PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3021, 7 March 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Pbriodic.h.U' we havo an outcry from a section of politicians and some military writers in England against the Salonika expedition — the frittering away of strength in secondary licids. There is something of the kind recorded this morning. The arguments of this section have been stated frequently and with some force by OoLONiir, Kepington, the military writer of The Time*. They may bo summed up as follows: The enemy can rcinforco_ his army in Macedonia by land quicker than we can reinforce ours by se<u Moreover, he can find and munition his troops with less effort than is possible for the Allies, who have to draw the bulk of their supplies from oversea. There is of course the submarine menace and the diversion of our shipping, which is urgently needed lor other purposes. Therefore we should concentrate our energies on the Western front—the decisive theatre.

Mji. Winston (Jhujschill's remarks on the subject of the Balkans campaign amount to a vague justification for the campaign, and at the same time a tacit endorsement of the contentions of the Western front school .of criticism. It is by this time fairly generally understood that the Allies' attack on the Dardanelles was less a matter of strategy than a matter of expediency—namely, to help .Russia's general plan of campaign. Incidentally it also was designed to relievo Egypt of Turkish aggression. Viewed from a military standpoint, the Dardanelles expedition was a diversion, and to this extent it may be said to have succeeded up to a certain point—it pinned a largo Turkish force to the Gallipoli Peninsula, and for a time created an undoubted effect on the morale of the Turkish populace/ With a diversion on a large scale there is attached a Certain risk that even if the immediate object sought is achieved the High Command may find itself by the force of unlookecl for circumstances committed to something very much bigger than was anticipated, involving a prolonged diversion and possible fiasco.

Following the Dardanelles experience came the German drive into Serbia and the organising of the Salonika expedition. Here, Mr. Churchill says in effect,' the tiling was less a matter of sound strategy than a question, of expediency. Tho Allies were morally bound to make an attempt to save Serbia. They saved her army, but, hesitating, were too late to save her territory. Having based themselves on Salonika, they, in honour bound to Serbia, Had to see it through. Mr. Churchill suggests that at' that stage it ought to have been recognised that the hour for intervention in the Balkans had passed. Bin wo stayed on—to what profit? Despite enormous difficulties as regards transport, men, and munitions, the. Allies have recreated the Serbian army, they have reconquered portion of its lost territory, exerted a sustained pressure on a front which is a direct menace to the German line of communication between Constantinople auci their own supplies, and put Greece—onlv after incredible muddlement and vacillation, it is true—out of the

reckoning as a source of trouble. It would seem practically certain now in the light of recent events that but for the presence of the Allied forces at Salonika Greece long ere this would have been found fighting on tie side of the Central Powers. And Rumania? What would have been her attitude to-day but for the presence and influence of the Allies at Salonika ? When the situation is weighed in all its bearings quite as much can be said in support of the Salonika expedition as against it. What, for instance, would have been the position to-day in Egypt and on the Southern Russian front had Greece and Rumania been permitted to drift into alliance with_ the_ Central Powers? "What possibilities would euoh a situation open up of trouble in Egypt, Persia, and possibly even India ?

No doubt it is embarrassing to maintain supplies at Salonika owing to the shortage of shipping and the danger of submarines, but even these drawbacks are being greatly minimised by the use of Italian and Greek ports on the Adriatic coast, thus shortening the overseas transport and lessening the risks from submarines. Meantime the Salonika force remains a standing and visible menace to Germany's great Berlin to Bagdad ambition.

The possibility of a shortage of reserves on the Western front suggested by one of the critics of the Salonika diversion is . undoubtedly one of gravo moment to all parts of tho Empire. That such a possibility shall not be permitted to grow into actual fact is a plain obligation which the Imperial Government is facing with conspicuous courage at tho present moment. The "combing out" process amongst the oxomptcd efficients of the earlier months of the war is being pursued in drastio fashion, and almost weekly the avenues of escape are being systematically narrowed. The Li.oyd George War Cabinet in this matter, as in so many others, has been sweeping in its action. Men and more men are being called up for service, and still more arc being sought so that thero may be no slackening in our offensive. No harm, is done by emphasising tho .importance, the gravity, of the obligation which rests on the whole Empire in this matter of maintaining its forces in tho field at their highest possible strength. Anything calculated to stimulate effort in this direction should bo welcomed. Hut so far as Britain is concerned it is quite clear that at the present time more thau at. any previous stiigo of tho war those in authority arc exerting themselves to tho fullest possible extent to ensure that every available man shall bo called up and trained to tako his place in tho firing line.

Theru is little news to-day of ar.tivitics on the various fronts, but such as there is affords grounds for satisfaction. In tbo Somme region, we are told, tho first phase ol the German retirement has been completed, and the new. lines taken up by the enemy are already under pressure. There is little or no respite for the oncmy on this front, and the moral effect of the incessant battering, the capturing of his seemingly impregnable positions and his own enforced retirement must count with increasing force.