The Dominion. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1917. PROSPECTS IN THE BALKANS

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3004, 15 February 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1917. PROSPECTS IN THE BALKANS

Though events in Greece aro moving less rapidly 'than could ho desired, tho general outlook in the , .Balkans has unmistakably improved during tho last six weeks. At the beginning of that period it was leai-ed that as a, sequel to the enemy's success in Rumania, General Sar- ■ Sail's army in Macedonia would bo attacked in front aud roar, tho Greek Royalists co-operating with tho Germans and Bulgarians. Ik, is now evident that this' expectation rested upon an unduly high estimate- of the strength tho enemy is able to bring to bear in the southeastern theatre- even during the present comparative lull on the main fronts. Present indications are that ■the Teutonic invasion of Rumania has petered out. For weeks tho enemy forces have been marking timo opposite the Sercth line, and it cannofc be supposed that they are doing so from choice, or that Mackejjsen i s , satisfied with the front .P'ohas reached. On tho route of the Eumanian central railway ho is well placed to hold his ground, but towards tho east, in tlio region of the Danube, the Russo-Rumanians hold an area south of the Sereth which may yet stand them in good stead as tho sally-port for a coun-ter-offensive. It is a state of affairs which] suggests that tho enemy has not come to a halt on a selected line, but was brought to a halt when tho Allies had sufficiently made good the deficiencies in artillery and munitions which compelled them to abandon all Wallachia and the Dobrudja to the invader. As to Macedonia, it does not seem likely now • that the enemy will attempt an offensive in that quarter, and if ho does the enterprise will hold much less dangerous possibilities than, it would have held a few weeks ago. It was the prospect of a treacherous attack by the Greek Royalists upon the rear of the Allied army that made the situation in Macedonia critical, and in the interval a good deal has been done towards bringing Constantine and his faction under control. Mr. Bonak Law, who last spoke on the subject with authority, stated that the Anglo-French commanders believed that in the event of a Gcrman-Bulgai- offensive- the danger of attack in rear would be nothing liko what it was a few weeks ago. Presumably active measures will be taken to as speedily as possible eliminate this danger entirely. Such a stock-taking as is now possible must lead to the conclusion that_ tho enemy is far from having attained tho objects with which he presumably opened his south-eastern offensive, and which would havejustified the outlay of strength involved. Too muoh might easily be made of tho enemy's success in Rumania as tending to hamper and impedo effective action by the Allies in the Balkans. It was remarked some time ago that Falkenhayn and Mackensen Between them had widened tho Balkan corridor into a spacious hall, but it is rather moro to tho_ purpose that the net result of their eftorts, so far as position and territory aro concerned, has been to reduce to three hundred miles the additional front the enemy is called upon to hold this year as compared with .his front of last summer. To-day the main East ■front stretches over a distance of a thousand miles, from tho Gulf of Riga to tho mouth of the Danube. Tho enemy, of course, is better placed than if Rumania had contrived to stem invasion on her frontiers, but an additional threo hundred miles of front will impose a far ■ more serious tax upon his resources than upon those of the Allies, more especially as the Rumanian army is being reorganised and equipped, and will presently be a factor of considerable importance. Meantime-, in Greece the Allies have gone far towards creating the conditions which will give them complete liberty of action from that country as a base. There- is much in tho position revealed to discredit tho opinion freely .and persistently ventilated in a section of the British Press that a vigorous offensive policy in tho Balkans is unwise, because it involves an undue diversion of strength from the decisive Western theatre. There is surface plausibility in this contention, but it is really more remarkable for what it ignores than for what it asserts. It is obviously necessary that the enemy should bo attacked in superior force where- ho is strongest, but it is absurd to carry this argument to the point of maintaining that for the sake of attacking hint where ho is strongest he must bo left alone whore ho is weakest and most vulnerable. Colonel Repington, and those who sharo his views, are fond of insisting that it is on tho West front and not in tho Balkans that Britain must concentrate her main effort, but this is bogging the real question. No one has been foolish enough to urge that Britain should transfer her main effort to tho Balikans. It is as an entcrpriso sub-

, sidiary unci HUripliunentiWy ti> the 1,-iHack upon Uio enemy in the main theatres thai, a vigorous offensive in tho . BfUkii-ns hus claims lo reco«nilion. Tho. divr-.rsion of form which j the ontcvprise. entail:* k much exaggerated by it? British critics a.iid opponents. Many of Uicni sin-ale only i.if the call entailed upon liriltsli resources), 'and point, out how much easier it is to assemble and supply British troops in I'iciirdy than iu the Serbian mountains, lint Uio diversion of slrongtli argument, loBCn most of >(.« force when it is remembered that British troops constitute only a part of Geneis.u. Sα i:iuii,'h army, and that it includes also French, Serbian, and Italian contingents, a- small force of Russians, and four or livo Greek divisions raised by the Provisional Government at Salonika. The Serbs and Greeks an> fighting in their natural theatre, and Italy is at no such extreme disadvantage as Great Britain, iu conducting a Balkan campaign. A uumber of small ports on tho Adriatic coast are available to Italy as depots. These have been developed, and tho roads leading into the, interior country improved, and Italy is likely to take a very important part in tho campaign as it develops. A survey of prospects in the Balkans opens up very wido questions, but these prospects arccertainly brightened, by the fact/ that tho enemy will be called upon to meet attacks of unprecedented weight and power this year in tho main theatres. Giving duo heed to this dominating fact, and taking account also of tho extent to whieti Turkey is involved in her own territory, it is a reasonable expectation that tho Bulgarians will bo left • almost unassisted to cope with Genkbali Sakkail's offensive when it is launched. In that caso it should nob be impossiblo for tho Allies to advance- as rapidly through, the Balkans as the enemy did at the end of 1915. Certainly as affairs aro shaping no theatre seems to offer a, more profitable return for a given effort.