state of affairs disclosed is one to renew and fortify tho confidence of the nations which have staked their fate nn a war against criminal despotism. Wc do not yet know when America will be able to place an army in the field, and it is still necessary to moderate expectations on this T>oint or run the risk of suffering disappointment. But the ovents connected with tho visit of the Frcnch Commission have done much to strengthen tho conviction that America is touched , by the samo spirt as iuspires tho members of the Enlcnic to continue tho struggle, conscious or tho terrible strain it imposes, but with unshaken purpose. While estimating at its full worth the accession of mcral and material force which America is bringing to the Allies, it is necessary to avoid reading more into some of the statements which the visit of tho French Commission to Amorica has called

forth than they were perhaps intended to convey. For instance, it is said by the Washington correspondent ot one American newspaper that tne i' re neb. implore haste, and are not making it a secret that the' appeal is on behalf of the nation, which is almost spent. This statementcannot bo accepted unreservedly- H Is truo that Franco is bearing up against a terrible strain, but to suggest that Franco is alspent while Germany remains relatively oxtremely formidable— and some people will road tho'statement quoied in this sense—would be to distort the facts. Tho truth is that Germany, like France, is sorely spent, and that Franco, like Germany, is still formidable—formidable in tho strength of her magnificent Army, and above all in tho high resolve of people and Army which compares to tho national spirit of .Germany as a. diamond does to clay. France does not stand alone, and oven a direct comparison, as knowledge stands, does not show her plight to be as bad as that of Germany. It is true that the exhaustion of French reserves is in sight, and possibly France may not bo .amo to maintain her armies at fcjifc strength hitherto maintained beyond the present year. But the : latest available information regard-1 ing French and German reserves is j to the effect that Germany has called I up one more class than France—that I is, to say, she has drawn upon recruits one year younger, and is to' that extent worse placed to face tho future. There are good grounds for believing also that the process of "combing-out" has been carried to much greater lengths in Germany than in France. On the other hand Germany'has contrived to body out her resources by utilising the forced labour of prisoners of war, and the inhabitants of invaded territory, but this is a procedure whioH does not make wholly for strength. At a general view, taking account of the aggregate strength of Franco and her Allies, Germany and her vassals aro ; of course, at a very great inferiority, both in numerical strength and in tho" industrial Btrength which plays such a vital part in modorn war. France has suffered relatively more than r.ny of her principal Allies, but sho is so far from being at an end of her resources that it is quite possiblo that the war may terminate in an Allied victory before America, however strenuously she exerts herself to that end, is able to throw any considerable force into the field.