DARDANELLES REPORT

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3034, 22 March 1917, Page 5

DARDANELLES REPORT

MR ASQUITH ON HIS DEFENCE

WERE THE EXPERTS FULLY

■ CONSULTED ?

(Rec. March 21, 9.35 p.m.}

London, March 21. The House of Commons was crowded to hear Mr. Aaquith's statement regarding tho Dardanelles report. Those present included General Smuts and Sir Joseph Ward. Mr. Asquith said it would have been better to have postponed tho controversy on tlio responsibility for past events until after tho war,, but the manner of the publication of the report, and tho use to which it had been put, rendered it necessary to say something immediately, not only in his own interest and those of his colleagues on the War Council, who included distinguished members of the present Government, but in the . interests of one who was no longer able to speak for himself—Lord Kitchener. Without that evidence it was impossible for anyone to form an opinion as to the justice of the conclusions of that report. They were now told that it was not in the national interest to publish the evidenoe. He was, therefore, bound to ask, in the name of common sense and common justice,-why was not the same consideration put forward regarding the report itself? The Commissioners had expressed the opinion that the machinery of war during the first four months was clumsy nnd Jnefficiont. This was a more obiter diotum. There was no evidence that entitled them to come to such a conclusion. The first four months of I the war presented'problems as numerI ons and as complicated as had over fallen,to tho lot of statesmen. "I am quito content," he said, "to leave the manner in which they were confronted and handled to the judgmont of history. When the War i Council reached any conclusion, that conclusion was formulated in writing, and read aloud, and, for greater certainty and security, was immediately circulated to a]l .the departments concerned. The position of the experts was precisejy as it always had been in the Committee of Imperial Defence. They were there to five tho lay members the benefit of their advice'. For what other purpose were the experts summoned ? Mv political and civil colleagues, includ-1 rag the present Prime Minister, will bear me out in saying that I have I never known an expert to show the j least reluctance in giving his opinions, invited or uninvited. It is their ' duty to do so." Cabinet, he added, had never abrogated its ultimate authority in his time. It was unfortunate that Lord Kitchener had died before the Commission sat. "I asked the Attorney-General to see that Lord Kitchener's case was properly Represented. The Attorney-General saw Lord Cromer, who said there was no necessity for jthe 'Attorney-General's appeal, as Lord Kitchener's interests were amply safeguarded."

Primarily a Naval Enterprise.

The Dardanelles expedition, he continued. was primarily a naval enterprise, because i Lord Kitchener proved to the War Council that troops were not available. The War Council spent three whole days examining their available resources of men, and oven summoned Lord French from France to hear his views. The War Council also ascertained tho opinions of other British and Frenoh exports. The whole of the naval expert opinion favonred the enterprise. Lord Fisher's adverse view was not founded on _ technical naval objections, but on his avowed preferenco for a different objective in a totally different sphere.. Dealing with the alleged delay in sending troops, iiy. cludingtho Twenty-ninth Division, ho emphasised the immense difficulties which wero involved. ' Tho Russian position was then bad, and thcro was urgent pressure by General Joffro on Lord French to keep the Twenty-ninth Division. Lord Kitchener might have been right or wrong; certainly he had weighty reasons. Moreover, what would have been said if tho civilian members of the' War Council had overruled Lord Kitchener? Whilo tho operations wero proceeding ho was in almost hourly consultation with Lord | Kitchener, Viscount Crey, and Mr. Churchill. Ho therefore took strong oxepptton to the statement in tho report that tho Council had not met during tho critical period. Speaking of Mio operations generally, he maintained that those had saved tho position in the Caucasus, prevontod formonths the defection of Bulgaria., kopt three Inm-i, dred thousand lurks immobilised, destroyed tho corps d'ellto of the Turkish army, and contributed to tho reconfc favourable events in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Persia.

Mr. Churchill Explains. •Mr. Churchill, foljflwing, explained tho Admiralty's standpoint in regard to tho dicision to attach tho Dardanelles. Ho declared th:it 'ho wiis liot 'endeavouring to roliovo himself of responsibility, or transfer it to tho War Council. 'After arguing that lord Fisher, as First Sea Lord, did not exerciso his right to utiliso the Jleot at tho Dardanolloß, Mr. Churchill proceodod to strongly dofond tho operations, _ and quoted facts refuting tho Commission's references to the heavy loss of blood and treasure. On tlio. contrary, tbo advantages of the attack jaailo ilimr.jeh'OH invaluably felt in many spheres of operations, inol tiding tho aotivo adhesion of Italy to clie Allies. He referred at length, and regretfully, to tho abandonment of the operations when apparently they wore 011 tho eve of success, ajid pointed out' that this was due 1.0 the discouragement he had suffered from majiy most influential quarters, which had a hampering effeot.—Aus.-N.Z. Cable Assn.