PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3046, 5 April 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

A ooeeeepondent with. thcf'Eritish Army (Me. Beach Thomas) states to-day that it is now in contact ■with an enemy fortified line from Beaurains (south of Arras) to near St. Quentin, that is to say, on approximately the northern half of tho lino on which tho enemy has retreated. On the direct approach to St. Quentin from tKo west, tho British , seom to be momentarily at a standstill, at a distance or about two miles from the oity, but in lato fighting they have captured the village of, Maissemy, five miles north-west' of St. Quentin, and three miles west of tho .main road connecting St. Quentin with Canibrai. This, with the capture of the village of Henin-sur-Cojeul, is the only progress reported on tho tfritieh- section of the front at timo of writing. The British line now runs south-east from near Arras to the Bapaume-Cambrai road', which it orosses about ten. miles west of the latter place From the road iho lino runs south-south-east, with a fairly pronounced eastward bulge over's, considerable part of its length, to a point about, two miles west of St. Quentin.

So far tli© nows is consistent with the idea that the Germans havo now reached tho lino on which they rontemplato a, dofcnsive stand, hut the state of affairs immediately south of St. Quontin runs in somo respects counter to this theory. It is to the effect that tho French have made notable progress in a turning movement against St.- Quentin from the south. They report a successful at-' tack upon a rango of enemy ]iositions on a front of eight miles, pxy tending south-east from the snwll village of Epine-de-Dallon, about Wo and a half miles south-west of St. Quentin, to tho Disc, south-east of the. latter place. Tho battle appears to have been the most important fought for somo time past on the AVesfc front. The enemy mot ■■•ho attaok in solidly organised positions, which ho held in heavy force. Assaulting after a violent artillery preparation, the French • attained thoir objectivo in spite of a. desperate resistance, and carried a series of strong positions and a number of villages. • I The French success not only brings the Allies noaror to tho occupation of Sfc. Quentin, bub dangerously threatens the enemy line on north and south. Tho fortified front on which the .Germans aro established between Arras and' St. i Quentin will speedily bo made untenable if the French drive into its southern flank, as they; aro now in a position, to do, and it is obvious that the eastward extension of tho French front also menaces tho enemy positions to the south. Matters j.tand at this point for the moment, but the situation seems likely to develop very rapidly. Even if it is assumed that tho Germans are conducting a retreat by stages, and that the line north from St. Quentin to Arras is the one on which they had intended to etand for a time, it can hardly be supposed that tho front on which they are engaged south of St. t Quentin Has been freely chosen or is to their liking.

It is by this time well understood that in the campaign which hae reached such, a critical stago in the Western theatre issues first importance hinge lipon 13b effective use of railways. this subject in a recent, article, Mb. HilAIEB Belloo remarked tha.t, as compared with the enemy, the Western Allies had handled their, railways better, and concealed their movements better. The enemy had never moved troops by railway .with the same secrecy and the" same rapidity as, in critical moments, the Western Mlie3 had proved themselves capable of moving them.« ."The Battle of the.Marno," Me. Belloo continues, "was won by tho ewinging of a great body of troops right behind the line of battle from east to west by train with a rapidity and secrecy of which the onemy has never been capable. This happened at the very beginning of the war, in aarly September, 1914. The whole of the British Expeditionary Force was moved with equal secrecy and rapidity from tho Aisne a few weeks later to the sector of Ypres. The enemy might, if he had been able to do it, have moved his troops first, he might , have done so more quickly, he had far greater numbers at his disposal. Hβ had all the rolling stock, and lines he wanted. But he is by nature slow compared with us, and this rapid handling of railways in the early days of the war closed the northern or,sea- gate against him, and completed the effect of 'tho Marne. Wβ were still grossly inferior to him in numbers, but a better handling of railways saved us. The Italians moved an immense mass of men from the Isonzo to tho Vicenza-Verona front; thoy did it deftly, nicely, most rapidly, at a calculated moment, and ruined tho enemy's Trentino offensive. The thing was done so secretly and so quickly, it went so smoothly, that it may justly be palled the best of all examples of railway work in any time or place of the great war. I was myself & witness cf the end ; of this great operation.. I. saw with my own eyes its astonishing success and the way in (which those interior lines wero used almost without disturbing the normal oivilian lifo and movement upon tbo roads and railways. It was an unforgettable experience" It is hardly necessary to obserro that the Allied superiority in the handling of railways which Mn. Belloo extols is to the full as important an asset at the present stage of the Western campaign as it was in the critical early ■days of the war. Whatever pros- , pects the Allies have of turning the enemy's retreat into a rout depend very largely upon their ability to mass troops with a rapidity and secrecy: which he is unable to emu-' late,"'