PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3022, 8 March 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

There is a suggestion in to-day's messages of very big happenings in prospect on tho Somme front. At the northern end of this line the thrust forward towards, and north of, Bapaumo has created and israpidly narrowing a salient roughly between Arras and Gommecourt, which the enemy is likely to find a dangerous position. As the British advance progresses the German forces in the advanced portion of this salient are being gradually hemmed in until a stage is ap.proaching when retreat will be a hazardous operation. The principle followed in so many instances in tho Somme advance of thrusting forward on both sides of a given point and forcing a costly retirement of the enemy from the ground i between the flanking lines of the thrust is being developed hero with double effect. The consequence of tho advance north of and towards Bapaume, may be expected not only 'to win a dominating position which will place Bapaume at the mercy of the attackers, but to compel a retreat of the enemy forces in the salient ,to the north, and a further swing forward of the British line there. Indeed one message to-day states that reports from advance parties show that the enemy movement north-east of Gommecourt extended very considerably during the twenty-four hours' preceding the snowfall which is said to have temporarily delayed all operations. Whatever excuse may be forthcoming from the German High Command for this further rclinquishment of powerfully-built aud strongly-fortified positions which the enemy has now held for nearly two years there can no covering up of the vary significant fact that the tactics being pursued by the British commanders have been devised and planned with consummate skill. Tho blows being struck have something more than a local effect; they react on other points of the line, and ground is won in many eases almost without a shot being fired-. This must prove very demoralising to the enemy and equally encouraging to our men.' It affords further evidenco that we can not only outfight the best of the 'Kaiser's scasuned troops, but ont-gcncral the best uf bis commanders.

Turning w t-he southern eml of tho Sornmrt iiuo in the region of I'oroiiiic it s;"!J« : b increasiogl? (.■'car thai, M-ic Uc'iiieMJcms iiaUiral diftioulties. ."vca-nuiai-ed as they have been hy i.be enemy's iortincaiions, arc now V:ing ra.picijy siirniounted, and tlic movement directed at thn encircling af Pcronne proceeds with greal"! , speed than could havo been

hoped for. This is a matter of immense importance. The enemy will be hard put indeed to find excuses for a retreat from Peronne, which he has stubbornly held and which ho will bitterly fight for as long as possible. It is stated to-day that the British are closing in on ISaislains, opening the road across the Nord Canal to Mt. St. Quentin, which dominates Peronne. The capture of Moislains would be a step likely to have far-reaching effects in the movement against Peronne. Moislains is about four miles N.E. of Peronne, and about three miles N.E. of Mt. St. Quentin, a powerfully-held Gorman position, and described as tho key to Peronne. A glance at tho map shows tho significance of this advance towards Moislains, which is less than a mile distant from the Malassio spur, which the British are stated to be now occupying. Tho occupation of Moislains by our troops would carry the Peronne encircling movement to a stage which would threaten tho German lino of retreat, and would in all probability soon be followed by further "strategical retirements" by the enemy. Desperate fighting may be looked for, however, before Mouslains falls into British hands. A Gorman report to-day states that British attacks east of Bouchavesncs, probably at a point about a mile S.W. of Mousla-ins, had been repulsed. It is a German report, and later information may throw a different light on the situation, but it may at least bo taken to show thai, tho importance of our advance jn this region is compelling a stubborn resistance 'from tho lenemy. There are big, very big, possibilities for tho Al,lics in tho situation now developing at this part of tho line.

The French war critics apparently tako a more optimistic view of tho nature of tho German tactics on the Ancrc front than do the British. In the opinion of the latter, the enemy has decided to withdraw his lines with the object of shortening his front in order to save his man-power for use at some new point of attack. Tho French view is that tho Gorman retirement has been forced upon the enemy by the ■sustained and punishing pressure of the British advance. This latter contention is sound when one to-. members how much the Germans arc dependent upon tho support of their half-hearted -co-belligerents—Aus-tria, Turkey, and .Bulgaria. 'It is hardly couccivablo that the Germans*, haying regard to tho •moral and political consequences of a general retirement of a substantial n;itiire, would deliberately embark upon a course which from its very aspect would certainly damp tin; ardour of their supporters. But even if we assume that the enemy, finding his present system of frontline defence unable to withstand tho terrific violence of tho new British field armament, mqj' have devised {I now system of. defences in rear of his present front, tho retirement is still full of danger. The' pressure of the British' advance may be increased to such an extent that it will assume the character , of an inundation, sweep the retiring lines past their objective, and force them into tho open where military skill, moral, and everything elso that counts in mobilo operations will be put to a decisive test. Haig's policy is, therefore, to "keep moving"—whether tho German retirement is voluntary or not is immaterial.' In tho end it comes to the same thing—the open battle and tho decision.

Fkoji tho Eastern front comos a German rcpoi't of preparations by tho Russians for an ■ attack on a colossal scale. We may , be certain that when Russia strikes in force her Allies will not be idle on the other fronts. There have been evidences already that Italy is prepared to strike; on the Salonika front recent aerial and artillery, activity suggests possibilities of an early move; while on the Western front the recent taking over by the British of an additional twenty miles of the battle-line may mean that the French have something big in hand. _ The slush and mud of early spring still place- difficulties in the way ot action on a large scale on most parts' of the battlelines, but almost any day now we may expect momentous tidings.