PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3059, 21 April 1917, Page 8

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

In his official reports which appear to-day the enemy makes studied efforts to convey an iinpres-J sion that the German armies on the West front are comfortably holding their own. in an almost stationary battle, in which tho loss of positions at one point is balanced by gains at another. A. typical example is the communique which states that French attacks • along. tho Aisne Canal failed, and that a, German counter-attack in the Champagne compensated for ,a gain of ground by the "French north-west of Auberive. There is ample evidence in the detailed French reports that the enemy's carefully-worded statements absolutely misrepresent the position in regard both to the gen-, oral situation and the detail events of the offensive. It is shown that the Germans have brought up strong reserves, that they ■■ have staked heavily upon counter-attacks at a number_ of points without gainingperceptible relief, and that in spite of their utmost efforts, the French are continuously' penetrating their line, and winning s!iong positions in widely-separated areas. It is noteworthy also that the French report that even where they aro driving in the enemy lino they are maintaining close contact with the. opposing forces. These are the ruling conditions of the mighty conflict at its present stage, and a somewhat similar state of'affairs obtains on the British'front, though fighting there is for the moment less intense 'than on the front along the Aisne and in the Champagne.-. ' . * • * * * Though they are details in a battle in which the French have set themselves to impose a racking strain upon a widely-extended section of the enemy front, while denying the enemy an opportunity for effective counter-attack, ' tho gains of ground'reported to-day are in themselves considerable. At the apex of the salient formed by the German lino where it runs south to the Aisne and then turns cast along the northern side of . that river French progress during tho last day or two has been measured by miles, and to-day the capture of further villages, and positions in this area is reported. Badly as the enemy is placed for defence in this quarter on account of tho salient formation of his lino he is 'evidently clinging obstinately to'his positions. Fort dp Conde in particular must have been enclosed in a very acute salient prior, to its capture. One result of the French progress now reported is to increasingly lay open on its southern flank the strong section of tho enemy line which runs, south of La Fere, through the St. Gobain Forest and tho High Forest of' Coucy. To the east tho French have further developed their attacks upon tho isolated high positions which interrupt tho generally low country north of Reims and east of that place. They have captured a strongly fortified trench system on rising ground about 17 miles east' of Reims. TBe news generally indicates that the enemy is. reduced to costlv and ineffective stone-walling tactics, while "his front over a wide area is being steadily and persistently weakened by the .capture of its strongest elements. '.•-..'. '. .....'

Particular interest attaches', to the statement (made in a French that twelve new G*i - - man .divisions been . identified on the Soissons-Auberive front, and to those passages in the ■ reports which deal with the enemv's numerous counter-attacks. The twelve divisions mentioned are assuredly not the only reinforcements which the enemy has lately sent to, the West front. Considerable forcements must also have been thrown in tho path of the British offensive, and it is probable that at least as new divisions have been allotted by tho enemy to the front from Artois to the .Aisne asto the front along the_ Aisne and in the Champagne on which twelve new divisions hava been So much assumed a 1 very considerable part of whatever strategic reserve von HiNDENBUEG can be supposedto have accumulated during the winter is accounted for.

This matter was interestingly discussed by" Colonel Repington military, correspondent) in an article written in February last. "Early in the autumn of last year , (he remarked) some 27 • new divisions had been raised < by the withdrawal of three battalions from certain divisions, and by their regrouping in new divisions; each of nine battalions, with new or captured artillery. The manufacture of new heavy guns and the utilisation of captured , batteries for the new divisions doubtless continued in a systematic manner. With these liew or partly now forces the campaign in Rumania became practicable, and the question is whether this process has gone on, and. what results it may give during the 1917 campaign. In order to oe on the safe side we assume that the. 2310 German practice has been continued up to tho limits imposed, first, by the supply of men, and, secondly, i by that of guns and ammunition. These.limits are not exaotly known, but if wo assume that tho system has been generalised and has Leon applied to some- 170 German divisions, it would produce 510 battalions of infantry, which might enable 56 fresh divisions to bo formed if tho artillery could bo found for them, as well as the necessary shells, which have, of course, been piling up on both sides during a period of comparative inactivity. In short, tho 27 new divisions known to have- existed when Rumania was'attacked may by. now havo grown to 56 " We must allow, Colonel Repington adds, that the 128 to 130 Gorman divisions j

