The Dominion. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1917. THE ROAD TO VICTORY.

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3005, 16 February 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1917. THE ROAD TO VICTORY.

Sib Douglas Haig has departed from' his .customary reserve to make an arresting pronouncement upon the war outlook. "This year," lie is reported in a cable message to-day to have said, "will see Germany beaten. Peace will only come with our absolute victory." The distinction drawn between Germany's unmistakable military defeat and the conditions which will restore peace is obvious and necessary. Germany has been already defeated in her main purpose, but even if her armies were driven out-of the territory they, have- invaded it would not necessarily follow that the Allies had won the peace they are lighting for. Many things have been put to the test since the war began, but a thing that has still to be tested is the'ability of the German people to continue a hopeless war without prospects, and merely for the sake of postponing an inevitable fate. Events may quite possibly show that the two questions which Sib Douglas Haig has judiciously separated —that of the enemy's patent defeat and that of his total submission and collapse—in fact, go hand in hand. It is not at all unlikely that such a defeat of the German armies as Sib Douglas Haig foreshadows may bo followed speedily by the surrender of the Germanic Alliance. But a bare possibility at least exists that Germany and her vassals may elect to fight to the last ditch in a defensive Avar, and it is necessary meantimo to draw a distinction between the victorious forward sweep of the Entente armies, which may be confidently expected this year, and the absolute victory which will set a period to their heroic efforts. What Sib Douglas Haig moans when lie says that this_. year_ will show Germany beaten is indicated in the context of his statement. "Wo havo reached," he said, "the maximum of our munitions output, and can supply more than the Allies need. We will break the German front severely at several points'. The Germans are powerfully entrenched, but we intend to strike with our full force until wo have achieved . tho total destruction of the German army." The British Commander-in-Chief does not commit himself to time otherwise than in the confident prediction that this year will make Germany's defeat manifest, but no less hopeful interpretation can reasonably bo put upon his words than that he believes tho Allies will this year break through tho fortified front in' the Western theatre which tho Germans have proudly declared to bo impregnable. Such a belief certainly seems to be warranted by tho events of last year. The.German strategic reserve was immolated at Verdun, and subsequently divisions constituting more than half the total German army were heavily defeated as they vainly tried to hold some of the strongest positions in the fortified Western line. Tho magnitude of the defeat inflicted upon tho enemy last year is only a part of the picture. It is a further and most important guarantee of ultimate success that tho Allies, long before last year's offensive died down, had elaborated a now tactical method under which they aro able to develop their attack, inflicting greater losses than they suffer. Equally as regards tho Western theatre and the wider field of tho whole war, tho question whichholds attention at the present time is not whether this will be a year of defeat for.. the enemy, but how far his defeat will bo carried. What is known about the pitch of propara-1 tion reached in Russia and in Italy and by the Allied forces in the Balkans and in minor theatres makes it as certain as anything can bo, in. war that this will be a year of defeat and disaster for tho enemy in all theatres. As to tho degree of success possible, however, much must' depend upon the skill with which the Allies use and apply tho tremendous superiority in force they have now developed. It is not to be forgotten that they aro, and have been, hampered in some degreo by the physical separation between east and west and the difficulty of conforming their measures with the utmost advantage to a common plan. As one writer put it recently, a con'fedcration has the obvious disadvantage of replacing immediate decision by conference, and single action by multiple action. The Germanic Alliance is to a_ great extent immune from these disadvantages. Not only do Germany and the countries with which she is allied form a. continuous block of territory, Iwith continuous land communications, but tho nature of the Prus_eiaja oi£ariiiga,iaon. _jsqsa„i!a_r, _to

eliminate the element of divided control. These are considerations of importance at the present stage of tho war, when the Allies are on the eve of a, maximum effort, as they havo been sinco ' the war began. Even from this .standpoint, however, the 'outlook is full of promise. Statesmen and soldiers of all flic Allied countries have laboured untiringly and not without success to promote that flexible but assured co-ordination which will enable tho Sntcnle to reap the maximum return for a, given effort. In a iiumbcrof instances, of which tho invasion of Rumania is the latest example, Entente co-ordination has failed. But there arc- vastly more important items to bo set down on the opposite sido of the account. Though tho measure of co-ordina-tion- now possible has been achieved by stages, the Allies from the earliest days of the war displayed a superiority in military skill and leadership—a better mastery of the art of war—which in no small dcgreo atoned for the lack of perfected co-ordination and limited tho illeffects arising from the all but total isolation of one member of tho Entente group. It was only last year that the Allies reached, even in the Western theatre, a superiority in material resources, but from the first days of tho war they showed themselves superior to tho enemy in what has been called "the element of technical skill and moral, ranging from tho capacity of commanders down through tho training of the troops and their spirit." It was not material resources that won the Battle of the Marno or enabled the Russians to escape disaster in a retreat which is without parallel in military-history. The failures ol German leadership are equally plain to all the world. The attack on tho Yser, the ■ Verdun offensive, and the attempt to break into Italy from the /Trentino arc such enterprises as need only bo repeated,, and that not very often, to bring the army undertaking them to disaster. Even now the Allies havo difficult problems to solve in order to achieve the best results of concerted action, but, taking past experience as a guide, they are capable of making very much moro effective use of superior resources than the enemy did in his days of power and predominance. The Allies have time and again won ■brilliant success in this war when odds in numbers and material were heavily against them. Not one such afhievement stands to the credit of tho enemy. To the attributes which havo made such a balance possible the Allies have now added an even greater superiority in material resources than was formerly enjoyed by the enemy. These are facts in which Germany's doom is very plainly written.