in the West in November last might be 'reinforced by the available balance from Rumania, say, tea divisions in all, and by some twenty divisions of new formation, making up a potential force of 166 divisions or thereabouts. Those German divisions, Colonel Hepington jobserves, do 'not appear to possess their old efficiency or moral, and their armament will probably remain inferior to that of the- Allies. He considers it probable also that all the Gorman divisions which promise to take the field before long cannot bo maintained for many months by drafts, and that the German' effort -will consequently bo short-lived,, and will the maximum endeavour of our principal enemy, but if it be true that the internal conditions of Germany positively preclude a long continuance of hostilities.it obviously will not matter much whether drafts are available for a long period ahead or not.

While Colonel Repington leaned to the opinion that the Germans were massing their now divisions on the West-front,' and considered it possible, though unlikely, that they had no higher ideal than to continue, their stone-walling tactics of last year, the speculations of other authorities ranged freely as to the possible employment of the German strategic reserve. An offensive against ißussia and a repetition of the attick on Italy were amongst the .possibilities considered. Developments in the Western theatre go a good long way towards setting these speculations at rest. It ia a. reasonable assumption that tho twelve new divisions identified on the Soissons-Auberive front represent only a part and perhaps not the 'greatest part of the reinforcements the Germans have lately sent to the West front. Available evidence, therefore, is that, at this early stage of the Allied offensive tho enemy is already using a great, if not the greater, part of nis strategic reserve in support of the stonewalling "tactics he is opposing to the Allied offensive.

It is a little- difficult to believe that in the disclosed state of his fortunes the enemy can be , really contemplating thft descent bj sea in rear of the Russian right flank for which he is said in one message today to be making extensive ..preparations. The authority of the Russian General Staff is cited for statements that ■ the Germans have assembled npmerous transports in the Baltic ports, that a portion of the badly-named High Seas Fleet: has left Kiel for Danzig, and that the enemy is believed to contemplate a descent on the coast of the Gulf of Finland. It must bo considered, however, that the Germans may' be making a demonstration with intent to deceive, and that if the Russian General Staff lattached mor,e importance to the enemy preparations' it might have less to say about the matter. Meantime there are one or two considerations which deserve attention,, apart from the question of available enemy reserves. Germany is still in a position to attack Russia in a great superiority of naval force, but in the restricted manoeuvring ground of the Baltic submarines constitute a formidable menace to capital ships. It will be remembered also that Sik John Jellicoe once said that though it would be difficult to take the British Fleet into the Baltic, he would not say it was impossible. Even in the unlikely .event that -.he has a force at "disposal which would "en-; able him to seriously threaten Pctrograd, the enterprise " must in _ a number of ways bo unattractive from the enemy's point of view.

One of tie risks incurred would be that of affording the Russians an enlarged opportunity on the southern front, which witnessed their principal effort last year. It is, of course, another side of the question that the enemy might hope to cripple Russian action on • the southern front by a new offensive in the north, but in the circumstances that exist the dangers of the enterprise 'would obviously be great. While Petr6grad _sends news of an enemy concentration'" in the Baltic, the Germans, report increased activity in Southern Russia and Galicia.. The''Russians,, they;. state, have increased their forces in these territories, and as a result their artillery fire is- more active between the Pripet and-the.Dniester. There 4s little doubt that-in-normal course the Russians will- elect to; resume the offensive on the' southern front, in which they were interrupted last year after achieving pronounced §uccess. It; is on the southern front tha't they'stand opposed to Austria and have prospects of cutting off this weaker member of the Teutonic partnership from effective contact with Germany.. The northern front does not offer the same advantages for the purposes of an offensive, and to concentrate chiefly in the north might be to enable the enemy to. make effective use of the advantage in communications which he still enjoys in the south. It is therefore likely enough that the enemy report of an increasing Russian concentration on the southern front is in accordance.with fact. The- later news .of political conditions'in Russia (which have sp material a bearing upon military prospects) is distinctly good, and weight attaches to M< Mitiukoef's assurance that is faithful to the' undertakings rnto which sh© has entered her Allies, i